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THE ANALYSIS OF BELIEF
By
MAN WAR BENTLEY
SUMMARY
The analysis of belief is concerned with what Russell calls 
'prepositional attitudes* which are expressed by, e.g., 'Othello 
believes that Desdemona loves Cassio', or knows that ^*, *A wishes 
that 2* » etc. The logical difficulties involved are many. Thus in 
'A believes that 2*> what does 'that 2 ' correspond to if it is false?
It cannot be a fact. Since 'believes* is a two-place predicate, then 
it expresses a relation between two singular terms and 'that 2 ’ must 
be an entity. But philosophers disagree about whether 'that 2 ' is a 
proposition, a sentence, or a statement, and whether there is any 
difference between them.
Other problems are posed by the rules of elementary logic - those 
of quantification, truth-functions, and identity. 'A believes that 2 ’ 
is obviously not truth-functional. It also transgresses against the laws 
of quantification and identity because even if has the same truth- 
value as '2 S  the substitution of *q* for '2  ^ in 'A believes that 2 * 
will affect the letter's truth-value. No two terms are synonymous and 
inter-substitutable because synonymy, analyticity, and prepositional 
identity are unclear concepts. These logical problems result from the 
application of logical rules which were originally devised for mathemat­
ical language. Natural language is quite different in that prepositional" 
attitude and performative utterances are the norm and atomic sentences 
such as 'Socrates is mortal* are 'implicit' propositional-attitude and 
performative sentences with the prefix 'I know that', 'I fear that',
•I state that', etc., deleted or understood. Standard logical rules 
can no longer be applied to the analysis of implicit or explicit 
propositional-attitude or performative sentences.
An alternative solution is to regard expressions of prepositional 
attitudes and performatives as couched in meta-language - when they 
need not obey the rules of standard logic. Either solution will free
the analysis from some of its traditional logical problems.
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THE ANALYSIS. OF BELIEF 
INTRODUCTION
According to Frege,^the aim of logic is to 'discern the laws of truth'.
He speaks of the laws of truth in the same sense as he speaks of the laws
of nature, i.e., as the 'generalization of natural occurrences with which
the occurrences are always in accordance'. This is, to him, not a matter
of wha^ t happens so much as what is. He is concerned to show that logic is
not psychology and gives to logic the task of 'discovering the laws of
truth, not of assertion or thought'. The truth that he is interested in is
that 'whose recognition is the goal of science'. But while the word 'true',
as Frege says, indicates the aim of logic as does 'beautiful' that of
aesthetics or 'good' that of ethics, 'it is probable that the content of
the word 'true' is unique and indefinable*. Nevertheless we do speak of
sentences being true even though we really mean that it is the sense
of a sentence that is true and by the 'sense' of a sentence Frege means
the 'thought' which is expressed by the sentence. Frege is careful to point
out that he is not using the word 'sentence* here in a purely grammatical
sense where it also includes subordinate clauses. An isolated subordinate
clause, he says, does not always have a sense about which the question of
truth can arise, whereas the complex sentence to which it belongs has such
a sense. What Frege calls a 'thought* philosophers nowadays call a 'pro*.-
position* and 'a proposition is something which is, or might be, propounded,
either in the way of assertion or in some other way, and is, or might be,
2thought or supposed, whether propounded or not*. Thus Strawson states 
one of the current positions taken on the subject of propositions.
If the word 'true* is indefinable, can it be that it is redundant? Frege 
anticipates Ramsey by considering this question when he says: 'It is also 
worthy of notice that the sentence "I smell the smell of violets'* has just 
the same content as the sentence "It is true that I smell the scent of 
violets". So it seems then that nothing is added to the thought by my 
ascribing to it the property of truth. And yet is it not a great result
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when the scientist after much hesitation and careful inquiry can finally
say "What I supposed is true"?’ Ramsey,^however, considers that the word
•true' serves no purpose. Without agreeing with Frege, Strawson modifies
Ramsey’s position by saying that ’the difference between saying, e.g.,
"If 2 , then ..." and saying "If it is true that 2» tben ..." is that in
the latter case we show ourselves thinking of the proposition that 2  as
something that may be (or has been) propounded or thought independently
of our current expression of it, and hence as a possible subject of predi-. •
dation. We could approximate our sense, depending on the case, by something
like "If, as has been (may be) thought (said), 2 » then ...". In general,
then, when "true" is predicated, there is an allusion to an actual or
possible propounding or thinking of some proposition*.^
In analysing the different kinds of sentences, Frege comes to the
conclusion that the indicative and interrogative sentences have something
in common, i.e., the same thought (proposition), but they differ in the
interrogative*s containing a request and the indicative's containing an
assertion. An indicative sentence for Frege expresses not only the thought
or proposition but also the recognition of truth seen in the 'assertive
force'-^of the sentence. While the Fregean thought or proposition is
'immaterial*^it is not an idea belonging only to the bearer in the way that
a sense impression belongs only to the bearer of the sense impression and
to nobody else. Nor is the Fregean proposition a 'thing of the outer world
in the way that a strawberry or a lime tree is. The Fregean proposition
belongs to a 'third realm*^in which the Pythagorean theorem is 'timelessly 
9true', true independently of whether anyone takes it to be true. As Frege 
says, 'It is not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is like 
a planet which, already before anyone has seen it, has been in interaction 
with other planets'*^^When one sees a thing, Frege further explains, 'one 
has an idea, one apprehends or thinks a thought. When one apprehends or 
thinks a thought one does not create it but only comes to stand in a 
certain relation, which is different from seeing a thing or having an idea.
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to what already existed beforehand.’^ ^In other words, Prege believes that
propositions are discovered by us whereas ideas or sense impressions are
part of our consciousness, the inner world. He distinguishes between what
is part of my consciousness, which may be an idea, and what is an object
of my thought, which is not an idea, but to which I, the discoverer, can
stand in some sort of relation. As he says, 'Therefore that about which I
state something is not necessarily my idea'. He goes on to say, 'I have
an idea of myself but I am not identical with this idea. What is a content
of my consciousness, my idea, should be sharply distinguished from what is
an object of my thought. Therefore the thesis that only what belongs to the
content of my consciousness can be the object of my awareness, of my
12thought, is false.' The process of reasoning by which Frege comes to 
posit a third realm or world is this. When two people have visual impress­
ions of a tree and agree that it is the same tree even though their sense 
impressions are slightly different and cannot, by the nature of things, be 
compared within the same consciousness, their agreement rests on a mutual 
acknowledgement of the same outer world which goes beyond their sense 
impressions. This is acknowledgement of a non-sensible but perceptible 
world which enables both the inner world of ideas and the outer world of 
perceptible material things to make sense of one another and which can also 
explain how one may have thoughts whose objects are neither sensible nor 
material. This third world links together the ideal world of sense impress­
ions and the real world of material things, but though the third world is 
non-sensible, it is not real in the way that trees and stones are, but it 
is still real according to Prege in being able to influence action such as
when the grasping of the Pythagorean theorem has the consequence of our
13applying it and bringing about the acceleration of masses. Thought can 
also be communicated, he says, from person to person and influence events 
as a result. What is even more important to Frege about thought is that it 
is changeless or timeless in itself and is not affected when it is passed
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from one person to another or when it is apprehended hy anyone or not. Its 
expression in the words of a sentence will remain timeless so long as the 
time and place of utterance or writing are indicated within the sentence.
Per example, in the indicative sentence 'The tree there is covered with 
green leaves', the thought or utterance is not complete unless the time 
and place of thought or utterance are shown, in which case it is an eternal, 
unchanging sentence. But, Prege warns, if we use the mere form of the indic­
ative sentence, avoiding the word 'true', two things must he distinguished, 
the expression of the thought and the assertion. The time-indication, he 
says, that may he contained in the sentence belongs only to the expression 
of the thought, while the truth, whose recognition lies in the form of the 
indicative sentence, is timeless.
It is as a result of Prege's insight that twentieth century philosophers
have concentrated on the study of the sentence as the unit of meaning rather
than the isolated word. But Prege realized early on that there is a type
of indicative sentence - i.e., reported speech - which presents rather
difficult problems. Por example, in the two sentences 'Copernicus believed
that the planetary orbits are circles' and 'Copernicus believed that the
apparent motion of the sun is produced by the real motion of the earth',
one subordinate clause can be substituted for the other without harm to the
truth of each complex sentence. The reason for this is that the main clause
and the subordinate clause of each sentence together have as their sense
only a single thought, and the truth of the whole includes neither the
truth nor the untruth of the subordinate clause. As Prege put it, 'It is
indifferent to the truth of the whole whether the subordinate clause is 
15true or false.♦ ^Although the truth of the whole sentence is not affected, 
still the problem remains • \ how to analyse the subordinate clause.
In the sentence 'John thinks that Venus is the Morning Star', 'the Morning 
Star' cannot in general be replaced by 'the Evening Star' without falsi­
fying the original statement, even though the Evening Star is the same
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Venus as the Morning Star and all three are identical, i.e., are one and 
the same planet. The crucial point here is that when John thinks that Venus 
is the Morning Star we have no way of knowing whether he also thinks that 
Venus is the Evening Star and, indeed, if he is aware that they are all 
one and the same planet. Hence in this case it would be illegitimate to 
substitute another subordinate clause for 'that Venus is the Morning Star' 
since we are given only one sentence about what John thinks. In the above 
case of Copernicus, however, we are given two sentences describing two of 
his beliefs and Prege is right to consider that the truth of each whole 
sentence is not affected if one subordinate clause is substituted for the 
other since Copernicus believed both, i.e., 'that the apparent motion of the 
sun is produced by the real motion of the earth' and 'that the planetary 
orbits are circles'. The point is further clarified if we consider the 
following examples:
(a) Mark said: 'I am tired out.'
(b) Mark said that he was exhausted.
Although Mark did not use the word 'exhausted' all native speakers of English 
would agree that 'exhausted' means the same as 'tired out' and (b) says the 
same thing as (a). Of course, if Mark is a child of three and has never 
come across the word 'exhausted', there is a sense in which it would not be 
correct to report him as saying that he was 'exhausted'. As Nelson Goodman 
says, discourse varies from discourse and the likeness of meaning required 
of two predicates will vary with the discourse.^^Consider the examples:
(c) Richard said: 'I like a glass of Scotch.*
(d) Richard said that he liked a glass of whisky.
(d) is not reporting correctly what Richard said, for a man who likes Scotch 
may not like any other sort of whisky. In fact, if Richard is a discrimin­
ating drinker he will not wish to drink any whisky unless it is Scotch.
Again consider the examples:
(e) Tony said: 'I enjoy any view that includes shimmering water in 
the distance.'
(f) Tony said that he enjoyed any view that included shimmering HgO 
in the distance.
(f) is not a correct report of what Tony said in (e) even though water is 
indeed because Tony not only may not know the scientific fact but, even 
if he did, is unlikely to use 'H^O' in the context, (b) is a more correct 
translation of (a) than is (d) of (c) or (f) of (e). Indeed, one may 
say that they are in descending order of acceptability or of correctness, 
for it is common knowledge that ’tired out’ is the English equivalent of 
•exhausted* and so there is less danger of misleading others with the 
substitution of 'exhausted* for 'tired out'. In the case of 'Scotch' and 
•whisky', no one who likes 'Scotch* would like a glass of just 'whisky' 
in place of 'Scotch'. In the case of (e) and (f), the knowledge that 'water* 
is ’HgO’ is even less common while 'shimmering HgO* does not convey the same 
meaning as 'shimmering water'. Hence the problems of reported or indirect
speech are related to the context of utterance.
Then there is the matter of Frege's third world in which when one 
thinks or apprehends a thought one does not create it but stands in a certain 
relation to it. If it is possible for the thinker to stand in a relation to 
the thought or proposition, then, according to established logical theory, 
the proposition must be an entity of some sort so that a relation can be 
maintained between it and the thinker. In other words, the proposition must 
exist in some form and, if so, what is its form? In today's terminology, 
has it got any ontological status and, if so, what sort of ontological 
status? This is a matter of controversy with its participants ranging from 
those who deny the existence of any such thing as a thought or proposition 
to those who accept it as a metaphysical entity.
Furthermore, if there is such a thing as a proposition, and a true 
proposition is, as Prege says, a 'fact', what is a false proposition then?
If there is no fact to make it true, can there be a proposition at all? If 
a false belief is not a proposition, then what can it be? Russell and Moore
are very occupied with this point as we will see.
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Even if one eschews propositions and speaks only of sentences, as
Quine prefers to do, other difficulties loom up. Sentences are grammatical
units and there are examples of perfectly correct sentences which make no
17sense, e.g., Russell's 'Quadruplicity drinks procrastination' and
Carnap's 'This stone is thinking about Vienna'.These are sentences, it
is true, but neither Russell nor Quine would consider them to mean anything,
that is to say, the sentences are meaningless, although Quine prefers to .
classify them as false rather than meaningless, thus preserving the standard
truth values, truth and falsity, as well as supporting the use of sentences
instead of propositions. The advocates of propositions, however, have sought
to justify their stand by pointing out that one can say the same thing in
different languages such as 'II pleut’ in French and 'It is raining’ in
English. They claim that if one wishes to refer to what has been said in
both sentences, one has to employ the term 'proposition' rather than
'sentence', Strawson, for instance, supports the existence of propositions
when he says that propositions are needed as a 'possible subject of predi*?.
Cation'. Ayer, too, makes the same point when he says: 'And it is necessary
to have such a word in order that one may be able to refer to the meaning
19of sentences without having to specify them particularly'. Those who 
disagree with Strawson and Ayer point out that even if the word 'proposition' 
is necessary, it need have no more ontological status than the word 'question' 
which is generally recognized as a linguistic terra that involves no meta­
physical considerations.
A further difficulty relates to Quine’s well-known opposition to 
propositions. Even if one admits propositions to one's ontology, the 
difficulty is still not overcome, for how can one specify their identity
and individuation? It is one of Quine's logical precepts that there should
20be no entity without identity. Inter-related with the lack of identity of 
propositions is their indeterminacy of meaning. Words do not have a fixed 
meaning, for even dictionary meanings are no arbiter of word-meaning since 
they are mere compilations of what people at different times have used the
words to mean. At the other extreme there are those who believe that no 
two words ever have the same meaning, even when they are identical 
inscriptions or utterances and so for them there is no possibility of 
translation or substitution of one statement for another.
If it is true that no two expressions express the same meaning, then
certain problems arise. One is the impossibility of translating one
expression into another, even within the same language. Por example, one
cannot use reported speech to convey another’s meaning, A worse problem
is that no communication is at all possible if one believes that even
identical inscriptions or identical utterances do not convey the same
meaning. Thus, according to this theory, if A says ’The sun is shining’
and B repeats ’The sun is shining*, they are saying different things
and so the meaning of what they say is different. But it is generally
acknowledged that 'meaning* is an unclear word and to say that one
expression has the 'same meaning' as another is to say something equally
unclear. Another approach to the problem is required that does not have
any bearing on whether expressions have the same meaning or not. Quine
puts forward his theory.of the 'indeterminacy of translation* to show that
it is a hopeless task to look for expressions that have the same meaning.
His *gavagai-rabbit' example is meant to show that one can usefully
correlate ’rabbit’ with 'gavagai' even though it is not certain whether
’gavagai' refers to a whole rabbit or a rabbit-part. As Quine puts it':
’The empirical meanings of typical statements about the external world
21are inaccessible and ineffable'. Because of this indeterminacy of 
empirical meaning, Quine believes that two languages may be translated 
into one another in numerous ways, all of which may be compatible with all 
the evidence and so he thinks that there is no reason to regard any of 
the translations as more correct than the others. In translating one 
language into another, Quine considers that we are not describing a 
further realm of reality - we are merely correlating two comprehensive
M  ^  .
theories concerning all there is, that is to say, concerning our theory 
of nature. But, according to Quine, our theory of nature is under-deter­
mined simply because several mutually incompatible theories of nature 
would still be compatible with the evidence. In the end we choose 
some theories rather than others not because they are true and the others 
are not, but simply because of ,their over-all simplicity as well as other 
factors. Such a theory would circumvent any dogmatism to which we may 
be inclined but it could also lead to scepticism. However, Quine thinks 
that, despite this, there is reason to believe that the sentences of 
well-confirmed theories are true and that the entities assumed by them 
do exist.
Lastly, there is the difficult problem of the relation of language 
to belief. Several questions arise out of this. Can one have a belief 
without the use of language? The issue of private language seems to 
provide an approach to a solution of this vexed question. The notion of 
belief in 'I believe that 2 ’ involves the notion of concepts which, by 
their nature, involve rules for classification purposes. Does it make 
sense to have private rules only for oneself to observe? Ayer would say 
so, but followers of Wittgenstein would not. The debate flourishes and 
spills over to dumb animals which, some claim, have linguistic ability 
and even rationality but which, according to other philosophers, have 
neither language nor any rational capacity comparable to human language 
or human rational ability.
In trying to follow the lines of analysis marked out by Prege and 
Russell in the study of logic, one is led inevitably into the most 
controversial philosophical problems of the day. But if one were to draw 
together the opposing threads of argument, one could see that they point 
to the source of these difficulties, problems, and controversies — i.e., 
the sharp distinction made by Frege and others between one form of cate­
gorical statement as exemplified in 'John goes to-school* and another
form of categorical statement exemplified in 'John believes that his
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school is the best'. No such sharp distinction can be made if one
accepts the consensus of modern scientific opinion that all knowledge
is relative and probablistic since the findings of science often change
as a result of successful experiments. Certainly, if one also agrees
22with Quine that no knowledge is immune to revision, including even 
the law of excluded middle - so' long the bastion of logical theory - 
then all categorical statements of any form can be seen as expressions 
of belief or of other prepositional attitudes with some of them, like 
'John likes football' classified as 'implicit' expressions and others, 
like 'John believes that Mark is a great footballer', classified as 
'explicit' expressions, 'Implicit' expressions of prepositional attitudes 
should therefore be made 'explicit' before they are analysed. Their 
analysis can no longer be expected to be in conformity with the rules 
of standard logic which were devised not for natural language but for 
mathematics,
A possible second approach to the analysis of prepositional attitudes 
is to consider expressions of prepositional attitudes as meta-language 
which cannot be subject to the rules of first level standard logic. This 
will be seen to apply to sentences in direct speech as much as to those 
of indirect speech even though the analysis of sentences in direct 
speech have not been considered by some logicians to be as problematic 
as those in indirect speech.
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I. PROPOSITIONS AND FACTS 
If the aim of logic is, as Frege claims, the study of what is true 
and truth is predicated of propositions, and a proposition is, according 
to Strawson, something which is, or might he, propounded, either in the 
way of assertion or in some other way, and is, or might he, thought 
or supposed, whether propounded or not, then prepositional logic is 
largely concerned with the proposition as the denotation of the sentence,
i.e., as the entity, if any, of which the sentence is a symbol. Propos­
itions are denoted by the variables ’2 ', etc., and their combin­
ations, It is propositions that are true or false and the sentences that 
express them are their 'names’. But there is little consensus of opinion 
as to what propositions really are. Theories on propositions abound and 
the analysis of propositional attitudes is very much tied up with whether 
there are propositions or not, 'Propositional attitudes'^ is the 
expression first used by Russell to describe 'occurrences such as 
believing, doubting, desiring, etc., which are naturally described by 
•sentences containing subordinate sentences, e.g., "I think it will 
rain."'. Other examples are 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves 
Cassio', 'John knows that Mark has returned home', 'Sara wishes that 
she could go to the party’, 'Richard doubts that Harry has been telling 
the truth', 'Mary says that everything has gone wrong', i.e., 'A believes 
that 2*5 *A knows that 2 *» *A wishes that 2 '> ^nd so on. In the following 
pages, the problems raised and solutions discussed in the analysis of 
belief will be taken to apply also in the analysis of any other pro- 
positional attitude. Russell realizes that the problem of belief 'is not 
very easy and it has not been much dealt with or discussed. Practically 
nobody has until quite lately begun to consider the problem of the nature 
of belief with anything like a proper logical apparatus and therefore 
one has very little to help one in any discussion and so one has to be 
content on many points at present with pointing out difficulties rather
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2than laying down quite clear solutions'. That was said in I9I8 and even 
today, after sixty-odd years of logical analysis, a clear solution is 
still far to seek.
When Russell was under the spell of Meinong, he believed that 
propositions had being as is evident in the following:
''Being' is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every 
possible object of thought - in short to everything that can possibly 
occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions 
themselves Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimaeras, and 
four-dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were not entities 
of a kind, we could make no propositions about them. Thus being is a 
general attribute of everything, and not to mention anything is to 
show that it is'.^
Russell was not alone in taking up such an extreme position, Moore 
shared his realist view and continued to hold it long after Russell had 
given it up, For instance, Moore wrote:
'"That the sun is hot is a true proposition" = "That the sun is 
hot is a fact", because both = the plain "The sun is hot"; and the sun 
was hot before anyone said so (or thought so) .
thus claiming that the proposition exists independently of thought. Even 
J.S. Mill, for whom 'proposition' means sentence, found that what a 
proposition 'puts into words' is not just a belief or disbelief, but 
'whatever can be the object' of a belief or disbelief. He distinguishes 
between 'the state of mind called Belief' and 'what is believed', 
between the 'fact of entertaining' a 'doctrine or opinion' and the 
doctrine or opinion entertained, between 'assent' and 'what is assented 
to'. It is to this 'objective' factor - 'not ••• the act of believing, 
but ... the thing believed' - that he refers throughout when he asks 
the question, 'What is the immediate object of belief in a Proposition? 
What is the matter of fact signified by it? What is it to which, when I 
assert the proposition, I give my assent, and call upon others to give
— 14 —
theirs? What is that which is expressed by the form of discourse called
a Proposition, and the conformity of which to fact constitutes the truth
of that proposition?*
Thus the realist position on propositions was fairly commonplace.
Still following Meinong^ Russell and Moore accepted facts as a sub-class
of propositions called 'objectives’ and, although Russell renounced the
reality of propositions very soon, he continued to believe in facts as
7late as 1959 when he wrote My Philosophical Development! Apart from a
Qtemporary lapse, Moore went on believing in the reality of propositions 
and facts as part of the furniture of the universe. Unfortunately, Moore's 
particular style of philosophising is on the whole very muddling and 
his many statements about beliefs, facts, propositions, and truth are 
both confused and confusing. Commenting on it, Marnook has this to say;
• 'To attend very carefully and honestly, to direct at what is before 
one a steady, straight, unsophisticated look, is in general an admirable 
practice; but it can also be disastrous, or at least unfruitful, if in 
fact there are unresolved uncertainties as to what one is supposed to be 
attending to at least part of what is amiss is that careful attention 
is partly wrongly, partly indeterminately aimed'.^
In his first attempt to analyse belief, Russell^^ contrasts it with 
knowledge. As far as things are concerned, he says, we either know them 
or not know them, but in the case of belief, what we believe may be true 
or false and false beliefs are held just as strongly as true beliefs,
Plato pointed this out long ago and put it even more strongly. Whoever
believes something, Plato declares, believes it to be true and it is there-
11 12 fore true for him. Perhaps this is the reason why Prior thinks that
the philosophical problems raised by the fact that what we think may be
false are in themselves insignificant (Prior's italics). But to Russell
the logical difference between knowledge and belief lies in the fact that
while knowledge is a relation between two genuine objects, the knower
and the fact known, belief is not a two-termed relation between the
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believer and the fact or falsehood believed. Thus Othello’s belief that 
Desdemona loves Cassio is not a relation between Othello and Desdemona*s 
love for Cassio because there is no such object as ’Desdemona.'s love 
for Cassio*, since the belief is false. Nor can it be said that Othello's 
belief is a relation to a different object, i.e., 'that Desdemona loves 
Cassio' since Desdemona does not love Cassio. If there were a relation 
between Othello and a single object, then there would have to be 
objective falsehoods, subsisting independently of any minds. This, Russell 
thinks, is a theory not logically refutable, but is to be avoided if 
possible, presumably because of the principle of Occam's Razor. He there­
fore analyses Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio as a relation 
of four terms with the relation called 'believing' knitting together the 
four terms Othello, Desdemona, Cassio, and loving. If Othello's belief 
is true, then there is a complex unity 'Desdemona’s love for Cassio*, 
but if the belief is false then there is no such unity. In other words, 
until you have discovered whether a belief is true or not, you cannot tell 
whether there is a complex unity knit together or not. Wittgenstein 
rejects this multiple theory for reasons which will be examined later.
In his second theory of belief,Russell continues with his 
distinction between true and false beliefs and their relation to facts 
and propositions. This is what he means by a fact;
'When I speak of a fact - I do not propose to attempt an exact
definition, but an explanation, so that you will know what I am talking
about - I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false.
If I say "It is raining", v;hat I say is true in a certain condition of
weather and is false in other conditions of weather. The condition of
weather that makes my statement true (or false as the case may be), is
what I shall call a "fact". Further on he says: 'What I call a fact
is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a
15single name like "Socrates".’ Facts are for Russell as much part of 
the 'real world' as 'particular chairs and tables'. Facts can be
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asserted, denied, desired, willed, or questioned, but they cannot be
named* 'Propositions are not names for facts' (Russell's italics) -
something he admits he has learned from Wittgenstein.^^
For the purposes of logic, Russell says, 'it is natural to concentrate
upon the proposition as the thing which is going to be our typical vehicle
on the duality of truth and falsehood. A proposition, one might say, is a
sentence in the indicative, a sentence asserting something, not questioning
or commanding or wishing. It may also be a sentence of that sort preceded
by the word "that". For example, "That Socrates is alive", "That two and
two are four", "That two and two are five", anything of that sort will be 
17a proposition'. He also says that 'a sentence (or a proposition) is the
proper symbol for a fact'^^ but it is a 'complex symbol in having parts
19which are also symbols'.^
In this second theory of Russell's, true and false beliefs alike are
20said to have facts as their 'objectives', but the true ones point
towards the objectives and the false ones point away from them. This is
21a variant of Wittgenstein's theory in the Tractatus where propositions
(i.e. sentences) are 'pictures of facts' which may represent or misrepres­
ent the facts they depict, and this representation or misrepresentation 
is the 'sense* of the proposition. Here belief, whether true or false, 
does consist in a relation to a fact, i.e., an 'objective', but the 
relation is different in the two cases,
Russell's second theory is no more satisfactory than his first. As
Prior points out, 'the theory gives no account at all of what it is that 
goes on when I have this belief whether it is true or false. It might be
suggested that A believes that grass is green if and only if either grass
is green and A mentally points towards the fact that grass is green, or 
grass is not green and A mentally points away from the fact that grass 
is not green. But if we neutral observers, in believing that A believes 
that grass is green, are supposed to be entertaining this disjunction.
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what are we_ supposed to be relating ourselves to in entertaining that
22part of it which concerns a fact which is non-existent?* A short
answer to this problem of Prior's could be that it is not necessary to
relate ourselves to anything in entertaining a fact which is non-existent.
Perhaps Russell has anticipated the problem when he says: 'There are no
false facts, so you cannot get one fact for every proposition but only
23for every pair of propositions'. There are no false facts because *A
24fact cannot be either true or false'. On the other hand/has to admit
reluctantly that there are negative facts such as 'Socrates is not alive'
and that negative facts have to be taken as ultimate. His reason for this
is given in the following words; 'When, e.g., you have a false positive
proposition, say "Socrates is alive", it is false because of a fact in
the real world. A thing cannot be false except because of a fact, so that
you can find it extremely difficult to say what exactly happens when
you make a positive assertion that , is false, unless you are going
25to admit negative facts'.^ Russell is in difficulties here only because 
of his theory of logical atomism according to which every proposition 
(i.e. sentence) has the same logical structure as the fact it 'corres­
ponds' to. He gives up this theory soon after he has expounded it for the 
sound reason that it raises more difficulties than it can solve and that 
the difficulties are inherent in the extreme metaphysical postulate of 
logical atoms. Therefore, whether you take Prior's reference to a non­
existent fact as a false fact (which Russell has disavowed from the start) 
or as a negative fact (which Russell admits not without reservations), 
you can treat it as valid criticism only if you agree with Prior’s 
assumption that 'entertaining', logically speaking, needs an object for 
relating to neutral observers.
Up to now Russell has been concentrating on the truth or falsehood 
of beliefs, but in a short passage at the end of section 3 of his Fourth 
Lecture, he sums up his position thus: 'There are really two main things
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that one wants to notice in the analysis of b e l i e f T h e  first point,
he says, is that it is impossible to treat the proposition believed as
an independent entity, entering as a unit into the occurrence of the
27belief, because he has now come to view propositions as 'nothing'. He 
does not believe that in addition to facts in the world there should
28also be propositions. In particular he thinks that it is 'monstrous'
to suppose a whole set of false propositions going about in the actual
world of nature. A false proposition must, he says, 'wherever it occurs,
be subject to analyses, be taken to pieces, pulled to bits, and shown to
be simply separate pieces of one fact in which the false proposition
29has been analysed away'. His other main point is the impossibility of
putting the subordinate verb on a level with its terms as an object term
in the belief. He is here referring to the 'knitting together' theory
of belief outlined above. In 'Othello believes that Desdemona loves
Cassio' he treated 'loves' as an object term on a level with Desdemona
and Cassio for the relation 'believes', but he now realizes that 'loves'
is not a particular like Desdemona or Cassio.
Within a year of expounding the above theory, Russell is explaining
a third theory of belief in which the subject has disappeared. This is
because Russell considers that the subject is 'schematically convenient,
but not empirically discoverable'^^ It has been constructed (Russell's
italics) like 'points and instants, numbers and particles and the rest of
31the apparatus of mathematics'. Once the subject has been rejected it is 
necessary to have a less relational theory of belief. There is no longer 
a distinction between sensation and sense-datum and beliefs become entire­
ly a matter of images, or sometimes a word-proposition, a feeling of assent 
and a relation between the feeling of assent and the proposition or the 
images.While it is not necessary, according to the Russell of this theory, 
that what is believed must always be expressed by a proposition because 
it may be that a single simple image is believed, still, 'the important
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beliefs, even if they be not the only ones, are those which, if 
rendered into explicit words, take the form of a proposition, i.e., that 
A is B, or that x has the relation R to or that all men are mortal,
32or that something like this existed before, or any other such sentence' 
(Russell's italics). Despite this declaration, Russell is really concerned 
with psychological questions and with a psychological analysis of belief 
which is beyond the scope of this thesis.
In The Problems of Philosophy and elsewhere Russell argues for the 
existence of a subject of experience partly because he believes that 
the idea of experience requires that there should be a subject of exper­
ience and partly because he believes that the subject has direct knowledge 
of particulars without the traditional medium of concepts under which the 
particulars are subsumed. As he puts it: ♦ ... the datum when we are 
aware of experiencing an object 0 is the fact "something is acquainted 
with 0"'^^ Hence the existence of the subject can be admitted and the 
'selectiveness of e x p e r i e n c e i s  explainable in a way not open to any­
one, like the neutral monist, who denies the existence of a unique subject 
of experience. Russell later reinforces this argument by showing that what
35he calls 'emphatic particulars'  ^ such as 'this', 'I' and suchlike words
iare proper names for the present objeots of attention. He admits that the ;
latter is ambiguous as it changes from moment to moment and from speaker |
to speaker, but he claims that if you reject consciousness altogether, |
!it will be extremely difficult now to explain what you mean by 'this* ji
and what it is that makes the absence of impartiality. He thinks that there I
is one qualification, however, in the case of 'I' as the subject. It
ineed not be a possible object of acquaintance because Russell thinks that ,
we can have knowledge of the subject by description.
Russell's theory of judgment is thus egocentric. His so-called 
'multiple theory of judgment' remains egocentric as outlined above with 
Othello as the subject and the objects combined together as a complex of
ciO —
Desdemona, Cassio, and loves. This theory requires a relation between 
the mind and the various constituents of the proposition in question.
As Russell says in another context: ♦ ... when we judge (say) "this is 
red", what occurs is a relation of three terms, the "mind", and "this", 
and "red"'^^
Wittgenstein has criticized this theory of Russell’s for several
reasons. One reason is that this theory ’does not make it impossible
37to judge a nonsense’. By this Wittgenstein means that there is nothing 
in Russell’s view to prevent, for example, A judging that ^  loves 7.» 
for Russell lays down no condition on the corresponding four-termed 
relation (J, say) that would prevent ’£(A, loves, J_) ’ from making 
sense?^ At the same time, in the example of the cube.
as Wittgenstein points out, ’To perceive a complex means to-perceive 
that its constituents are related to one another in such and such a way. 
This no doubt also explains why there are two possible ways of seeing the 
figure as a cube; and all similar phenomena. For we really see two 
different facts, (if I look in the first place at the corners marked a 
and only glance at the b's, then the ^ ’s appear to be in front, and vice 
v e r s a ) . H e r e ,  then, are two separate facts which may be recorded of 
the cube illustrated above, but one cannot tell from Russell’s multiple 
theory which is the fact described. Russell may be aware of this difficulty 
for he does indicate that the order in which you combine the constituents 
should give the sense of the judgment so that ^(O, B, JL, C_) will give 
one sense, i.e. Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio and
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£(£, £, L, D) will give another sense, i.e., Othello judges that Cassio 
loves Desdemona. But Wittgenstein seems to have in mind more than this.
As Geach points out; ’To say that "the relation of judging places the 
constituents in a different order" (RUSSELL (l), p.198) is no explanation, 
hut just a way of stating the difference that has to he explained. In 
RUSSELL (2) on the other hand we read; "The relation must not he abstractly 
before the mind but must be before it as proceeding from ^ to b rather 
than from _b to a ... We may distinguish two "senses" of a relation, 
according as it goes from ^  to ^  or from b to a. Then the relation as it 
enters into the judgment must have a "sense" ... Thus the judgment that 
two terms have a certain relation R is a relation of the mind to the two 
terms and the relation R with the appropriate sense (pp.183-4)’*• Yet if 
the relation R is before the mind, not as relating a and b, but only as 
a term of a judging relation that holds between the mind, a, the relation 
R, and b, how can there be any talk of the relation R ’s "proceeding" 
from ^  to b rather than from ]b to a? How can a relation that occurs 
not as relating things, but as one of the things related by another 
relation, occur with one or other "sense"? This difficulty looks even 
worse if we consider how in fact the relation R does enter into the 
judgment, namely, as an object of thought. For not only is the concept 
of a pair of converse relations a single and indivisible mental capacity 
(eadem est scientia oppositorum); the exercise of that concept in judgment 
also brings in the two relations equally and simultaneously, for to judge 
that a, bears the one relation to ^  is the very same act as judging that 
b bears the converse relation to a. Thus both relations of a pair of 
converses, or, in Russell’s language, the relation ^  in both its "senses", 
must enter into the act of judgment equally and simultaneously; his 
solution then collapses, and indeed the problem looks intractable
Thus Wittgenstein is correct in saying that according to Russell’s 
multiple theory of judgment, anything is allowed to be combined and the
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choice of objects is limitless, so that either anything goes and there 
is, therefore, no judging, or there is no sense to a not being ^  to b 
since the identity of ^ and b may vary with the proposition judged. 
Wittgenstein's second reason against Russell's theory is that Russell 
fails to distinguish effectively between judging (or supposing) that 
aRb and that bRa. Wittgenstein's third objection against Russell's theory 
is that it fails to explain negative judgments. For example, if I 
judge that A is to the right of B, I stand in the judging relation to 
A, B, and the relation to the right of, but if I judge that A is not 
to the right of B, what happens then? Wittgenstein asks the question 
whether I, in such a case, stand in the judging relation to A, B, to 
the right of, and not? Similar questions will arise for the other logical 
constants, 'if, 'and*, and 'or'. This difficulty is seen in Wittgen­
stein's remark: 'A proposition can determine only one place in logical 
space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must already be given
by it. (otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc, would
*4-1introduce more and more new elements - in co-ordination.)
Having criticized Russell's theory of judgment as unsatisfactory, 
Wittgenstein explains his own theory in the following way:
'At first sight it appears as if it were possible for one proposition 
to occur in another in a different way. Particularly with certain forms 
of proposition in psychology, such as "A believes that p is the case" and 
"A has the thought etc. For if these are considered superficially, it
looks as if the proposition ^  stood in some kind of relation to an object 
A. (And in modern theory of knowledge (Russell, Moore, etc.) these 
propositions have actually been construed in this way.) It is clear, 
however, that "A believes that "A has the thought and "A says
2** are of the form " '2 ' says 2 ": and this does not involve a correlation 
of a fact with an object, but rather the correlation of facts by means 
of the correlation of their objects. This shows, too, that there is no
— 23 —
such thing as the soul - the subject, etc. - as it is conceived in the 
superficial psychology of the present day. Indeed a composite soul would 
no longer be a soul.
According to Anscombe, the above remarks of Wittgenstein's should 
not be understood to mean that he held that it was impossible to have 
a thought without uttering a sentence (for which interpretation she can 
see no reason at all) or that he held that a person vjas to be analysed 
as a complex. As against the latter interpretation Anscombe thinks that 
it is 'evident that he is arguing; You can't explain the mind as "the 
judging subject" in "A judges 2", because (Anscombe's italics) "A judges 
2 " is of the form "'2 ' says 2" ; so that way you will only reach a complex, 
and a composite mind would not be a mind. Therefore Wittgenstein's 
statement that "A believes 2 " i® of the form "'2 * says 2 ” cannot be 
based on any Humean theory that a person is a complex.Moreover, what 
was clear to Wittgenstein was that for anything to be capable of repres­
enting the fact that 2> it must be as complex as the fact that 2  itself. 
Anscombe goes on to say;
'It is perhaps not quite right to say that "A judges 2 " i® of the 
form " '2 ' says that 2 '*? what he should have said was that the business 
part of "A judges that 2"> the part that relates to something's having 
as its content a potential representation of the fact that 2> was of the 
form '"2 * says that 2 "? believes 2 " or "conceives 2” or "says 2 " must 
mean "There occurs in A or is produced by A something which is (capable 
of being) a picture of 2 "* Ue should here remember the letter to Russell 
in which he said he did not know what the constituents of thoughts were, 
but he was certain that a thought must have constituents corresponding 
to the words of language.
According to Wittgenstein's picture theory of language and reality, 
a thought or a proposition is a picture of a state of affairs, so that 
the constituents of a thought are the same as those of a proposition
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and both of them are pictures of the fact pictured. This is the meaning
behind his remark: ’Instead of, "The complex sign 'aRb* says that _a
stands to b in the relation R", we ought to put, "That '2 * stands to
45*_b* in a certain relation says that aRb". *
In other words, it is the fact or state of affairs that makes the 
thought or proposition true or false so that a negative proposition is 
one that does not mirror an atomic fact. '"aRb" says that aRb' could be 
interpreted as 'That in "aRb" "2 " is written in italics and "b" in Roman 
says that a R b , A l t h o u g h  it contains a true description of the prepos­
itional sign as here occurring, 'it is a false statement (though it could 
be a true one); for it is not, as it happens, this fact, but the fact 
that "a" stands to the left and "b" to the right of "R", that says that 
aRb. The use of italic and Roman letters is immaterial as far as concerns 
the expression of a relation'.
If this is what Wittgenstein means, Anscombe continues, then the 
proposition '"2 " says that 2 ' is a genuine proposition, with true-false 
poles, for its truth or falsity depends on how the prepositional sign 
'2 * is understood to be described.
Wittgenstein's picturing theory of propositions does not allow the 
existence of a subject because in 'A believes that 2 * » it is actually 
the belief or thought or proposition '2 * that says 2 - This interpretation 
of prepositional attitudes is fundamental to Wittgenstein and is even 
more important than whether prepositional attitudes transgress his 
truth-functional theory of language. In Russell's multiple theory of 
judgment, the subject is related to objects and to universale. Therefore 
the judging relation is a psychological one which Wittgenstein rejects 
as of no interest in the study of logic. Logic shows that the proposition 
is a picture of a fact, but the pictorial relation cannot be represented 
without going outside the representation. The subject cannot stand 
outside 'its' own thought and so cannot be represented in thought.
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That propositions such as 'A believes that 2 * i^re not extensional
Wittgenstein dismisses with the same argument, i.e., that *A believes
that 2 ' i® the same as ’"p" says that 2 '» If *£’ is taken to be 'London
is larger than Paris* and 2  to be London is larger than Paris, then 
"'London is larger than Paris" says that London is larger than Paris' 
and is a contingent proposition and, according to Wittgenstein's 
principles, is significant, but it is certainly not obvious to Black 
that it could be construed as a truth-function of elementary propositions^^ 
Despite Wittgenstein's confidence that 'A believes that 2 ' oan be accom­
odated within extensional logic, it is not shared by many other 
philosophers. As Geach remarks: ' ... a plausible analysis of descriptions 
of judgments has not yet been given within a purely extensional logic*7
Thus Wittgenstein rejects Russell's account of acquaintance as an 
experiential relation between a subject in the world and objects in the 
world. Thinking, for Wittgenstein, is picturing. The relation between 
a thought and - reality is the same as the relation between a proposition 
and reality; they stand in an 'internal pictorial relation* to that of 
which they are true or false. Hence, as Ramsey puts it, Wittgenstein 
'explicitly reduces the question as to the analysis of judgment ... 
to the question "What is it for a proposition token to have a certain 
sense?"
Wittgenstein's answer to his own question may be summed up in the
following words: (l) Wittgenstein leaves no room in the world represented
in thought for a subject that thinks, (2) He leaves no possibility of
giving an account of the relation between words and the world in terms
of the subject's cognitive experience of the world, and (3) If it is
assumed that any proposition that can be discovered to be true
a posteriori can sensibly be thought false, then Wittgenstein's theory
requires that there should be the possibility of indefinable names
51standing for objects which are 'roughly speaking, colourless'.
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As Russell acknowledges, it was Wittgenstein who showed him that
52prepositional attitudes represented a 'new species' for his zoo and
in 1919 when he wrote On Propositions: What they are and how they mean, |
he had assimilated enough of Wittgenstein's ideas to reject, in his '
analysis of belief, the subject, the objects and universals which, to
him, are now 'logical constructions' and which have no existence in
the real world, but which have become a matter of linguistic convenience.
Language is no longer transparent, as he once thought, for 'language
53misleads us both by its vocabulary and by its syntax'7 The analysis of 
belief on which he started out to do so confidently becomes a description 
of a form of behaviourism which he considers to be a more reliable way 
to knowledge because it is observable and, therefore, more akin to science. 
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II. PROPOSITIONS AND SENTENCES
It has been generally assumed by philosophers that it is the 
proposition that is true or false, although both Russell and Wittgenstein 
have taken the proposition to be no more than a sentence, a linguistic 
symbol, rather than part of the furniture of the world. In this respect 
Russell and Wittgenstein have their followers just as Frege, who holds 
the opposite view, has his. Frege's views were better known to Russell 
and Wittgenstein than to his other contemporaries, but the importance 
of Frege's philosophy has since been well recognized and its influence 
proportionately increased.
Although Frege was unaware of Russell's expression 'prepositional 
attitudes', he was equally concerned with the problems they pose to 
logic, especially in the form of indirect speech, Frege says that in 
indirect speech it is 'indifferent to the truth of the whole whether 
the subordinate clause is true or falseTake, for example, the two 
sentences 'Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles' 
and 'Copernicus believed that the apparent motion of the sun is produced 
by the real motion of the Earth'. The subordinate clause of one sentence, 
he says, can be substituted for that of the other without affecting the 
truth or falsehood of the whole sentence. That is because the main, 
clause and the subordinate clause together have only a single thought 
as their sense and the truth of the whole sentence includes neither the 
truth nor the untruth of the subordinate clause. Accordingly, Frege 
distinguishes between what he calls 'sense' and 'reference'. The 
subordinate clause does not have truth or falsehood as its reference, 
but only what he calls a 'thought' by which he means the sense of the 
subordinate clause as constituted by the senses of the individual words 
of the clause. Such subordinate clauses do not have truth or falsehood 
as their reference, but have only a thought as their reference. a 
thought,' says Frege, 'I understand not the subjective performance of
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thinking but its objective content, which is capable of being the common
2property of several thinkers'. Frege's theory of sense and reference 
is basic to his logic. A Fregean proper name could be 'Plato' or 'Venus' 
or 'The Morning Star'. Each proper name has both its sense and its
reference, with the reference as the object to which the proper name has
been given as a 'sign' and the 'sense of a proper name is grasped by 
everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality 
of designations to which it belongs.*^ To show what he means by 'sense' 
Frege gives the example of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' 
which may have different senses. He explains this view thus:
*In the case of an actual proper name such as "Aristotle" opinions 
as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the 
following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody 
who does this will attach another sense to the sentence "Aristotle was 
born in Stagira" than will a man who takes as the sense of the name; the 
the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as 
the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, 
although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demon­
strative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language,
Therefore, if a man knows Aristotle as the pupil of Plato, then the
sense is 'the pupil of Plato', and if another man knows him as the 
philosopher born in Stagira, then this is another sense of 'Aristotle', 
Thus for Frege every name has a reference, a definite object, but not 
just one sense although, as Frege points out, 'one must be content if 
the same word has the same sense in the same context*7 However, he admits 
that while 'the celestial body most distant from the E a r t h h a s  a 
sense, it is very doubtful if it also has a reference. Even where no 
reference has been secured, the sense of part of the sentence, i.e., the 
thought, is relevant to the sense of the whole sentence. For instance, 
the sentence 'Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep' has
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sense even though ’Odysseus has no reference. According to Frege, it is
significant that we should he interested in whether a proper name has
reference or not. To him the reason why we are not satisfied with the
sense alone of a sentence is because we are concerned with its truth
value. He is convinced that 'it is the striving for truth that drives
Tus always to advance from the sense to the reference'; From this he 
argues that we are 'therefore driven into accepting the truth value of a 
sentence as constituting its reference.'Sy the truth value of a sentence 
I understand the circumstance that it is true or false. There are no 
other truth values. For brevity I call the one the True, the other the 
False, Every declarative sentence concerned with the reference of its 
words is therefore to be regarded as a proper name, and its reference, 
if it has one, is either the True or the False'. Further on he says:
'A truth value cannot be a part of a thought, any more than, say, the 
Sun can, for it is not a sense but an object'^
Frege's distinction between the sense and reference of a proper 
name, whether it is a singular proper name like 'Venus' or a complex 
proper name like 'The Morning Star', is an important one for it contrib­
utes to the clarification of logic. But it is generally acknowledged
that he has not made logical matters clearer by treating sentences as
objects and, worse still, by creating a new object called a 'truth 
value*. His notion of the sense of a declarative sentence, however, seems 
to have the support of intuition, for we commonly accept that the sense 
of a sentence is that which we understand when we understand the sentence. 
It does not seem possible to go further than this. As Dumraet asks: 'VJhat
can a model of sense be, but a model of what it is to grasp a sense?
He also says: 'The notion of sense was required in the first place in 
order to explain how our sentences come to have the cognitive value 
which they have for us'l^ But the notion of the reference of a sentence 
does not seem to have the same intuitive support. At the same time
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commentators have disagreed about Frege's explanation of the sense of
'Aristotle' as 'the pupil of Plato', for then there would be a conflation
of a proper name and a definite description, i.e., an identification of a
name with that of some descriptive phrase. Such an interpretation is not
consonant with Frege's general account of sense and would have the
unacceptable consequence of contingent statements such as 'the pupil
of Plato' turning out to be analytic of the proper name 'Aristotle'. But
it is quite clear, as David Bell^^ points out, that Frege is quite
adamant that there is no backward road from reference to sense. Thus when
he gives the sense of 'Aristotle* as 'the pupil of Plato', Frege is not
giving a definition but 'an elucidation'; 'since definitions are not
possible for primitive elements, something else must enter in. I call it 
12elucidation'. While Bell agrees with Frege that proper names do have
a sense, he considers it impossible to give any precise specification
13of the sense of a proper name. Perhaps that is why some philosophers
have sought to give proper names a 'rigid designation'M However, Frege
.has made his position clearer when he says; 'Moreover, there is nothing
contained in the name "Columbus" about discovery or about America, even
though it is the same man that we call Columbus and the discoverer of 
15America',
Although Frege has already decided in his On Sense and Reference that 
a thought is the objective content of thinking that is also capable of 
being the common property of several thinkers and not the subjective 
performance of thinking, it is in his later article The Thought that he 
displays his Platonism to the full. He is concerned about the widespread 
intrusion of psychological and subjective elements into logic and the 
foundations of mathematics and is interested in establishing the 
objectivity of scientific knowledge and factual information. He declares 
that the aim of logic is to 'discern the laws of t r u t h T r u t h  is to 
be discovered rather than to be perceived by means of the correspondence
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of an idea to something, like that of a picture to what it represents.
He dismisses such a theory of correspondence because if one does not 
already know what it is that the idea is supposed to correspond with, 
then correspondence is an incoherent notion. Besides, perfect correspon­
dence means that the corresponding things coincide and, if they do, then 
they are not distinct things at all. Thirdly, an idea could only coincide 
with another idea, but that is not what the advocates of the correspon­
dence theory of truth mean. Lastly, to say that one could lay down a 
certain respect in which an idea - i.e., a sense impression, a creation 
of the imagination, of sensation, feeling, inclination, and wishes - 
has to correspond to reality would be to lead to an infinite regress. 
Consequently, Frege thinks that 'it is probable that the content of the 
word "true" is unique and indefinable*. The truth he is concerned with
is that kind of truth 'whose recognition is the goal of science*. When
we ask if it is true that the sun has risen, we are not referring to the
sun or its rays which are sense impressions, but we are referring to
.what is true, i.e., that the sun has or has not risen. 'That the sun 
has risen' is what Frege calls a 'Thought' - nowadays called a 'Propos­
ition'. 'Proposition' has the added advantage that it has no psychological 
implications against which Frege is fighting.
A Fregean Proposition is the bearer of truth or falsehood. It is the
sense of a sentence, but only of an indicative or interrogative sentence.
A Proposition is immaterial, according to Frege, in a very special sense,
17in the same way as truth is immaterial ‘ for him. A Proposition does not 
belong to the outer world of trees and stones which are independent of an 
observer. Nor does it belong to the inner world of ideas, for ideas need 
bearers and each bearer has his own ideas which no one can compare with 
another's because no one can have another person's ideas. His reasoning 
is that if more than one person can have the same idea, then ideas would 
exist independently of their bearers and become objective. Frege used 
the example of the Pythagorean theorem to show that a Proposition is the
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same for everybody, because if the Pythagorean theorem were an idea, then 
my idea of it will differ from your idea of it. In fact, it would be 
impossible to know whether the two ideas are different or not, since 
the two ideas cannot be compared within the same consciousness. It 
follows, therefore, according to Frege, that a Proposition does not need 
a bearer; if it did, then science would have been impossible. Thus he 
concludes that a Proposition must belong to a ’third realm’ which 
’corresponds with ideas, in that it cannot be perceived by the senses, 
and with things, in that it needs no bearer to the contents of whose 
consciousness.. to belong. The Proposition, for example, which we 
express in the Pythagorean theorem, is timelessly true, true independ­
ently of whether anyone takes it to be true. It needs no bearer. It is 
not true for the first time when it is discovered, but is like a planet 
which, already before anyone has seen it, has been in interaction with 
other planets
For Frege, Propositions stand in the closest relation to truth, 
even though it is important for him that one can express a Proposition 
without laying it down as true. Like Propositions, truth has an indepen­
dent existence, i.e., it is independent of whether anyone thinks it or 
not. Like Propositions again, truth is timeless, unchangeable and real, 
but the reality is not of a Platonist kind. Propositions and truth are 
real, according to Frege, in the sense that they are apprehended by us, 
thus becoming implicated with the temporal, so that Frege's Propositions 
and truth are timeless and unchanging like Platonic forms, but they are 
real in a different way from them because they can be communicated from 
one person to another. But in communicating a Proposition to another 
person, the Proposition does not leave the control of the communicator 
by being communicated, for a person has no control over it. As Frege 
says:
'VJhen a Proposition is apprehended, it at first only brings about
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changes in the inner world of the apprehender, yet it remains untouched
in its true essence, since the changes it undergoes involve only
19inessential properties.*
By ’inessential properties’ Frege means that Propositions them­
selves are essentially unchangeable, but their effects on the thinker 
may lead to actions and changes'. Propositions are not created by the 
thinker who has to take them as they are. In saying this Frege is 
postulating a set of Propositions which exist independently of whether 
there are thinkers to think them or not, and which may sometimes be 
’clothed* in sentences and sometimes not. This is the consequence of
his attempt to protect the objective truth of logic, mathematics, and
science from the prevalent psychologism of the time.
While a sentence may express a Proposition, Frege thinlcs that ’the
20contents of a sentence often go beyond the Propositions expressed by it’.
It may also happen,' as he points out, that a sentence possesses an
intelligible content but yet expresses no Proposition. Sentences which 
contain irreducible indexical and token-reflexive elements as well as 
those which contain a tensed verb without a precise time indication 
or those which are too vague to possess a determinate truth-value do not 
express a Proposition. For example, the words ’this tree is covered with 
green leaves’ do not express a Fregean Proposition because they have no 
time indication. The sentence, for example, ’I am tired today’ is not a. 
Proposition either, for the indexical ’I’ is too vague and needs a 
contextual supplement to make a Proposition. ’Today’ does not give the 
actual time of utterance which is required for a Proposition. If these 
indeterminacies are removed, such as in ’I (so-and-so) am tired today 
(the such-and-such day and year at time and in place £_)', then a 
Proposition has been expressed which will possess a truth-value which 
may never change, regardless of who utters the sentence, or when, or 
where, or into which language the sentence is translated, or what change 
of sense the words in it may undergo. Moreover, the Proposition expressed
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by this sentence would be true (or false) regardless of whether anyone
ever uttered it, or entertained it. Because of these considerations Frege
believes that Propositions are eternal and immutable and the primary
bearers of truth-values.
When Frege says; ’And when we call a sentence true we really mean 
21its sense is’, what he means is that we ascribe truth or falsity to
what a person says, the statements that he makes, and not to the words
or sentences which he uses. For instance, a person who knows several
European languages would be able to express the Proposition that it is
raining by saying ’II pleut’, or ’Es regnet’, or ’It is raining'. The
Proposition, when completed by the appropriate time and place indicators,
would be the same in each case, and it would be presumed that the
speaker asserted this Proposition, rather than just uttering these words,
because he believed that what he was asserting was true.
It is a fundamental part of Frege’s theory that a Proposition itself
does not state whether it is true or false even though it is a bearer
.of truth-value. His special notational script makes this clear. His
special sign ’ |— —  ’ indicates when assertive force is present so that
22when the vertical stroke ’|’ is absent, no assertion is being made.
However, when it comes to direct and indirect speech, Frege has to
modify his theory, an important part of which is that he holds with
Leibniz that the truth value of a sentence must remain unchanged when a
part of the sentence is replaced by an expression having the same refer- 
23ence. But he admits that ’Exceptions are to be expected when the whole 
sentence or its part is direct or indirect quotation; for in such cases, 
as we have seen, the words do not have their customary reference. In 
direct quotation, a sentence designates another sentence, and in indirect 
quotation a Proposition’^ ^ Elsewhere he says; ’In reported speech one 
talks about the sense, e.g., of another person’s remarks. It is quite 
clear that in this way of speaking words do not have their customary 
reference but designate what is usually their sense. In order to have a
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short expression, we will say; In reported speech, words are used 
indirectly or have their indirect reference. We distinguish accordingly 
the customary from the indirect reference of a word; and its customary 
sense from its indirect sense. The indirect reference of a word is 
accordingly its customary sense. Such exceptions must always be borne in
mind if the mode of connexion between sign, sense, and reference in
25 'particular cases is to be correctly understood, ’ |
In other words, if the utterance ’Julius Caesar is dead’ is in the. j
course of a normal conversation, the words 'Julius Caesar is dead’ have 
their normal sense and reference - i.e., ’Julius Caesar' refers to the man 
of that name and the sentence as a whole expresses the Proposition that 
Julius Caesar is dead, and refers to the True. But if I now say that the
sentence 'Julius Caesar is dead' occurs in the preceding sentence on
this page, then the words in the last quoted sentence refer to words 
in the previous sentence. And if I say ’Shakespeare said that Julius 
Caesar is dead', the subordinate clause ’that Julius Caesar is dead’ 
refers to the sense of the sentence ’Julius Caesar is dead’, i.e., to the 
Thought thus expressed. And so, for Frege, in ascribing a statement 
or belief to someone,'I neither refer to the words (if any) which he 
uttered or entertained, nor to the truth-value (if any) of what he 
asserted or believed, but only to the Thought which he expressed or 
entertained
The Thought - or, rather, the Proposition - is considered by Frege 
as objective, immutable, and eternal. Thus when we say 'It is true that 
X is T ’, ’it' is not anyone's state of mind but is actually the Propos­
ition 'that X is T'. For instance, it is essential to Frege and others
like him, who are concerned about the objectivity of truth and the 
possibility of knowledge, that the values of logical laws like the Law 
of Contradiction (or rather non-Contradiction), e.g., (2_**^ £.), should be 
Propositions rather than sentences. Propositions are unchanging, 
independent of context and are timelessly true. Only when such third
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realm entities exist are logical relations possible. Sentences may■change
in sense in the same way as words may change in meaning in the course of
time through the change of customs or linguistic habits or through
translation into another language or expressed synonymously in the same
language, but Propositions exist for all time unchanged or, better still,
for all eternity, whatever that'may mean, so that their expressions in
sentences are fortuitous, unpredictable, and uncertain in meaning. Hence,
for Frege and other logicians like him, there can be logical relations
like contradiction, implication, compatibility, incompatibility, condition
and consequent and premises and conclusion only if there are timeless and
immutable Propositions between which such relations may hold. If such
logical relations were to hold between sentences, then ambiguity would
result and truth would be impossible.
Since Frege's time there have been various philosophers who try to
abolish propositions in favour of sentences. The latter seem to them more
concrete and therefore more accessible to analysis. However, such a
manoeuvre shows that there are difficulties and complications that are
both inherent and insuperable. Alonzo Church has pinpointed these difficul- 
27ties very clearly.'
Church takes as his prepositional attitude example;
(d) Seneca said that man is a rational animal.
Opponents of propositions as abstract entities are shown by Church to 
analyse (l) in terms of sentences in the following ways;
(2) Seneca wrote the words 'Man is a rational animal';
(3) Seneca wrote the words 'Rationale enim animal est homo';
(4 ) Seneca wrote words whose translation from Latin into English 
is 'Man is a rational animal';
(5) Seneca wrote words whose translation from some language 
into English is 'Man is a rational animal*;
(6) There is a language such that Seneca wrote as sentence of
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words whose translation from into English is 'Man is a 
rat i onal animal',
In discussing these sentences Church decides that in all cases the 
word 'wrote' is to he understood in the sense 'wrote with assertive 
intent * and, in order to simplify the discussion, he also decides to ignore 
the existence of spoken languages, and treat all languages as written. 
Church rejects (2) as an analysis,of (l)lheGause it is obviously 
false if we accept the truth of (l). He also rejects (3) - (6) on the 
ground that though they have the same truth-value as (l), they do not 
convey the same information. His criticism is that (l) conveys the content 
of what Seneca said without revealing his actual words, while (3) repro­
duces Seneca's words without saying what meaning was attached to them.
In (4) the crucial information is omitted (without which, he says, (l) 
is not even a consequence) that Seneca intended his words as a Latin 
sentence, rather than as a sentence of some other language in which 
conceivably the identical words 'rationale enim animal est homo' might have 
some quite different meaning. Church considers (5 ) to be as objectionable 
as (4 ) and that in Carnap's abstract sense of 'language' as a 'semantical 
system' so that it is not part of the concept of a language that a 
language must have been used in historical fact by some human group, then
(5) is L-equivalent merely to the statement that Seneca once wrote some­
thing.
Church further points out that (5) and (6) are closely similar to 
the analysis of belief statements in Carnap's Meaning and Necessity and 
it seems to him that Carnap intends a similar analysis for statements 
of assertion. Church finds that (6) is also unacceptable as an analysis 
of (1) since it is not even possible to infer (1) from (6) on logical 
grounds alone, i.e., without the addition of factual information not 
contained in (6), that 'Man is a rational animal' means in English that 
man is a rational animal. Church also suggests that the inadequacy of
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(6) as an analysis of (l) is brought out by translating it into German 
in which ’English' in (6) must be translated as ’Englisch’ (not as 
’Deutsch*) and ’Man is a rational animal’ must be ’Man is a rational 
animal* and not translated as ’Der Mensch ist ein vernunftigen Tier*.
Church thus shows that an attempt like Carnap’s to replace propos­
itions with sentences has the consequence of distorting the sense of what 
is written. In the English sentence ’John believes that Seneca said that 
man is a rational animal*, its translation into German or any other 
language would be doubly risky because John may well fail to draw certain 
consequences, logical or otherwise, from his belief, especially when 
Carnap's requirement of intensional isomorphism is brought in. In such a 
case John may believe what he does believe but refuses to acknowledge 
any intensional isomorphism at all, and therefore the translation of his 
original belief into equivalent expressions may not represent what he 
originally believes. This objection is applicable to all translations, 
whether in a foreign language or in one's native language.
There are philosophers who have no use for Fregean Propositions but 
who yet advocate the retention of the word 'proposition' for various 
reasons. One of them is Ayer who thinks that 'it is necessary to have 
such a word in order that one may be able to refer to the meaning of
28sentences without having to specify them particularly'. Occasions on 
which he considers it convenient to use the word 'proposition' are, for 
example, (l) when one talks about somebody else's speech and says; 'In 
the course of his speech he asserted a number of propositions of which I 
can now remember nothing except that at least three of them were false ' 
and (2) 'He often wish to make statements which apply not merely to a 
given indicative sentence, but also to any other sentence, whether of the 
same or of a different language, that has the same meaning; and our use 
of the word 'proposition' enables us to do this concisely'.
29Colwyn Williamson has criticised these conclusions of Ayer's on the
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desirability of propositions. Williamson's first point against Ayer is 
that if by 'proposition' is meant the meaning of a sentence rather than 
the sentence, then difficulties arise because the concept of proposition 
is tied, not only to sentences and their meaning, but also to what is • 
'true* and 'false', to prepositional logic, prepositional identity, and so 
on. An account will then have to be given of propositions that can be used 
in such a variety of ways.
Williamson's second point against Ayer concerns the convenience 
supposedly gained by employing 'proposition* in the way Ayer suggests. 
Williamson thinks that Ayer could have equated 'proposition' with 'sent­
ence* instead of 'the meaning of a sentence'. In the following example 
he shows that the use of 'proposition' merely means 'sentence' without 
any suggestion of abstractness that he finds in Ayer's use of the word 
'proposition' and so the word 'proposition* might be simply replaced by 
the word 'sentence';
'And anything that is said, in the following pages, of a particular 
proposition may also be assumed to hold of any other proposition, in this 
or another language, always provided that the other proposition has the 
same meaning as the one mentioned, ' Williamson claims that clarity has 
not been sacrificed here and yet no abstract entity has been unnecess­
arily introduced.
Williamson's third point relates to what Ayer has said about a speech 
containing a number of propositions of which he remembers nothing except 
that three of them were false. Williamson thinks that such an assertion 
does not require the postulation of propositions as the meanings of 
sentences, for one does not postulate any new entity when one says that 
one cannot remember the questions asked except that three of them were 
rhetorical. Williamson claims that there is no need for Ayer to think 
that he is 'referring to propositions without specifying sentences' when 
he might just as well say that he is referring to sentences without
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specifying them, thus avoiding the use of abstract entities.
The necessity for propositions to be distinguished from sentences is 
argued for by Russell^^ who, however, does not think that such proposit­
ions need be an indefinable abstract object. He defines them as psychol­
ogical occurrences of certain sorts - complex images, expectations, i.e., 
•implicit behaviour•, Such occurrences are 'expressed* by sentences, but 
the sentences 'assert* something else. He says: 'When two sentences have 
the same meaning, that is because they express the same proposition.
Words are not essential to propositions. The exact psychological definit­
ion of propositions is irrelevant to logic and theory of knowledge; the 
only thing essential to our inquiries is that sentences signify something 
other than themselves, which can be the same when the sentences differ. 
That this something must be psychological (or physiological) is made 
evident by the fact that propositions can be false.' For Russell, single 
words 'have* meaning while sentences 'have' significance, a distinction 
which he thinks is not found in ordinary usage but which is convenient
in philosophical analysis,
31Strawson also believes that it is not sentences that are true or 
false. His position may be summed up in the following:
(1) The same sentence may be used in different contexts of utterance 
to make different statements, some true and some false, e.g., 'The 
present King of France is bald* is true if said by someone in the reign 
of Louis XIV, but is false if said by someone in the reign of Louis XV, 
and
(2) The same statement, true or false, may be made by using different 
contexts of utterance, e.g., *I am hot' said by A is the same statement
as 'You are hot' said by B to A in each other's presence.
Hence, according to Strawson, sentences are used to make statements, 
true or false, and to give the meaning of a sentence is 'to give general 
directions for its use in making true or false assertions'. We cannot ask
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'What is the sentence about?' because we can only ask about some use of 
a sentence to make a statement. What Strawson seems to have established is 
not that there are things called 'statements' different from 'sentences' 
so much as that sentences are not true or false in themselves but that 
their truth or falsity is dependent on the context of utterance. The 
controversy between Russell and Strawson on definite descriptions, there­
fore, rests on a mutual misunderstanding. For Russell sentences such as 
'Quadruplicity drinks procrastination' are meaningless and do not qualify 
for the application of the Law of Excluded Middle, whereas 'The present 
King of France is bald' is meaningful but false. Strawson's position is 
that the question of truth or falsity does not arise for such a sentence 
as 'The present King of France is bald', and that it is only the use made 
of the sentence in a certain context to make a statement that is capable 
of truth or falsity.
Strawson's notion of statement is interesting in the present context,
for what is its relation to propositions or meanings? It will be recalled 
32that Frege considers that a sentence expresses a thought or proposition 
which is the sense of the sentence. Frege distinguishes between the sense 
of 'The Morning Star' and that of 'The Evening Star' even though they have 
the same reference, i.e., the planet Venus. He also points out that many 
uniquely referring expressions such as 'the least rapidly converging 
series' or 'The King of France' have a perfectly clear sense, but no 
reference and therefore no truth-value, i.e., propositions containing 
them as subjects are neither true nor false. This is exactly Strawson's 
position. But their views differ on whether the sense of a uniquely 
referring expression can change. As we have seen, Strawson believes that 
the sense of a sentence changes from context to context, but Frege thinks 
the very opposite as can be seen from this quotation; 'The regular 
connection between a sign, its sense, and its reference is of such a kind 
that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in turn
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a definite r e f e r e n c e . T h u s  if we take sentences to he merely sequences 
of words belonging to a given language formed in accordance with an agreed 
syntax and an accepted interpretation of their conjunction, Frege's prop­
ositions and Strawson's statements are distinct from sentences. When 'The 
present King of France is bald' was uttered in different reigns, different 
statements were made because different kings were referred to, but the 
sense of the words remains unchanged at the different dates of utterance 
and so the proposition expressed, in Frege's sense, is the same. Let 
'The present King of France is bald' be uttered in Louis XIV's reign and 
let 'The previous King of France was bald' be uttered in Louis XV's reign. 
Here two distinct sentences have been uttered to make the same statement 
about Louis XIV, but since the two sentences are evidently not synonymous, 
two distinct propositions have been expressed.
It is noteworthy that the 'that — ' construction applies only to 
statements and propositions while sentences are best referred to through 
the device of quotation marks. Hence it is necessary to inspect a 'that 
— ' clause carefully before one can discover whether it is a statement or 
a proposition. Another point worth noticing is that the distinction 
between statements and propositions is necessary and possible only in 
connection with those sentences whose truth-value is dependent on their 
context. In the case of general sentences belonging to the natural 
sciences, e.g., 'All ravens are black', or to mathematics, e.g.,
*7 + 5  = 12', the truth-value is timelessly given and so there is little 
point or sense in making a distinction here between the propositions 
expressed and the statements such sentences are used to make.
Just as the reference of a proper name and of a definite description 
may be explained away by Russell or made to depend on context by Strawson, 
so a proper name or definite description could have a Fregean definite 
sense. There is nothing inherently strange about this. Words and sentences 
have been fashioned by human beings to serve many diverse purposes, not
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just one. am hot' may have different meanings according to the different 
persons saying it, but it is an accepted fact of language that 'I* refers 
to the speaker of the sentence in any context. To say that 'it is raining' ! 
means different things whether said yesterday or today is only one way of jI
explaining the use of the sentence. Another common usage is that one who
utters these words speaks corre'ctly only if he refers to the weather at
the time of his utterance and in his (more or less) immediate vicinity.
It is this general fact about what the words mean which makes it possible
for distinct utterances of them to vary as to statement made. It is indeed
to turn the argument on its head to use this obvious fact of language to
35show that phrases and sentences have no meaning of their own.
However, Cohen^^ has argued that even if sentences have their own 
accepted meanings, these meanings need not be propositions. He thinks that 
two or more sayings may have the same meaning, but the sayings have 
spatio-temporal ties which meanings do not have. He considers that an 
assertion, an utteranoe-sentence, a saying-sentenoe, and a saying are 
just different and progressively more abstract ways of describing the 
same thing. But 'the same thing* is not for him a subsistent being 
mysteriously non-physical and non-mental like a Pregean Proposition.
Cohen's saying is a sentence-token described under a certain determinable 
such that a term, or a saying may be said to exist if a token of it has 
been, is being, or will be uttered, or, if rules have been, are being or 
will be given for forming tokens of it, like the formation and semantic 
rules of a formalized language, or rules for constructing numerals in the 
decimal notation, or rules for constructing map-references from a co­
ordinate system. He claims that when you repeat your friend’s advice to 
yourself, the sense in which what you say is the same as what you heard 
is the sense in which your friend's saying is a sentence-token just as 
your repetition is another sentence-token. But it is still necessary 
to ask what is the sentence-token of, and Cohen admits that any view on
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this is hound to be controversial but that his own theory does not require 
the existence of universals or Pregean entities. Nevertheless he is against 
accepting that 'it is raining today' has a temporal and changeable truth- 
value. He takes a very simple case of the law of modus ponens; 'If 2  
only if and £, then q ' would be no use at all if, by the time we got 
from the first occurrence of *3 ’^ to the second, '2 * could have changed 
its truth-value. Thus for him timeless truth-evaluations are necessary 
in any instance of argumentation and it would be for him a more economical 
policy to accept it also for distinguishing the criteria for sameness 
and difference of saying.
Cohen's view is that to ask for the meaning of a sentence or a saying
is to ask for an explanation in simpler words or words known and understood 
37by the inquirer. The meaning on its own, he thinks, might conveniently be 
conceived merely as a rule. But the saying can be summarized or analysed 
or talked about. This has made some logicians accept and some deny that 
the saying has spatio-temporal ties. Geach, for instance, says that judg­
ment 'is loosely bound up with physical time, in that (e.g.) it did not 
occur before the beginning or after the end of the words in which it is 
uttered; if we try to assign it to a definite moment or moments, or to a 
definite stretch of time, we find ourselves in a bog of nonsense.* But he 
warns that in saying this he is not implying that 'judgments are really 
performed in a super-physical realm* but that 'to be tied loosely to 
physical time is still for them to be tied'^^ Cohen fears that if the 
notion of meaning as something neither mental nor physical is combined 
with a proposition that is untied to space or time, then the danger is that 
the combination would be taken to be a timeless substance in a Pregean 
third realm. Cohen does not believe in the divine origin of language or 
the pre-Herder assumption of a changeless stock of concepts and meanings 
so that for him there is no longer any reason for applying a realist 
theory to terms for the classification of individual human utterances.
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His own theory about translating or reporting another's utteranoe-sentence 
is that the translator’s utterance-sentences are really the author's own 
saying-centences, for the translator has not produced any of his own. Such 
a theory is based on the assumption of a temporal order 'in which no
39precognitive or retrocognitive telepathy in verbalised form is possible'. 
He therefore concludes that the arguments against so defining 'saying' 
that the same saying may now be true, now false, are strong without 
suggesting that a realist theory of universals should apply. As he says, 
'They are arguments for constructing one definition rather than another, 
not arguments for saying that one thing is the case rather than another 
On the subject of propositions, Geach^^ mentions Kotarbinski*s 
*onomatoids*, a dispensable manner of speaking of number, functions, 
classes, Platonic ideas, facts, events, situations, etc. The technical 
difficulties of doing without such nouns as entities of some sort are 
well known. Nobody has shown how to do mathematics without employing 
set theory. But Geach proposes an interesting solution here. He suggests 
that mathematical infinity should be viewed not as an infinity of Pregean 
objective thoughts, but as the infinite (illimitable) potentialities of 
human knowledge. If this is acceptable, then mathematical discourse 
would be discourse about concrete objects, namely, about what men, who 
make mathematics, are able to say and think. This would involve, Geach 
admits, a gigantic operation in modal logic dealing with potentialities, 
but he does not think it would be an impossible task. Meanwhile he acknow­
ledges that we cannot dispense with set-theoretical entities, even though 
these may be mythical. But then he reminds us that propositions are also 
a myth if they are taken to be what sentences 'express'. To distinguish 
these propositions from the older, linguistic application of the word, 
and from 'sentences' and 'statements' which are its modern controversial 
substitutes, Geach uses 'Proposition* with an initial capital letter to 
mark off the modern use of the word.
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Geach has an answer to those philosophers who use the problem of 
translation to justify the postulation of Propositions. He gives the 
following examples:
(1) James believes that his wife fears that she has cancer,
(2) James believes ’Iv]y wife's fear is "I have cancer"'.
(1) is the oratio obliqua construction and (2) the oratio recta
construction. Geach alleges that philosophers have a prejudice against 
the oratio recta construction but that every intelligent school child 
knows how to translate one construction to the other and back again.
Geach dismisses as frivolous the arguments employed by some philosophers 
who believe in Propositions such as that (2) is correctly inferable from 
(1) only with the added supposition that James talks English and 
believes that his wife does; or again that a correct translation of (2) 
would leave the oratio recta in English, whereas a correct translation 
of (1) would translate the oratio obliqua. As Geach so succinctly puts 
it: 'These deserve no answer'. He continues: 'God said "Let there be 
light" does not mean that God uses English, and only a philosopher would 
argue that this is a mistranslation unless the original consisted of a 
quoted English sentence standing in a Hebrew context.Commenting on 
this, Lewy does not hesitate to say that Geach's treatment of this is 
'irrelevant'. Lewy's reason is that 'God said "Let there be light"* does 
not mean 'God uttered the words "Let there be light"' and therefore Lewy 
thinks that Geach has missed the point. 1 think that Levjy has misunderstood 
Geach*s position here for they are both on the same side of the argument. 
This can be seen from the example Lewy gives in his criticism of Geach.
Lewy asks:
'And has Geach overlooked the fact that if I translated:
(a) Churchill uttered the words "We shall never surrender" into
Polish by:
(b) Churchill wymdlvi3^  sîowa "My sig nigdy nie poddamy", 1 should 
be turning a truth into a falsehood?'q
Lewy goes on to say:
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'I do not deny that for some purposes (Lewy's italics) it would be
legitimate to translate (a) by (b); but in this sense of "translation",
translation need not be truth-preserving. It is entirely clear that there
is another sense of "translation" in which translation must be truth-
preserving; and it ought to be equally clear that it is this latter sense
43that is involved in the translation argument.*
It seems strange that Lewy should have thus mistaken Geach's view 
for it is clear from the context that Geach is opposing those philosoph­
ers who think that 'God said "Let there be light"' is equivalent to 'God 
uttered the words "Let there be light"'. Geach is as concerned about 
translation being truth-preserving as Lewy is.
Geach thinks that the underlying prejudice against oratio recta
clauses is expressible as follows; '(2) is only language about language,
and thus can touch only the physical expressions of attitudes, not
describe the attitudes themselves'. This prejudice, he says, is what has
led Frege and others like him to suppose that there are abstract entities
.called Propositions. Geach considers that a proposition is something we
propound or put forward - it may or may not be asserted. He prefers to
consider his proposition as a predication, as he calls it, which occurs
when a predicable, i.e., an expression that gives us a proposition about
something if we attach it to another expression that stands for what
we are forming the proposition about, becomes a predicate, and the other
expression becomes its subject^^ In this way Geach thinks he has disposed
of the controversy about propositions. However, Prior points out that
where 'proposition' is linked to 'propounding', then propositions are
sentences - a linguistic entity - whereas he prefers to consider true
45propositions as well as facts as 'logical constructions'7 a term used 
interchangeably by Russell with 'logical fictions' and 'incomplete 
symbols'. Thus for Prior, both facts and true propositions are not only 
logical constructions, but are the same logical constructions. For 
example, h"e says that 'What we think is a fact' certainly means no more
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and no less than 'What we think is true', and that this identity of 
meaning remains whether we use this pair of expressions as complete 
sentences or as mere parts of sentences, e.g., 'What we think is a fact 
is not always so' means the same as 'What we think is true is not always 
so*. In some usages, it is not possible to replace 'true proposition' 
by 'fact' or vice versa, but, according to Prior, the grounds for it are 
usually trivial. In the elementary case, 'That £  is a true proposition' 
always = 'That ^  is a fact' and 'That grass is green is a true proposition' 
= 'That grass is green is a fact'. In order to explain what he means by 
'logical construction', Prior uses a simpler example than Russell's, i.e. 
'Othello believes that Desdemona is unfaithful' or 'Othello believes in 
the unfaithfulness of Desdemona', These examples, he says, appear to ex­
press a relation between Othello and a more abstract object designated by 
the noun clause 'that Desdemona is unfaithful*, or by the phrase 'the 
unfaithfulness of Desdemona'. But Prior points out that there can be no 
such relation because there is just no such thing as the unfaithfulness of 
Desdemona, since she is not unfaithful. But if the statement is rephrased 
as 'Othello ascribes infidelity to Desdemona', this appearance vanishes, 
and it is clear that the statement is not about the infidelity of Desdem­
ona at all, but about the two objects Desdemona and infidelity, to which 
Othello stands in the complex relation of ascribing the latter to the 
former. Thus all statements which appear to be about propositions can be 
paraphrased in such a way that this appearance vanishes. In this sense, 
'propositions are logical constructions', prior thinks that Russell's 
paraphrase can be taken a step further so that instead of saying 'Othello 
ascribes infidelity to Desdemona', one can say 'Othello believes that 
Desdemona is unfaithful', thus doing away with the abstract object 
'infidelity*. Similarly all universals can be got rid of as entities by 
being rephrased in this way. Once logical constructions are admitted, 
claims Prior, there is no problem about false beliefs entering into a
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relation with non-existent facts. This was the problem that seemed to 
worry Russell and Moore most at one time. However, by saying 'Othello 
believes that Desdemona is unfaithful' Prior has not resolved the problem.
How he analyses it will be seen later.
To say that propositions are logical constructions, however, is not, 
according to Prior, to say that' they are linguistic entities. Propositions 
are not sentences even when they are expressed by means of sentences. If 
they were sentences, Prior points out, they wouldn't be logical construc­
tions, for sentences are not logical constructions, but perfectly ordinary 
objects in the sense of particular inscriptions. 'Propositions are logical 
constructions' is an assertion about language, but it is not an assertion 
that propositions are 'bits' of language. Rather, he says, it is an asser­
tion about sentences that are ostensibly about propositions, to the effect 
that they are not in reality about propositions but about something else. 
Prior thinks that the sentence 'The proposition that the sun is hot is 
true' means no more and no less than the sentence 'The sun is hot*, i.e.,
the sentence 'The proposition that the sun is hot is true* is not. in
reality, according to Prior, about the proposition that the sun is hot, 
but about the sun. Similarly, he continues, 'The proposition that the sun 
is hot would be true even if unasserted* means the same as 'The sun would 
be hot even if no one said so*, and, so Prior thinks, is not about the 
proposition that the sun is hot but about the sun. Propositions, and their 
truth and falsehood, are language-independent just because propositions 
are logical constructions^^ Thus while sentences, statements, and prop­
ositions each have their uses, they do not have the same logical status. 
Sentences are marks on paper or some other surface in accordance with 
certain syntactic rules of the language employed, while statements may be 
spoken or written sentences. On the other hand, propositions may be ex — 
pressed by unspoken, spoken, or written sentences (including single-word 
sentences such as 'Fireîî'), but they are not sentences and are logical 
constructions instead.
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VJhile propositions are logical constructions and therefore not 
linguistic entities, nevertheless, because they are often expressed in 
language they are taken to be sentences. As Prior points, out, it is an 
'obvious error' that whenever we think something, what we think is a 
sentence. It seems clear to him that, when we can say the same thing by 
uttering different sentences, and that in telling someone what somebody 
said, e.g., that he said that grass is green, we do not ipso facto tell 
him what sentence he uttered, but only tell him something which perhaps 
entails that he uttered a sentence. It is also clear to Prior that even if 
we always think in sentences, we do not think sentences. It is even 
clearer that we do not fear, hope, desire, etc., sentences. Or at least 
the objects of such fears, hopes, etc., as are expressed by saying that 
someone fears that so-and-so, hopes that so-and-so, desires that so-and-so, 
are not sentences.
However, Prior is ready to concede that although fearing that 
thinking that jd, etc., do not amount to fearing, thinking, etc., a sen­
tence which means that 2,) they do amount to doing other things to, or 
standing in other relations to, such a sentence. This is like saying that 
2  amounts to, or at least in some sense involves, uttering such a sentence. 
Hence, whoever fears, thinks, etc*, that 2 ? ipso facto stands in a. 
relation to such a sentence. As Prior says, 'For to fear that I am going 
off my head is ipso facto to fear that which I might assert by uttering 
the sentence "I am going off my head"; and this does constitute a comp­
licated relation between me and this s e n t e n c e T h i s  concession, however, 
is admitted by Prior to be a trivial one. For if one breaks one's leg, 
one does not have a relation between a person - i.e., oneself - and any 
form of words whatever. Yet in breaking my leg I do ipso facto stand in a 
relation to the phrase 'my leg', since in breaking ray leg I break some­
thing which would normally be called in English 'my leg'. But breaking 
one's leg, all the same, does not consist in standing in this relation
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to this phrase, and *I have broken my leg* does not mean *1 have broken
what would normally be called in English "my leg"'. I could as easily
break my leg if no such phrase existed, or if its use in English were
quite different from what it is. It is really because I have broken my leg
that I stand in this relation to this phrase, and not vice versa. In
other words, says Prior, my relation to the phrase is parasitic upon my
relation to my legf^
However, in another instance, the point is not so obvious. Suppose,
says Prior, *X fears that there will be a nuclear war*. This sentence does
not mean *X fears that something is the case which could be asserted by
uttering the sentence "There will be a nuclear war"*. A man could have this
fear even if no such sentence existed, or if it meant something quite
different from what it does. Furthermore, it is because he fears that there
will be a nuclear war that he stands in this relation to this sentence,
rather than vice versa. That is to say, his relation to the sentence is
parasitic upon his relation to ... Here we are brought up short for we do
not know what it is that his relation to the sentence is parasitic upon.
It is certainly parasitic upon his fear that there will be a nuclear war,
but 'There will be a nuclear war* is a sentence and does not designate an
object. Prior suggests that some philosophers might say that 'X fears that
there will be a nuclear war* expresses X's relation to the proposition
that there will be a nuclear war. But it is in fact unusual for people to
say *X fears the proposition that so-and-so', or even *X thinks the
proposition that so-and-so*. Prior admits that he is not sure what the
reason for this is, even though vje do say 'X fears (thinks) that so-and-
so* and 'That so-and-so, is a proposition*. His conclusion is that 'we
treat propositions as entities when we feel we have to, otherwise not; and
49in reality we never have to*7
Prior is concerned to show that propositions, like facts and truth, 
are redundant, in Ramsey's sense, but it is not true that 'The proposition 
that the sun is hot is true’ is not about the proposition that the sun is
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hot, but about the sun. Certainly, the heat of the sun is in question 
here, but what is singled out for comment here is not just the heat of the 
sun, but the assertion or the proposition that the sun is hot. In other 
words, it is the truth or falsehood of the assertion or proposition that 
is of interest, not just the sun and its heat, 'The sun is hot' is clearly 
not the same as 'That the sun is hot', for the former is a complete sen­
tence while the latter is merely an expression, i.e., in Geach's termin­
ology, a 'predicable'.
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III. IDENTITY
Quine's opposition to propositions for over forty years is well known. 
At one time he used the word 'statement' to refer to declarative sentences 
in order to avoid using the word 'proposition' hut gave up using even the 
word 'statement' because of 'the growing tendency at Oxford to use the 
word for acts that we perform in uttering declarative sentences'^ Since 
then he has preferred to use the word 'sentence' to distinguish it from 
'proposition' when the latter is used to refer to the meaning of sentences 
or as the entity named by sentences neither of which interpretation does 
he accept.
Khen a German utters a declarative sentence, says Quine, such as 'Der 
Schnee ist weiss', he speaks truly thanks to the happy concurrence of two 
circumstances: his sentence means that snow is white, and in point of fact 
snow 22. white. But Quine points out that even though the meaning of the 
sentence is that snow is white and the fact of the matter is that snow
white, there is no reason for postulating two 'intangible intervening
2elements, a meaning and a fact'. While some people might say that the 
seeming reference to meaning and to a fact was only a manner of speaking 
which Quine admitted could be the case where 'fact' was concerned, he was 
adamant against the use of 'propositions' as 'meanings of sentences' or as 
'abstract entities in their own right'. 'These,' he says, 'not the sen­
tences themselves, are seen as the things that are true or false. These 
are the things also that stand in the logical relation of implication.
These are the things also that are known or believed or disbelieved and are 
found obvious or surprising'^ Quine thinks that once some philosophers 
have admitted propositions to their ontology to be things that are true or 
false rather than sentences, they consider that they have gained directness 
thereby saving a step, especially in the case of translations from one 
language to another and in the case of differences of formulation within 
a language. In considering the above example of the German sentence 'Der
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Schnee ist weiss' and its English translation 'Snow is white*, the 
propositionalist saves one step by saying that the proposition, that snow 
is white, is true whether the proposition is expressed in German or in 
English.
Quine's objection to recognizing propositions is based on several 
grounds one of which is philosophical parsimony or 'Occam's Razor' 
according to which no entities should be postulated in one's philosophy 
unless they are strictly needed to make one's theory simpler or more 
elegant^ Another reason for Quine's disapproval of propositions is that 
they are intangible, abstract entities as mentioned earlier. But, as he 
says, his objection to them is 'more urgent'. His more urgent reason 
against propositions is that if they existed, then sentences expressing 
them would be seen to have a relation of synonymy or equivalence - a view 
which he totally rejects. This is how he puts it :
'If there were propositions, they would induce a certain relation of 
synonymy or equivalence between sentences thamselves; those sentences 
would be equivalent that expressed the same proposition. Now my objection 
is going to be that the appropriate equivalence relation makes no object­
ive sense at the level of sentences. This, if I succeed in making it plain, 
should spike the hypothesis of propositions.'
Quine considers the case of reporting a man's remark in indirect 
quotation. In doing so we supply a sentence that is like his in meaning, 
taking care not to distort his meaning by using a derogatory word in place 
of a neutral one. For example, when a man says 'Philip has two lively 
children', we do not report him as saying that Philip had two rowdy 
children. 'Lively' is a neutral word while 'rowdy' is a derogatory one and 
to use 'rowdy* in place of 'lively' is to distort the man's meaning. This 
is a common and well-understood usage that will not countenance the 
substitution of words that misrepresent the speaker’s attitude and thereby 
his meaning. But it has been claimed that in relaying objective information 
without regard to attitudes, the substitution of a derogatory word for a
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neutral one will not be counted as distorting the man's meaning. Even in 
such a case of objective information Quine denies that it is possible 
to speak of sentences being alike or unlike in meaning or of their 
expressing the same proposition. He denies that you can have the sameness 
of objective information, even without regard to attitudes or to poetic 
qualities. The reason for his denial is that he does not find the notion 
of objective information itself acceptably clear.
Quine points out that the notion of information is central to the 
theory of communication and it does make sense relative to one or another 
pre-assigned matrix of alternatives, i.e. one or another check list, 
according to which certain features are said to count in advance while 
certain others are not, Quine gives the example of the familiar half-tone 
method of photographic illustration^ A half-tone picture is completely 
determined by settling which of 360,000 points are black. Thus two 
paintings give the same information, relative to this matrix, when they 
determine the same points as black. Or alternatively, one could give the 
same information by saying which positions are white instead of black. In 
such a case there is a pre-assigned matrix of black and white alternatives. 
But in real life, as Quine says, no matrix of alternatives is given, that 
is to say, there is no evident rule for separating the information from 
stylistic or other immaterial features of the sentences. To say that two 
sentences mean the same proposition when they.contain the sameness of 
objective information is, therefore, not an adequate explanation of same­
ness of meaning. It is merely a re-phrasing of the problem.
However, there is an area in which Quine does find an 'absolute
7concept of objective information', and a matrix of alternatives. In part­
icle physics, he says, two sentences agree in objective information, and 
so express the same proposition, when every cosmic distribution of part­
icles that would make either sentence true would make the other true as 
well. Each distribution of elementary particles of specified kinds over
I
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total space-time.-may be called a possible world; and then two sentences :
mean the same proposition when they are true in all the same possible j
worlds. Thus the truths of pure mathematics and logic are true in all 
possible worlds and the class of possible worlds in which a sentence comes 
out true is the sentence’s objective information, i.e., its proposition.
But, continues Quine, this idea' does not give us a general way of equating 
sentences in real life. His conclusion is that we can never hope to arrive 
at a technique for so analysing our ordinary sentences as to reveal their 
implications in respect of the distribution of particles.
An attempt to assess objective information is the verification theory 
of meaning according to which the proposition or meaning of a sentence 
is identified with the information conveyed, but the matrix of alternatives 
used here in defining information is the totality of possible distinctions 
and combinations of sensory input. Differences of opinion exist as to what 
these alternatives are. Some philosophers would call them sense data while 
others would call them instances of neural stimulation. Quine finds that 
either theory runs into difficulties in trying to 'distribute the sensory
gevidence over separate sentences'.
Like Frege, Quine is concerned with scientific truth as the goal of
logic. Hence he is concerned with the objective information of a scientific
theory taken as a whole, and not simply sentence by sentence. Science
deals with observation sentences which can be affirmed or denied by the
people present under a certain stimulus in a certain context. When a
number of observation sentences are inter-connected to form a scientific
hypothesis, the testing of the hypothesis may result in the abandoning of
one or more observation sentences or one or more beliefs without the
gabandonment of the hypothesis altogether, Quine shows that even though a 
set H of hypotheses may be incompatible with a set H ' of hypotheses, it 
can happen that a total theory 2  into which both H and H' have been 
subsumed, resulting in a total theory , the resulting 2* still fits all
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possible observations just as well as 2 d-id. It is evident, therefore, that 
H and H* convey the same empirical information, as far as empirical infor­
mation can be apportioned to H and H' at all; but H and H' nevertheless 
remain incompatible. This, to Quine, is proof enough that propositions 
cannot be the empirical meanings of sentences. What the scientist does in 
rejecting certain beliefs in his hypothesis and replacing them with others 
does not serve to show how to allocate separate empirical evidence to 
separate sentences. All that he can do is to allocate separate evidence to 
each observation sentence but not to all other sentences. When a theory is 
falsified by an experiment, what is shown to be false is at least one of 
the inter-connecting hypotheses on which the theory has been based, but it 
is not known which hypothesis actually is the false one. It is the theory 
as a whole that admits of evidence or counter-evidence in observation and 
experiment, not single observations.
Quine's opposition to propositions as meanings of sentences is part 
of his more general opposition to what he calls the 'myth of meaning'^^ 
According to this myth, each idea is tagged with the expression which 
means it, and each proposition is tagged with ai’tappropriate sentence. An 
empirical theory of meaning might support this myth with its fairly clear 
individuation in the domain of sensory evidence but Quine has shown that we 
cannot allocate separate empirical evidence to separate sentences. We can 
only allocate separate evidence to each observation sentence, but that is 
about the end of itl^
Quine sees the question how to individuate propositions as the ques­
tion how to define equivalence of sentences which may be empirical equival­
ence or 'cognitive' equivalence geared somehow to truth conditions. We 
have seen that he denies the possibility of the empirical equivalence of 
sentences. He now considers whether it is possible to have cognitive 
equivalence by defining a strong synonymy relation for single words simply 
by requiring that they be inter-changeable salva veritate, that is to say, 
by putting one word for another while preserving the truth value of the
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context, turning truths into truths and falsehoods into falsehoods. For 
example, 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' may be called synonymous when 
always inter-changeable salva veritate. As a consequence of this, Quine 
proposes that we call two sentences equivalent, in a strong sense, when 
they are built up of corresponding parts which are pairwise synonymous 
in the above sense.
Quine discusses the synonymy of terms such as 'creature with a heart' 
i.e., 'cordate' and 'creature with a kidney*, i.e., 'renate'. All four 
terms are true of just the same creatures, but they are synonymous only 
in pairs, 'cordate' with 'creature with a heart* and 'renate' with 'creaturt 
with a kidney'. Thus
(1) Necessarily all cordâtes are cordâtes 
will remain true when turned into
(2) Necessarily all cordâtes are creatures with a heart 
but will be false if turned into
(3 ) Necessarily all cordâtes are renates.
But, as Quine points out, this successful contrast depends oddly on the 
resources of the language, i.e., on the availability of the adverb 
'necessarily' which, in its turn, is to Quine just as obscure as the 
notions of synonymy and equivalence. Similarly, the example:
(4 ) Tom thinks all cordâtes are cordâtes
seems more innocent than (l) with its 'cooked-up sense' of necessity.
But to Quine, the 'thinks'iidiom, for all its ordinariness, is just as 
obscure as the notions of synonymy and equivalence, for (4) cannot be 
turned into
(5) Tom. thinks all cordâtes are renates
without turning a truth into a falsehood, just like (3 ).
In fact, Quine asks whether such notions as synonymy, equivalence, 
and deducibility can be dispensed with in serious science. His answer is: 
'In large part I think they are'ï^ Quine is not saying that he has no use
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at all for these notions. There are, he says, relativized usages that 
account for much of the everyday utility of these terms. For instance, we 
speak of equivalence or deducibility relative to one or another tacitly 
accepted corpus of background information. Also there are certain narrowly 
logical notions of equivalence and deducibility that he accepts and 
defends. You could know, he says, what simple sentences a certain sequence 
^a, b^ satisfies and be unable to decide whether it satisfies a certain 
quantification * ( z)Fxyz *. The reason for this, he thinks, is the 
question whether ^a, b, satisfies 'Pxyz' for at least one thing £. This 
question, however, outruns all that simple information about ^ .
Higher-level information about b ^  depends thus on simple information 
about more than^a, b^ itself. But, Quine points out, all the higher- 
level information is nevertheless determinate relative to the infinite 
totality, however unmanageable, of simple information. If we are given 
that certain sequences satisfy certain simple sentences, then we know 
what sequences satisfy any compound sentence.
It is these determining links that are the business of logic. Once we 
know what sequences satisfy the simple sentences, we can settle what 
compound sentences will be true. Similarly, given that a compound sentence 
is true, we can settle what alternatives are left open for the simple 
sentences. In this way dependences upward and downward as well as trans­
verse interdependences can be explored between one compound sentence and 
another.
Quine defines a logically true sentence thus: a sentence is logically 
true if all sentences are true that share its logical structure. Taking 
the notion of logical truth as basic, he goes on to define the other re­
lated notions as follows: A sentence is logically false just in case its 
negation is logically true. Two or more sentences are logically incompat­
ible just in case their conjunction is logically false. And one sentence 
logically implies another when logically incompatible with the other’s 
negation. Sentences are logically equivalent that imply each other}^
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Outside these narrow logical limits, Quine finds the notions of 
implication, equivalence, and deducibility unclear. As he says, 'It is not 
as though equivalence were a new and technical notion, needing still to be 
paraphrased into ordinary language. On the contrary, the term is itself 
ordinary, for all its obscurity. The idea of equivalence, "cognitive" 
equivalence, seems to make sense as it stands, until scrutinized. It is 
only mutual implication, after all, and implication is only deducibility. 
The complaint against these notions is not lack of familiarity, but lack 
of clarity
In the same way, Quine thinks that we can dispense with the doctrine 
of propositions. The doctrine is futile because the problem of individ­
uation cannot be solved. Even if it can, with a suitable definition of 
equivalence of sentences, then, he says, one might just as well talk of 
sentences and equivalences and let go of propositions. Quine calls prop­
ositions 'shadows of s e n t e n c e s f o r  they give us nothing which, he 
thinks, sentences will not give. His opinion is that the reason why some 
philosophers have made use of propositions is that they consider that 
truth is intelligible only of propositions, not of sentences. But he 
thinks he can explain the truth of sentences to propositionalists by saying 
that sentences are true whose meanings are true propositions. However, he 
can detect a deeper though vaguer reason for belief in propositions. It is 
the deep-seated belief that truth should hinge on reality and not on 
language, and sentences are language. Quine agrees with propositionalists 
that truth should hinge on reality, not on language, but he realizes, 
which they do not seem to, that truth does hinge on reality because no
sentence is true unless reality makes it so. In this light propositions
17are a 'shabby' imaginary projection from sentences.' He quotes Tarski's 
theory of truth in which 'Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is 
white. Sentences are thus true only in so far as they point to reality.
As Quine adds, 'No sentence is true but reality makes it so'. But the
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truth predicate has its uses even when we are concerned with reality 
because of the occasional need, through certain technical complications, 
to mention sentences. One of these occasions occurs when we are seeking 
generality in an oblique way because we cannot generalize over objects.
For example, we can generalize on 'Tom is mortal', 'Dick is mortal’, and 
so on, without talking of truth or of sentences by saying 'All men are 
mortal'. We can generalize also on 'Tom is Tom', 'Dick is Dick', '0 is O', 
and so on, by saying 'Everything is itself. But when we want to generalize 
on 'Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal', 'Snow is white or snow is not 
white', and so on, we 'ascend to talk of truth and of sentences, saying 
"Every sentence of the form '£ or not £' is true", or "Every alternation 
of a sentence with its negation is true",' This semantic ascent is made 
not because 'Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal' is somehow about senten­
ces while 'Tom is mortal' and 'Tom is Tom' are about Tom. All three sen­
tences are about Tom. We make the semantic ascent because of 'the oblique 
way in which the instances over which we are generalizing are related to 
one anotiier.In other words, one cannot generalize on 'Tom is mortal or 
Tom is not mortal' by saying '£ or not £ for all things £ of the sort that 
sentences are names o f  because sentences are not names. So in order to 
gain our desired generality, we go up one step and talk about sentences: 
'Every sentence of the form "£ or not £" is true'. Here '£' is merely a 
schematic letter, and not a variable ranging over propositions or meanings 
of sentences or other abstract objects}^
This ascent to a linguistic plane of reference is, says Quine, only a 
momentary retreat from the world, for the utility of the truth predicate 
is precisely the cancellation of linguistic reference. This is seen clearly 
in Tarski's paradigm:
'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.
Quotation marks show whether we are talking about words or talking 
about snow. The quotation is a name of a sentence that contains a name,
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namely, 'snow', of snow. By calling the sentence true, we call snow white.
Quine points out that 'the truth predicate is a device of disquotation ...
We need it to restore the effect of objective reference when for the sake
20of some generalization we have resorted to semantic ascent,' i.e., when 
we use language to talk about language.
However, Quine concludes that though a sentence is what is true or 
false rather than a proposition, what is actually true is an event of 
utterance. The same sentence that is uttered by different people may now 
be false and now be true. Similarly, when the sentence is written rather 
than spoken, then it is the inscription that is true or false. In both 
cases it is the context that decides whether the utterance or the inscrip­
tion is true or false. When sentences are spoken of as being true or false, 
then they are eternal sentences which are forever true or forever false, 
e.g., sentences of arithmetic, of the laws of physics and any statement, 
however important or inconsequential, that can be turned into an eternal 
sentence by supplying dates, places, and names and cancelling the tenses 
.of verbs. An example of the latter may be 'It rains in Boston, Mass., on 
July 15, 1988', Quine agrees with Peirce that utterances and inscriptions 
are tokens of the sentence or other linguistic expression concerned, and 
this linguistic expression is the type of those utterances and inscrip­
tions. Combining this terminology with Frege's truth values, i.e., truth 
and falsity, Quine summarizes his position by saying that an eternal 
sentence is a sentence whose tokens all have the same truth value. Although 
eternal sentences always have the same truth value, one should remember 
that they are nevertheless relativized to a language at a certain date and 
place. But this presents no difficulty to Quine. The important conclusion 
from all this to Quine is that it is sentence tokens and eternal senten­
ces, not propositions, that are true or false. It can be shown that it is 
not necessary to posit a non-linguistic proposition as a vehicle for 
non-linguistic truth because the truth predicate serves the purpose of
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reconciling the mention of linguistic forms with an interest in the
objective world. It is only when we need to generalize about sentences
such as when we say 'Most of what Tom says is true' that we need to talk
of the truth of sentences, i.e., in cases where we cannot eliminate the
meta-linguistic mode of talking.
' 21In contrast to Quine, Lemmon argues that there are occasions when 
neither 'sentence* nor 'statement' quite expresses what we mean and that 
is when we need to use 'proposition' to communicate what we do mean.
Lemmon discusses Frege's 'On Sense and Reference' in which Frege begins
with a puzzle about identity and says that in the sentences
(6) The morning star is the morning star,
(7) The morning star is the evening star,
(6) is a trivial truth of logic, an example of the law of identity while
(7) is a far from trivial astronomical fact, dependent for its truth not
on logic but on the way the world happens to be. Nevertheless, (6) and
(7) cannot be all that different since they are about the same object,
.Venus. Frege's way out of the difficulty is to distinguish between the 
reference of uniquely referring expressions and their sense. The refer­
ence of both 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' is the planet 
Venus but Frege nowhere defines what he means by sense and merely explains 
it as the mode of presentation of the object which is its reference.
Lemmon accepts that 'the morning star' and 'the evening star* have diff­
erent senses, with, for example, 'the morning star' having the same sense 
as the correct French translation 'I'etoil du matin'. He also accepts that 
'the man whom Brutus killed' and 'the man who invaded Britain in 55 B.C.', 
though they have the same reference, Caesar, have different senses, while
'the man whom Brutus killed' and 'the man who was killed by Brutus' have
22the same reference and the same sense,
Lemmon finds it 'natural* to speak of sentences as a whole having a 
sense, e.g., what the sentence has in common with its correct translation
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into other languages. He agrees with Frege that this sense will be a
function of the sense of any expressions occurring in the sentence. It is
clear to Lemmon that two different sentences may express the same sense or
proposition and that the same sentence, if it contains some ambiguous word
or phrase, may have two different senses and so express two different
propositions. In consequence of this view, Lemmon concludes that both (6)
and (7) have the same reference and the same truth value, i.e., they are
both true, but they have different senses and so express different propos-
23itions. In this way the puzzle about identity ceases to be puzzling.
Lemmon is convinced that we have, intuitively, three distinct 
notionssentence, statement, and proposition. Sentences are, for 
Lemmon, 'merely taken to be sequences of words belonging to a given lan­
guage'. Statements differ from sentences in that sentences are used to 
make statements with. Let
(8) The present King of France is bald 
be uttered in Louis XIV's reign and let
(9) The previous King of France was bald
be uttered during Louis XV's reign. Here, says Lemmon, are two distinct 
sentences used to make the same statement, with Louis XIV referred to 
twice and the same thing said about him. But the two sentences are clearly 
not synonymous and so two distinct propositions have been expressed.
All three - sentence, statement, and proposition - may be true or 
false, according to Lemmon who, however, admits that they may be so in 
different senses, A sentence, he says, may be said to be true (false), 
relative to a particular context of utterance if, in that context, it is 
used to make a true (false) statement, A proposition also may be said 
to be true (false) relative to a context of utterance if there is a 
sentence, true (false) relative to that context which expresses it. 
Sentences, then, will vary in their truth value from context to context 
and so will propositions as the senses of sentences, By contrast, state­
ments are true or false once and for all, 'Brutus killed Caesar' is true
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for all time even though the sentence used in making it may in other 
25contexts he false.
While Lemmon admits statements and propositions in addition to sen­
tences to his ontology, he realizes that the ontological status of state­
ments and propositions is peculiar7^ They are not linguistic entities 
as sentences are. They do not belong to a language, nor are they spatio- 
temporal particulars, locatable at a position in space-time, like 
physical objects or even events and processes. Thus he considers that 
there is a prima facie case against postulating them unless we have to.
On the other hand, as abstract objects they are perhaps no worse than 
qualities such as colours or even symphonies considered not as perform 
—.ances, Lemmon agrees with Quine that whether the notion of proposition 
can be justified depends really on whether the notion of meaning or sense 
and the closely related notion of synonymy can be adequately defined.
He discusses Quine's view in Word and Object, Chapter II, where Quine 
calls translational schemes from one language to another 'analytical 
hypotheses', and quotes Quine as saying (Word and Object, p.75):
'The indefinability of synonymy by reference to the methodology of 
analytical hypotheses is formally the same as the indefinability of truth 
by reference to scientific method. Also the consequences are parallel.
Just as we may meaningfully speak of the truth of a sentence only within 
the terms of some theory, so on the whole we may meaningfully speak of 
inter-linguistic synonymy only within the terms of some particular system 
of analytical hypotheses,'
Lemmon's criticism is that even on his own view Quine's wholesale 
rejection of synonymy is not called for. Once a translational scheme is 
more or less agreed on, Lemmon thinks that we may profitably speak of 
synonymy. He has no doubt that the notion of synonymy is in need of proper 
clarification but that Quine has not shown that such clarification is 
unobtainable. All that Quine has done is to reveal some of the difficul­
ties that might stand in the way of such clarification. After all, the
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notion of truth, says Lemmon, with which few logicians or philosophers
would like to dispense is only different in degree of clarity, perhaps,
hut not in kind from the notion of synonymy, as a basis for prepositional
identity* Lemmon concludes that the latter notion may be unsatisfactory
but is not doomed by Quine's arguments against it,
Lemmon also attacks Quine's notion of eternal sentences in which
verbs are tenseless, time and place are indicated, 'indicator words' such
as 'I', 'now', and 'this' replaced by exact and objective spatio-temporal
references and incomplete descriptions and proper names filled out to
27secure a unique for-all-time reference, Lemmon doubts whether such an 
expansion into eternal sentences is in principle always possible. For 
example, in
(10) Brutus killed Caesar,
Lemmon points out that Brutus and Caesar may be dogs rather than Romans 
and that even if we expand (lO) into
(11) Brutus, the Roman Senator who lived from 85 to 42 B,G., killed 
Caesar, the Roman General who lived from 102 to 44 B,0,,
Lemmon does not think that in theory we are any better off, for it is in 
principle still possible that there were two such senators or two such 
generals, or even two Romes, No such definite description, he says, or 
proper name, however 'complete', carries a logical assurance of context- 
free unique reference, which is what Quine's expansion into eternal sen­
tences seems to demand.
Furthermore, suppose we grant that it is possible to expand into 
eternal sentences. Here again Lemmon finds fault with Quine's theory.
First, Lemmon considers that it is statements rather than propositions
28that eternal sentences might replace. This is conceded by Quine, For 
eternal sentences, like statements but unlike propositions, are supposed 
to be timelessly true or false. Hence, continues Lemmon, there is no 
reason to suppose that eternal sentences can hope to explain idioms such
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as those exemplified in
(12) It used to be true that the population of London was under 
four million, but this is no longer true today.
Lemmon points out that propositions are in fact called in, as distinct 
from statements, precisely as the constant senses, from context to context, 
of non-eternal sentences. Secondly, he says that it is not clear that 
eternal sentences will do in place of statements, just because eternal 
sentences belong to a language in a way that statements do not so that the 
distinction between (12) and
(13) 'The population of London is under four million' used to be 
true, but is no longer true today
is obscured. Lemmon argues that a sentence to the effect that an eternal
sentence is true is a sentence about a language, in a way that a sentence
to the effect that the corresponding statement is, is not. Thirdly, Lemmon
argues that it is theoretically simpler to postulate the existence of
statements as entities than to rely on a putative and complex translation
into eternal sentences. But Lemmon has to admit that these arguments de*^
29pend on clear criteria being available for the identity of statements - 
something that Quine has found impossible. So it seems that we are back to 
square one.
The problem with synonymy is related to what Quine has called the 
resources of language. As Benson Mates^^ says: 'We need empirical re­
search regarding the ordinary language in order to determine which express­
ions are in fact synonymous, and with the help of these data it may be 
possible to find an acceptable definition of "synonymity” for some lang­
uage which has a determinate structure and which closely resembles the 
ordinary language'•
Mates continues: 'Yet it is important to observe that this very re­
search could hardly be carried out unless we possessed in advance a 
sufficiently precise characterization of synonymity to enable us to decide
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■under what conditions we would regard tvjo expressions as synonymous for a
given person. Otherwise, we would be forced to ask questions of the form
"Are A and B synonymous?”; and the answers would depend not only upon
whether or not the subjects regarded the expressions as synonymous, but
also upon how they understood the term "synonymous” ’. It is this sort of
circular evidence which buttresses Quine’s case against the notions of
synonymy, equivalence, meaning, and so on.
31Nelson Goodman is on the side of Quine in this controversy. He 
considers the theory that two predicates have the same meaning if and only 
if they apply to exactly the same things - that is, have the same exten­
sion. But a serious objection to this view is that there are clear cases 
where two words that have the same extension do not have the same meaning. 
For example:, ’centaur’ and ’unicorn’ have the same (null) extension, but 
they differ in meaning.
It is obvious, he points out, that if two terms have the same meaning 
they have the same extension, but not vice versa, Extensional identity 
is a necessary but not a sufficient criterion for sameness of meaning.
He thinks that one can account for difference of meaning without intro­
ducing what he calls ’ghostly entities’ called meanings beyond terms and 
their extensions.
In the case of a centaur, he says, if there is a foot or uncle of a 
centaur, then there is a centaur, but if there is a picture of a centaur, 
we cannot infer that there is a centaur. A phrase ’picture of a centaur’ 
is, according to Goodman, a simple predicate, like ’centaur-picture* or 
like ’unicorn-picture’ which applies to different physical objects just as 
’chair’ and ’desk* apply to different physical objects. Although ’centaur' 
and ’unicorn’ apply to nothing and so have the same extension, ’centaur- 
picture’ and ’unicorn-picture’ apply to many things.
Thus two words may have the same extension, but identical additions 
to them make them have different extensions. A distinction between
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primary extension and secondary extension helps to explain any difference 
of meaning among extensionally identical predicates. Thus if a predicate 
has a primary extension (its own) and a secondary extension (its com­
pound’s), then two terms have the same meaning if and only if they have 
the same primary and secondary extensions. There is no need to refer to 
anything mysterious other than terms and the things they apply to, Goodman 
uses Frege’s ’Morning-star’ and ’Evening-star’ as examples of two predi­
cates that have the same extension but are different in meaning. He now 
explains the difference as one in their secondary extensions: ’Morning- 
star-pictures’ that are not ’Evening-star-pictures', Even if, he says,
’P ’ and apply to odours or electric charges, there can still be ’P- 
descriptions ’ and ’^ -diagrams’ so that *^’ and ’j^ ’ differ in their secon­
dary extensions and thus in meaning. Even words are actual word-inscrip­
tions which are as genuine physical objects as anything else. This shows 
that every difference in meaning is reflected by a difference in primary 
or secondary extension. Thus ’triangle' and 'trilateral* differ in meaning 
because a 'triangle that is not trilateral* is a triangle-description but 
not a trilateral-description. According to this theory of meaning, no two 
different words have the same meaning. This demonstrates that in terms of 
extensions alone Goodman thinks that he has been able to draw fine 
enough distinctions in meaning.
It is notable that Goodman has been able to show that there are no 
two predicates such that each can be replaced by the other in every sen­
tence without changing the truth-value, even if we exclude all the so- 
called intensional contexts in which such words as ’necessary’, ’possible’, 
’attitude of’ or 'thought of’ occur. Thus for him no two words have the 
same meaning and no two different predicates ever have the same meaning.
Goodman concludes that it is better to say that two predicates have 
a greater or lesser degree, or one or another kind, of ’likeness’ of 
meaning. In ordinary speech when we say that two terms have the same
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meaning, we usually indicate only that their kind and degree of likeness 
of meaning is sufficient for the purposes of immediate discourse. But 
discourse varies from discourse and the likeness of meaning required of 
two predicates will vary with the discourse. Sometimes it is the same 
primary extension that is required and at other times it is certain sec­
ondary extensions that are required to he identical. As he says, if we 
overlook this variation of requirement and seek a fixed criterion of 
sameness of meaning that will at once conform to these differing usages 
and satisfy our theoretical demands, we are doomed to perpetual confusion. 
There is really no exact synonymy between diverse predicates according to 
Goodman's theory,
Goodman also argues against those who say that 'All A's are B's’ is 
analytic if the meaning of B is contained in that of A. His theory has 
shown that not only do two predicates like 'A' and 'B' never have the same 
meaning, but that neither meaning is included in the other because there 
is an A-description that is not a B-description and vice versa. Thus for 
Goodman no non-repetitive statement will be analytic; it can only be more 
or less analytic. Similarly, a non-repetitive statement is never absolutely 
necessary, but only more or less necessary.
Likeness of meaning is, to Quine, a dim notion. It has never been 
clear to him, in the case of two predicates said to be alike in extension, 
when to say that they are alike in meaning and when not. It involves, he 
says, the same old problem of featherless bipeds and rational animals, or 
of equiangular and equilateral triangles, Featherless bipeds belong to 
the same class of extension as rational animals, but the expressions are 
not alike in meaning. Similarly, equiangular triangles are members of the 
same class of extension as equilateral triangles, but again the express­
ions do not have the same meaning. If the identity of propositions is to 
depend on their being alike in meaning and such likeness of meaning is not 
to be found, then there is no such thing as prepositional identity. Indeed,
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Quine says that the question of prepositional identity comes to 'admit of 
one or another definite answer in terms of geometrical similarity or con­
ventional correspondence of written m a r k s I n  other words, there is no Iprepositional identity apart from significant sentences which are signi- 
acant only by fiat, with each expression in a sentence assigned a use and a 
set of rules according to which'certain expressions may be used together to 
form a sentence. Once he has made his position clear in this way, Quine has 
no hesitation in using the word 'proposition' in Wittgenstein's sense of 
sentence, i,e,, a linguistic symbol.
In discussing the problem of prepositional identity, Lewy^^ makes use 
of three statements made by Wisdom:
(14) 'Vixen' means the same as 'female fox';
(15) 'Vixen' means female fox;
(16) A vixen ma,y be defined as a female fox.
It is not clear to Lewy what Wisdom means when he says that the sentences 
(14)j (15)» and (16) make the 'same factual c l a i m s b u t  that when he 
discussed them with Wisdom in 1942 the latter accepted Lewy's suggested 
interpretation that the propositions expressed by the three sentences are 
logically equivalent - that they all entail each other. Lewy here takes 
'entails' to mean strictly implies (—3 ). That is to say, '2 entails
means/v (P , Also he takes 'logical equivalence' or 'mutual entail-
ment* to mean strict equivalence, i.e., mutual strict implication, 
symbolized by * 5
Lewy points out that if Wisdom is right in his claims, then he has 
solved one of the principal problems in the philosophy of logic, that is, 
the problem of the relation of propositions about abstract entities to 
propositions about words and, secondly, he has gone some way towards solv­
ing another of the principal problems in this field, that is the problem 
of the relation of logically necessary propositions to propositions about 
words. In other words, if Wisdom is right, then he has explained the
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notion of an abstract entity, and has also gone some way towards explain­
ing the notion of logical necessity. Both Wisdom and Lewy arc here con­
cerned with a central area of discourse in philosophical logic.
In discussing Wisdom's above three statements, Lewy quotes from a 
paper of Wisdom's in which the latter says that the decoder, the trans­
lator, and the philosopher 'all'use the same form of words because what 
they say is the same'^^ In other words. Wisdom may be taken to mean that
(14), (15)» and (16) all say the same, i.e., they all express the same 
proposition. But even if one interprets Wisdom to mean logical equivalence 
rather than prepositional identity, Lewy is able to show that there is a 
basic contradiction in Wisdom's thesis.
Wisdom tells us that in order to understand sentence (I4) it is not 
necessary to understand either the word 'vixen' or the expression 'female 
fox'. He says that sentences such as (14) - 'decoder's sentences’ - can be 
understood by anybody who understands the meaning of ’means the same as’; 
that in order to understand (15) it is necessary to understand the express­
ion 'female fox'; and that in order to understand (16) it is necessary to 
understand both the word 'vixen' and the expression 'female fox'.
Lewy interprets Wisdom's assertion that (I4 ) and (15) ’make the same- 
factual claims' to mean that the proposition expressed by (I4 ) entails and 
is entailed by the proposition expressed by (15)* Hence Lewy asks the 
questions:
(a) Does (14) entail (15)?
(B) Does (15) entail (I4 )?
He offers two arguments against (A). His first argument is an instance of 
the so-called 'translation argument'. He translates (14) into Latin as 
(14a) 'Vixen' signifient idem quam 'female fox'.
He translates (15) into Latin as
(15a) 'Vixen* signifient vulpem feminam.
It is obvious that (l5a) cannot be deduced from (14a). The value of any
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translation argument lies in its making explicit the difference between, 
as in this case, the word 'vixen' and the object vixen or the expression 
'female fox' and the object female fox.
Lewy's second argument is more direct. (14) only tells us that 'vixen' 
and 'female fox' have some meaning in common but (14) entails nothing 
about what meaning they have in' common. For this reason the clearest way 
of expressing (14) would be by saying '"vixen” means what is meant by 
"female fox"'. On the other hand, (l5) does tell us what the word 'vixen' 
means; i.e., (ip) does make a 'factual claim' which (14) does not make. 
Therefore (14) does not entail (15).
In disposing of (b), Lewy shows that the Latin translations (14&) and 
(15a), i.e.,
(I4a) 'Vixen' signifient idem quam 'female fox'
and (15a) 'Vixen' signifient vulpem feminam
make it quite clear that (I5a) does not entail (14a-)» He also argues that
(14) entails that the expression 'female fox' has some meaning in English;
(15) does not entail this. But clearly if 2 entails Q, and R does not 
entail £, then R does not entail P, Hence, (15) does not entail (14). In 
other words, (14) makes a 'factual claim' which (15) does not make, viz., 
that 'female fox' has some meaning in English and hence (15) does not 
entail (14).
It has been relatively easy to show that (14) and (15) are not logic­
ally equivalent and therefore do not 'say the same thing'. As they are
both contingent propositions, they present fewer difficulties than a
necessary proposition like (I6). In discussing (I6), Lewy prefers to re­
formulate it, 'without prejudice to Wisdom's views or argument', as
(16) The concept of being a vixen is identical with the concept of
37being a female fox.
The questions now are: Does (16) entail (I4 )? Does (I6 ) entail (I5 )? Does 
(14) entail (16)? Does (15) entail (l6)?
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(l6) is logically necessary and Lewy thinks that Wisdom himself would 
admit this since one of his main purposes was to explain the necessity of 
necessary propositions and a definition is a necessary proposition. But 
both (14) and (15) are contingent. Since a necessary proposition cannot 
entail a contingent proposition, (I6 ) does not entail (14) and (16) does 
not entail (I5).
A second argument put forward by Lewy against (l6) entailing (I4 ) 
and (16) entailing (15) is this. Both (I4 ) and (15) entail that the word 
'vixen* has a meaning in English. But (16) entails nothing whatever about 
English. It follows immediately that (I6 ) does not entail (I4 ) and (I6 ) 
does not entail (I5 ). Or, to put it another way, it is logically possible 
that (16) be true but (I4 ) and (15) be false. This would be the case even 
if English did not exist.
But does (14) entail (I6 )? Does (15) entail (16)? Still using 'entails' 
to mean strictly implies, Lex^'s answer is that since (I6) is necessary 
and a necessary proposition is entailed by any proposition whatever, one 
can say - trivially - that (I4) entails (I6 ) and also that (15) entails
(16). But such an answer is unhelpful though trivially true. The answer is 
really that (I4) does not entail (16) and (15) does not entail (16) but 
it is consequent upon a rather difficult and complicated analysis.
According to Lewy, Wisdom's (14) contains the concept 'the concept 
expressed by the word "vixen”' and the concept 'the concept expressed by 
the expression "female fox”*. It does not contain either the concept 
'the concept of being a vixen' or the concept 'the concept of being a 
female fox'. (15) contains the concept 'the concept expressed by the 
word "vixen” ' and the concept 'the concept of being a female fox'. It does 
not contain either the concept 'the concept expressed by the expression 
"female fox” ' or the concept 'the concept of being a vixen'. (16) contains 
the concept 'the concept of being a vixen' and the concept 'the concept 
of being a female fox'. It does not contain either the concept 'the con­
cept expressed by the word "vixen” ' or the concept 'the concept expressed
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by the expression "female fox"’. Lewy makes it abundantly clear that 
(14), (15), and (16) do not entail and are not entailed by one another 
because each proposition says something different rather than 'the same 
thing' as Wisdom claims^^
According to Lewy, Wisdom’s mistake lies in his taking 'the concept 
of being a vixen* and 'the concept of being a female fox’ to mean ’the 
concept expressed by the word "vixen"' and 'the concept expressed by the 
expression "female fox"' respectively. What is more, Wisdom thought that 
any sentence containing one or both of the latter phrases should be inter­
preted in accordance with Russell's theory of definite description. This 
made him hold that all his three sentences express the same proposition. 
But it also made it impossible for him to explain the difference between 
propositions like (I6 ), which give analyses of concepts, and propositions 
like (14) and (15) which do not do so. To get out of this difficulty, 
Wisdom then put forward the theory that although all his three sentences 
say the same thing, yet in order to understand sentence (I6 ) a man must 
understand the word 'vixen' and the expression 'female fox', and in order 
to understand sentence (I5 ) a man must understand the expression 'female 
fox'. But Lewy thinks that to understand the word 'vixen' and the exr 
pression 'female fox' is to understand the concepts expressed by the word 
'vixen' and by the expression 'female fox'. The phrase 'the concept exp­
ressed by the word "vixen"' and the phrase 'the concept expressed by the 
expression "female fox"' are not descriptive phrases in Russell’s sense, 
whereas the way that Wisdom treats them in (I6), whether in his own words 
or in Lewy's re-formulation, the phrases both are and are not descriptive 
phrases in Russell's sense. This is what Lewy means by a basic contra­
diction in Wisdom’s thesis.
39As Cooper points out, Lewy relies heavily on two arguments to 
establish his thesis. One is the translation argument according to which 
a sentence about words cannot mean the same as one about a concept since
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foreign translations of the two will clearly differ in meaning. The other 
is Levjy's 'direct* argument according to which a sentence about words 
cannot be strictly equivalent to one about a concept, since they have 
different entailments. Lewy's method, as Cooper says, is uncompromisingly 
formalistic and takes for granted the clarity of such notions as propos­
ition, concept, necessity, etc. Lewy also fails to realize that even to
understand the proof *"___ " means the same as "____"' does not strictly
imply that the concept ___  is identical with the concept ....; we have to
understand the latter proposition, which is precisely what Wisdom and 
others deny that we do. Their point is not, says Cooper, that this propos­
ition means something which, as it turns out, is entailed by what the 
first sentence means; but that unless we treat the conceptual claim as a 
disguised way of making the verbal claim, we just do not understand the 
claim. This consideration suggests to Cooper that Lewy's 'main arguments 
for the distinctions he draws themselves rest on over confidence in the 
intelligibility of crucial notions. For the same point can be made about 
the "translation" argument, which rests on the view that adequate trans­
lation is tested by its preserving synonymy or propositional identity.
This is to ignore the arguments of Quine to show that the test must go in 
the reverse direction
In his attack on Wisdom's three sentences - i.e., (14)> (15), and
(16) - Lewy seems to take for granted that we all understand clearly what 
Quine has so persistently questioned - i.e., words like 'proposition', 
'equivalence', and 'prepositional identity*. He has also.:.ignored the 
problem about concepts and their relation to words. His reformulation of 
Wisdom's third sentence (16) into 'The concept of being a vixen is iden­
tical with the concept of being a female fox' is really to change the terms 
of the debate in favour of his own arguments. Certainly, if we grant that 
Wisdom's three sentences - (14)» (15), and (16) - have clear meanings 
and are well expressed by the words of the sentences and, moreover, have
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the meanings ascribed to them by Lewy, then they clearly cannot mutually 
entail one another. But there are philosophers who would question whether 
Wisdom's sentences have any clear meaning if only because the word 
•meaning' has no agreed sense and the expression 'the same' is equally 
problematic. Furthermore, a definition is a verbal act that is not always 
recognized as involving something called a 'concept'. Although the 'trans­
lation' argument as used here brings out graphically the difference between 
what is verbal and what is conceptual, the distinction exists only if one 
already has assumed that what is conceptual cannot be verbal. Hence Lewy's 
demolition work appears more real and successful than it actually is.
The question of propositional identity and concept identity is a 
difficult one. When is one proposition identical to another, if there is 
such a thing as a proposition? If it is open to question that there is 
such a thing as a concept, then it is idle to talk about concept identity. 
Further, it is problematic whether, if there are concepts, they can be 
understood apart from words. Carnap offers his own solution to these 
.problems with his linguistic theory of logical truth according to which an 
expression is not taken as 'naming anything, but as possessing an inten­
sion and an e x t e n s i o n C a r n a p  lays down that if two designators are 
equivalent, then they have the same extension and if they are, moreover, 
logically equivalent, then they have also the same intension. For him a 
propositional attitude like 'John believes that it is raining now' is a 
psychological sentence and is neither extensional nor intensional with 
respect to its subsentence. He thinks he can solve the problem of the
semantical analysis of these belief-sentences with the help of what he
4.2calls 'the concept of intensional structure'.
For Carnap a sentence also has both an extension and an intension.
The extension of a sentence is its truth-value, i.e., its truth or fal­
sity. The intension of a sentence is, for him, the proposition expressed 
by it. He regards propositions as objective, non-mental, extra-linguistic 
entities of a certain logical type, namely, those expressed by declar-
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ative sentences in a language. Thus he disagrees with Russell who tries to 
overcome the difficulty connected with false propositions by considering 
propositions as psychological and physiological occurrences such as com­
plex images and expectations which signify something other than themselves 
and which can be the same when the sentences differ. Carnap thinks that 
any proposition must be regarded as a complex entity, consisting of com­
ponent entities which, in their turn, may be simple or again may be com­
plex. But even if these component entities can be exemplified, Carnap does 
not think that the whole complex, i.e., the proposition itself, need be 
exemplified. For example, a compound predicator such as ’H.T.* may express 
an empty property, that is to say, one not exemplified by any individual 
even though 'H' and *2’ may separately be exemplified by an individualf^ 
Because in a belief-sentence such as 'John believes that it is rain­
ing' the sub-sentence 'it is raining' cannot be replaced by another sen­
tence logically equivalent to it without changing the truth-value of the 
whole sentence, Carnap puts forward the theory that the whole belief- 
sentence is neither extensional nor intensional with respect to the sub­
sentence included in it. Therefore he does not regard an interpretation of 
belief-sentences as referring either to sentences or to propositions as 
quite satisfactory. For a more adequate interpretation he thinks that we 
need a relation between sentences which is still stronger than logical 
equivalence. This relation is based on what Carnap calls intensional 
structure. Two sentences, according to Carnap, have the same intensional 
structure if they can be understood in the same way. That is to say, the 
whole sentences must not only be logically equivalent but they must con­
sist of logically equivalent parts, and both sentences must be built up 
out of these parts in the same way. If this is the case, then the two 
sentences have the same intensional structure or they are intensionally 
isomorphic, i.e., they are synonymous. For instance, *2+5’ and 'II sum V  
are intensionally isomorphic, being both logically equivalent to '?', and
. V
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each consists of three parts in such a way that corresponding parts are 
logically equivalent to one another. Hence they have the same intensionf^
Carnap considers that his intensional isomorphism is the synonymy
Quine thinks is required in indirect speech, Quine says: 'The notion of
synonymity figures implicitly also whenever we use the method of indirect
quotations. In indirect quotation we do not insist on a literal repetition
of the words of the person quoted, but we insist on a synonymous sentence;
we require reproduction of the meaning. Such synonymity differs even from
45logical equivalence; and exactly what it is remains unspecified'.
Carnap notices also a 'striking similarity' between his own concept of 
intensional isomorphism and the theory of C.I. Lewis who writes: 'Two
expressions are equivalent in analytic meaning, (l) if at least one is 
elementary [i.e., not comple^ and they have the same intension, or (2) 
if, both being complex, they can be so analysed into constituents that (a) 
for every constituent distinguished in either, there is a corresponding 
constituent in the other which has the same intension, (b) no constituent 
distinguished in either has zero intension or universal intension, and (c) 
the order of corresponding constituents is the same in both, or can be 
made the same without alteration of the intension of either whole express­
ion'. For example, Lewis considers 'round excision' and 'circular hole' to 
be equivalent in analytic meaning, while 'equilateral triangle' and 'equi­
angular triangle' not to be equivalent although they.have the same inten­
sion. Lewis concludes by saying: 'We shall be in conformity with good 
usage if we say that twro expressions are synonymous or equipollent (l) if 
they have the same intension and that intension is neither zero nor uni­
versal, or (2) if, their intension being zero or universal, they are equi­
valent in analytic meaning
Carnap has made use of his concept of intensional structure to 
explain the difference between the following two sentences:
(17) The concept Brother is identical with the concept Male Sibling,
(18) The concept Brother is identical with the concept Brother.
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(17) is a sentence conveying useful information of a logical though not a 
factual nature. It states the result of an analysis of the analysandum, 
i.e., the concept Brother while (18) is a trivial statement of identity. 
Moore was puzzled by the fact that if (17) is true then (l8) seems to make 
the same statement as (17) and (17) and (18) should be interchangeable 
sentences. Yet it is obvious that (17) and (l8) do not make the same 
statement. Carnap thinks that if logical equivalence or L-equivalence, as 
he prefers to call it, is taken as the criterion for the identity of pro­
positions, then (17) and (I8 ) are L-true and L-equivalent to each other 
and they express the same proposition. But they are not intensionally 
isomorphic because there is a difference in intensional structure between
(17) and (18). This difference exists in spite of the identity of intension, 
Carnap explains that though (17) and (18) are L-equivalent, they are not 
synonymous, that is to say, they are not intensionally isomorphic. Hence 
when synonymy is required in a belief context, then L-equivalence is not 
enough - only intensional isomorphism would dof^ But even this stronger 
relation of intensional isomorphism can be seen to distort the truth-value 
of propositional attitudes despite Carnap's claim. For example, 'John 
believes that 2+5=7’ cannot be replaced by 'John believes that II sum V 
=VII' without affecting the truth-value of the first sentence simply 
because there is nothing to show that John knows Latin or believes any­
thing in Latin.
Carnap is aware that a sentence like
(19) John believes that the earth is round 
may produce complications in analysis but such complications do not seem 
to Carnap to be inevitable. He regards it as possible to construct a lang­
uage of the form of (19) in such a way that 'every expression has always 
the same sense and that therefore two expressions which fulfill a certain 
criterion of synonymity are synonymous in any context, including contexts 
of simple or iterated indirect discourse. But many more investigations
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and ■tentative constructions of languages will have to he made before we
can see the whole situation clearly and make a well-founded decision as
to the choice of the language form'f^
49According to Wiggins, identity-statements present insuperable diffi­
culties, if they are analysed into term+relation+term or subject+predicate 
relation. Generally speaking, there are two prevalent views about identity- 
statements. One is the Fregean view that in the sentence '_a is the same as 
2 ’ with 'the same* bearing the 'numerical' sense if it is meant that iden­
tity holds between a and b, and the 'qualitative' sense if it is meant 
that a resembles b. Such a view assumes that whether the sentence is con­
sidered in the numerical sense or in the qualitative sense, it is of the 
same logical form, that is to say, that a and b are no less logical sub­
jects in the numerical sense than in the qualitative case and that diff­
erences in the senses of the sentences can be traced to differences in the 
senses of the words 'the same', that is, either interpreted in the numer­
ical sense or in the qualitative sense. Another view is that of Wittgen-
50stein's of the Tractatus^ in which he agrees with the earlier Frege that
a and b are mere linguistic symbols which do not point beyond themselves.
51Geach is also of the same mind when he says that it makes no sense to 
say 'a is the same as b ' because one should always say instead 'a is the 
same A as b ', where ^  ±b a count noun, e.g., 'dog', and not a predicate. 
Quine thinks that this is true only of the identity idiom at its inception 
and remains true as long as the sides of the identity sentence are demon­
strative pronouns because there is no point in pointing twice and saying 
'This is the same (one) as that' when the question will be asked 'Same 
what?' Quine thinks that when we have reached the sophistication of making 
statements of identity with names on either side, or descriptions, or 
variables, then it is evident that we can affirm identities without rel- 
ativizing them in Geach's fashion. We can then say outright that a is 
identical with b, and whether a is the same dog as b, or the same ear as _b
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will depend on whether a is a dog or an ear* When the identity idiom comes
of age Quine believes that Geach's old relativism evidently goes untenable.
But Quine admits that there is a subtle sense in which identity is relative
still. For example, we often speak of objects of one or another queer sort
for which we can supply no principle of individuation. Take characters of
fiction. Do two drafts of a novel, asks Quine, have the same hero? How
dissimilar can they be and still be drafts of the same novel? Or take gods.
Was Baal the devil? Were the Algonquins, in their worship of the Great
Spirit, worshipping God? All these examples belong under the general head
52of identity between individuals in different possible worlds,
5 3Wiggins's^ arguments against the subject-predicate or relational 
form of analysis of identity-statements are as follows:
(i) In a subject^predicate or relational statement, the content is 
determined by (a) what its term(s) is(are), and (b) what is said to be 
true of those terms. If this principle is correct, and if identity- 
statements are predicative or relational, then 'the evening-star = the 
morning star’ and 'the evening star = the evening star* should have the 
same content. But, Wiggins asks, how can they have the same content if 
the first is contingent and the second non-contingent?
(ii) The second argument concerns the awkwardness of ’They are one 
and the same thing*. When we say a = b, we are saying that there is only 
one thing we are referring to by *_a* and 'b '. Such a predicative analysis 
shows that what we ascribe to the logical subject in the above utterance 
is not just identity but actually self-identity. But then self-identity 
marks nothing off because everything is identical with itself. In this 
case there cannot be a predicate or the ascription of a genuine property. 
Besides, asks Wiggins, how can contingent statements result from such
an ascription?
(iii) To obviate the above difficulty, it might be said that the 
relation of identity marks off the pair consisting of an object and itself
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from pairs consisting of diverse objects. Thus, for instance, d| and
b^ and £^, c^ are marked off by the relation of identity from j^ d, 
and and ^  • So the relation of identity might be thought to
divide the class consisting of all possible pair classes intelligibly and 
exhaustively into two, pairs whose members satisfy the relation and pairs 
whose members do not. But then ^x, 2^  = . The division effected is in
fact identical to a division between unit classes and pair classes. To say 
that belongs with the first set of pairs is tantamount to the num­
erical statement that there is but one individual here. It is well-known
that statements of number cannot have individuals as logical subjects, for jj
they are complex statements about what falls under a concept. |
(iv) Relations have to have terms to hold between and hence presuppose;
Îthe identification of these terms. If this is so, then how could identity ^
itself be a relation? j
(v) It is impossible to teach identity as a relation because if the | 
teacher says that this thing a has to a what that thing 2  bas to Jb? the I 
pupil would already have had to understand identification, hence identity, : 
in order to take in the lesson,
(vi) Frege’s sense-reference distinction is thought by him to master 
the objections to the analysis, call identity a relation, and accomodate 
identity-statements within the subject-predicate schema by the device of 
reading as ’is none other than’ where ’is’ is allowed the normal 
function of the copula.
54Wiggins considers that in the Begriffsschrift Frege gives the wrong : 
explanation of identity leading to an infinite regress. The two identity- 
statements considered by Frege are:
(p) The evening star = the evening star.
(q ) The evening star = the morning star.
According to Frege, in statement (q ) each noun phrase stands for itself
and the two expressions have ’equality of content’ or the same content is
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given by two ways of determining it, one being given by 'the evening star' 
and the other by 'the morning star'. In (p) there is only one expression 
from which we gain no new knowledge. From (q ) instead we learn something. 
As Frege points out, this explanation does show the different logical 
status of (p) and (q ) but, as Wiggins says, the explanation is wrong be­
cause the Greeks and the Romans made an astronomical discovery when they 
found out that the morning star and the evening star have the same object, 
Venus, as reference. It is not a linguistic discovery and so Frege does 
not do justice to the fact. As for the regress involved in Frege's 
Begriffsschrift theory, Wiggins points out that in 'a - = b ', 'a' and 'b_' 
have the same content or designate only one thing. This generates a new 
statement of the same form as the original explicandum - 'The content or 
designation of 'a' = the content or designation of 'b''... ad infinitum.
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein is able to ignore Frege's problem be­
cause he holds a version of Russell's theory of description and can deny 
that the planet is a genuine constituent in any proposition. For Wittgen­
stein the identity sign only figures between logically proper names and 
therefore says nothing about the content of the expressions 'the evening 
star' and 'the morning star'. The identity sign merely permits the sub­
stitution of one expression for another and there is no question, as far 
as Wittgenstein is concerned, of stating an informative identity by means 
of proper names. But such a theory depends on the doctrine of logically
proper names whereas outside the confines of such a theory proper names
55are widely used for what Wiggins calls 'workaday persisting things'.^ If 
we had to know all about a planet in order to name or identify it, we 
could never get started in learning anything about the planet's history. 
If, on the other hand, we can use a proper name without knowing all about 
its bearer's history, then we can formulate a non-trivial identity- 
statement by means of proper names, e.g., 'Hesperus is Phosphorus',
In his later theory in On Sense and Reference Frege gives what he
thinks is a better explanation for a non-trivial identity-statement and 
for the apparent falsity of Leibniz* Law, 'Eadem sunt, quae sibi mutuo 
substitut possunt, salva veritate*, according to which symbol x can always 
replace symbol ^ and conversely if symbol x and symbol ^ bave the same 
conceptual content. Wiggins calls Frege's new theory 'a beautiful and 
powerful theory of meaning for decidable propositions of great generality 
and explanatory p o w e r b u t  that it cannot save any subject+predicate or 
term+relation+term analysis of identity-statements because it does not 
overcome any of the six objections or arguments put forward by Wiggins.
Frege (and Strawson after him) does not distinguish between proper 
names and definite descriptions. Hence he is able to identify 'the morning 
star' with 'the evening star' and both with 'Venus' and to call them all
proper names. Fregean proper names can therefore have both sense and refer­
ence, with the sense of 'the morning star’ made up out of the senses of the 
individual words in the expression and the reference being the planet, 
Venus. Wiggins agrees with Frege in this and quotes him with approval:
'We must not fail to recognize that the same sense, the same thought, 
may be variously expressed ... If all transformations of the expression 
were forbidden on the plea that this would alter the content as well, logic 
would simply be crippled; for the task of logic can hardly be performed
without trying to recognize the thought in its manifold guises. Moreover,
57all definitions would have to be rejected as false'.
But if proper names have sense in the above way, then do we in fact
have any genuine proper names at all? Wiggins answers this question by
suggesting that while the proper names we ordinarily use can only be ap­
proximate to the ideal of a proper name, nevertheless we do need genuine 
proper names in order to understand correctly all the identity-statements 
made by the use of pairs of genuine proper names. Suppose, he says, 'that 
it is in virtue of the same fact that it is true that my brother wants a 
drink (R), that the man in gum boots wants a drink (S), and that the man 
with fair hair and a discontented expression wants a drink (T). For,
- U9 -
suppose these are one and the same person'. Now, he says, we need some 
neutral access to the fact in virtue of which (R), (s ), and (T) are true, 
access which is not mediated by propositions (R), (S), and (T). '.iggins 
sees this neutral access in 'F. P. T. Wiggins wants a drink' (U). He 
recognizes that in this case it is important that the proper name 'F. P.
T. Wiggins' should be devoid of' descriptive content, otherwise we should 
have another proposition of the same kind as (R), (s ), and (T) and we 
should be back where we were. But Wiggins thinks that it could be further 
reduced to saying that this man wants a drink (w)^^ This final reduction 
is necessary to Wiggins because proper names have to be assigned and their 
bearers individuated. Hence we need a minimal description (in this case 
'man') and a demonstrative (in this case 'this'). It seems to Wiggins that 
if (r ), (S), (T), and (U) are true in virtue of (w), then it follows that 
their logical subjects have the same sense and are individuable and trace­
able through time in whatever way they are individuable and traceable. One 
would need the full apparatus of referential devices to get the complete 
knowledge of the spatio-temporal history of, say, the planet Venus which 
would be a pre-requisite of correctly understanding all the identity- 
statements which were made about Venus by the use of pairs of genuine 
proper names.
It is Wiggins's contention that noun-phrases in identity-statements 
really indicate concepts as well as being genuine proper names. This he 
accomplishes by giving referential terms in identity-statements a double 
analysis. In 'The evening star = the morning star', he thinks that 'evening 
star' and 'morning star* will have to be said to occur first referentially, 
thereby indicating the requisite concepts evening star and morning star, 
and then to stand in a second role, for the composite concept itself, what 
it is to be the evening star and the morning star. Wiggins does not think 
that identity-statements can be reduced to predication because both forms 
of statement are primitive. As he says:
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'To utter an identity-statement is to give to understand that we will 
name or refer to one object in two acts of reference. If there is to be any 
singling out of persisting things at all, there must be the possibility of 
amplifying and supplementing any act of singling out. This is the role 
of identity-statement. Persisting things are not simple things with only 
one face. The life-history of a persisting thing is a contingent matter 
and an indefinite number of singlings out may be needed in tracing it 
through space and time. If there are persisting things to single out and 
ascribe properties to, there must be contingent identity-statements, or 
their possibility*^^
Wiggins admits that the word 'one* occurs essentially in this explan­
ation. He thinks that it is too much to hope for that identity, cardinality
and reference should be completely and wholly disentangled from one another 
in some final analysis of these notions. Thus it seems to him that we have 
to be content simply to succeed in indicating an activity which can be 
recognized rather than to be completely explained.
Consequently, Wiggins finds it easy to see why inter-substitutability 
of identicals breaks down in identity-statements. 'The point of an identity* 
statement*, he says, 'its content and its purport, lies in the particular 
referring expression actually produced, and in these referring expressions 
exhibited in use. Hence the content of an identity-statement includes, e.g. 
what it is to be the evening star and what it is to be the morning star*^^ 
In his view not even proper names are inter—substitutable for, in its use, 
every proper name has to carry with it an identificatory backing, or the 
possibility of one. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' cannot be normally expect­
ed, in a determinate context of utterance and use, to have the same iden­
tificatory backing. 'So, ' he continues, 'to change "Hesperus is Phosphor­
us" into "Hesperus is Hesperus" would be to change what the former identity 
statement, in a determinate context, exhibits and asserts
Such a conclusion puts paid to Leibniz' Law which Frege tried to save
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by means of his sense-refcrence distinction, Quine, too, has tried to save 
Leibniz' Law in his own way. Quine considers the statements
(20) Giorgione = Barbarolli,
(21) Giorgione was so-called because of his size.
Given these statements as true, Quine says that replacement of the name 
'Giorgione' by the name 'Barbarelli' turns (21) into the falsehood:
(22) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size.
Quine admits that (21) is a statement about a man and not merely about his 
name and that it was the man, not his name, that was called so-and-so be­
cause of his size. Nevertheless, he says, the failure of substitutivity 
shows that the occurrence of the personal name in (21) is not purely 
referential. If (21) is translated into another statement:
(23) Giorgione was called 'Giorgione* because of his size, 
then the substitution of the purely referential first term produces:
(24) Barbarelli was called 'Giorgione' because of his size,
which is a true statement. Quine notes that the second occurrence of the 
personal name is no more referential than any other occurrence within a 
context of quotes. But there is more to it than that. For to turn (21) into 
(22) is wrong because of a built-in ambiguity in the use of 'Giorgione' 
in the statement. 'Giorgione was so-called* disguises the fact that the 
occurrence of 'Giorgione' is a double one, first as the man and then as 
the name with 'so-called' standing for the occurrence of the name. This 
point seems to have been ignored by Quine and because of this ommission 
the explanation he gives^^ strikes one as somehow incomplete, and rather 
puzzling.
65In his further examples such as the following:
(25) 'Giorgione played chess' is true,
(26) 'Giorgione' named a chess player,
(27) Giorgione played chess,
Quine says that (25) and (26) are true or false insofar as (27) is true
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or false. This is true and quite straightforward. But he goes on to say 
that his criterion of referential occurrence makes the occurrence of the 
name of 'Giorgione' in (27) referential, and must make the occurrences of 
'Giorgione' in (25) and (26) referential by the same token, despite the 
presence of single quotes in (25) and (26). The latter examples, he ex­
plains, are exceptional in that'the special predicates 'is true' and 
'named' have the effect of undoing the single quotes - as is evident on 
comparison of (25) and (26) with (27). This explanation is again very 
puzzling because, as Lewy points out, there is no occurrence of the man 
Giorgione in either (25) or (26), even on Quine's own principles. As Lewy 
says:
'Surely there is a big muddle in Quine's position. For one thing, 
according to Quine's well-known theory of quoted language, there is no 
occurrence of "Giorgione" in (7 ) [i.e.my (26^ at all. What does occur in 
(7 ) ^.e. my (26^ is the expression ""Giorgione"" (as opposed to "Gior­
gione"). Also on Quine's theory, there is no occurrence of the name 
"Giorgione" in (6) ^.e. my (25 J] : in (6) |i»e. my (25^ the letters "G",
"i", "o", "r", "g", "i", "o", "n", and "e" occur, in this order, within
the expression ""Giorgione played chess"", i.e. within a name of a
, , 66 sentence.*
Lewy is, I think, correct in his criticism of Quine's point here. 'Is 
true* and 'named' do not really have the effect of undoing the single 
quotes as Quine claims. In fact, later in the same paper,.Quine himself 
talks about 'quotation as one referentially opaque context among many'.
He explains what he means by 'referentially opaque* thus:
'What £2 imperative is to observe merely that the contexts "is unaware 
that ..." and "believes that ..." resemble the context of the single quotes 
in this respect: a name may occur referentially in a statement 2 yet 
not occur referentially in a longer statement which is formed by embedding 
S in the context "is unaware that ..." and "believes that ..."' These
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contexts he calls referentially opaque. The same is true of the contexts 
'knows that •••', 'says that 'doubts that 'is surprised
that .
These referentially opaque contexts are, of course, what Russell calls 
'prepositional attitudes'. If there are difficulties in the substitution 
of singular terms in identity-statements, the difficulties are even greater 
in the case of propositional attitudes. After all, Quine agrees with 
Russell that singular terms are eliminable by paraphrase as the values of 
the variables of quantification. But quantification into referentially 
opaque contexts is a complicated matter. Because Quine considers that 
belief contexts as well as other propositional attitudes are referentially 
opaque, it is prima facie meaningless to quantify into them. He disting­
uishes between what he calls the 'relational' and the 'notional' sense i
of belief^^ Take, for example, |
(28) (3ix) (Ralph believes that x is a spy), I
(29) Ralph believes that Q|x) (x is a spy).
•Both (28) and (29) may be ambiguously phrased, says Quine, as 'Ralph her •' 
Iitves that someone is a spy', but they may be unambiguously phrased respect- ; 
ively as 'There is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy' and 'Ralph 
believes there are spies'. The difference between them is vast for (28) 
gives the relational sense describing a relation between Ralph and someone 
who is a spy while (29) gives the notional sense describing a general 
notion of Ralph's that there are spies somewhere. Again,
(30) (3x) (v.'itold wishes that x is president) 
shows a relation between Witold and his candidate whereas
(31) (Witold wishes that (3x) (% is president)
shows merely that Witold wishes to have a presidential form of government.
Quine points out that the relational senses of (28) and (30) both 
involve quantifying into a propositional attitude idiom from outside. This,
70to him, is a dubious business. Consider the examples:
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(32) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy,
(33) Ralph does not believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy, 
and let us assume that, unbeknown to Ralph, the man in the brown hat and 
the man seen at the beach are one and the same person, Bernard J, Ort- 
cuttl^ (32) and (33) do not show that Ralph has two contradictory beliefs.
Both of the component 'that ___' clauses are indeed about the man Ortcutt,
but the 'that' in (32) and (33) must be viewed as sealing those clauses off, 
thereby making (32) and (33) compatible because, as wholes, they are not 
about Ortcutt at all. (29) also is acceptable because it exhibits only a 
quantification within the 'believes that' context, not a quantification 
into it.
However, relational statements of belief, like 'There is someone whom 
Ralph believes to be a spy', are admitted by Quine to be indispensable and 
some way of accomodating them has to be found. He first considers treating 
belief as a relation between the believer and a certain 'intension' named
by the 'that ___' clause, with intensions of degree 0 called 'propositions'
.and intensions of degree 1 called 'attributes'. Propositions are intensions 
without free variables while attributes are intensions with a variable 
prefixed to a sentence, e.g., £ (£ is a spy) is spyhood. Intensions of 
higher degrees are obtained by prefixing multiple variables. Thus we have 
a dyadic relation of belief between a believer and a propositions
(34) Ralph believes that Orcutt is a spy,
a triadic relation of belief among a believer, an object and an attribute;
(35) Ralph believes _z (z_ is a spy) of Ortcutt, 
and a tetradic belief;
(36) Tom believes (y^  denounced £) of Cicero and Catiline, 
and so on to higher degrees of intension.
But such an analysis is totally unacceptable to Quine who considers
propositions, attributes and the rest of the intensions as 'at best a
72pretty obscure lot'l But he realizes at the same time that he cannot drop
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intensions in favour of extensions. If anyone w is to hunt unicorns without 
hunting griffins, the attributes 
2 finds a unicorn),
(2 finds a griffin)
must be distinct. But, says Quine, ’the corresponding classes are identical,
being empty. So it is indeed the attributes, and not the classes, that were
73needed in our formulation.’
Quine considers how to circumvent this by suggesting that instead of: 
w believes that ... 
we may say:
w believes-true * ... ’.
Instead of:
(37) w believes 2  ( '*« Z ) of % 
we may se>y:
(38) w believes ^ satisfied by x.
The words ’believes satisfied by’ here, like ’believes of’ before, he 
would view as an irreducibly triadic predicate. Of course, he could see 
that some people might object to this suggestion on the ground that the 
subject of the propositional attitude is expected to speak the language of 
the quotation. Quine thinks that this may be an unnatural way of formulat­
ing the propositional attitude but it is not therefore wrong to do so. He 
compares it to describing a prehistoric ocean current as clockwise. Also, 
if anyone approves of speaking of belief of a proposition at all and of 
speaking of a proposition in turn as meant by a sentence, then he does not 
think that such a person should object to his semantical re-formulation 
*w believes-true on any special grounds of obscurity, for ’w believes- 
true' is explicitly definable in the propositionalist’s terms as 
*w believes the proposition meant by .
Quine admits that his semantical version does involve a relativity to 
language which must be made explicit, not because w needs to understand
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but because _S might by coincidence exist (as a linguistic form) with very 
different meanings in two different languages. He agrees with Church that 
•There are unicorns' is not strictly or analytically equivalent to:
'There are unicorns' is true in English, ;
but he says that all he claims for his theory is a systematic agreement in !Itruth value, and no more. After all, his scepticism about analyticity is !
well-known to many philosophers. î
Although Quine offers his semantical version as a possible theory
about the relational sense of propositional attitudes, he is not entirely
happy with it. As he concludes:
".;hat I find more disturbing about the semantical versions ... is the .
need of dragging in the language concept at all. V.’hat is a language? What :
degree of fixity is supposed? When do we have one language and not two? .
The propositional attitudes are dim affairs to begin with, and it is a pity;
to have to add obscurity to obscurity by bringing in language variables
too. Only let it not be supposed that any clarity is gained by restituting * 
74the intensions';^
If, as Quine here suggests, to bring in language variables to the 
semantical analysis of propositional attitudes is to add obscurity to obs- i 
curity, then what does he propose should be put in '...' in such contexts 
as "w believes-true *...*"? He gives no indication of an answer unless one 
tcikes as an answer what he has said about 'w believes-true 8^' being expli 
-citly definable in the propositionalist's terms as believes the prop­
osition meant by ^*. If, as Quine has often demonstrated, there are no 
propositions and the propositionalist is believing in a myth, then the 
above answer would seem to be an appeal to a myth. In fact, in his attempt 
to abolish intensions and intensional language in favour of a purely exten- 
sional language, Quine has found more difficulties than solutions, Propos­
itional attitudes are an everyday occurrence in the same way as the use of 
language is. If they resist being pressed into quantificational language, 
the fault may lie in trying to treat them as expressible in observation
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sentences, and not - as they seem to be - of a totally different logical 
type. Again, if by 'dragging in the language concept' in the semantical 
analysis of 'There are unicorns' into "’There are unicorns" is true in
English' one is adding obscurity to obscurity, then Quine's theory put
forward above does not even ensure *a systematic agreement in truth value'. 
Despite his various suggestions Quine has left one basic problem untouched- 
what substitutions can be made for ' ... ' in such contexts as "John 
believes-true ' ...
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IV. ANALYSIS AND INDETERMINACY 
According to Quine, 'Logic chases truth up the tree of grammar'^ 
because logic explores the truth conditions of sentences in the light of 
how the sentences are grammatically constructed. But the grammar of lang­
uages can enlighten as well as mislead, as we all know. Perhaps it is 
because of English grammatical constructions that it has been commonly 
assumed that prepositional attitudes have an object called a 'proposition'. 
Underlying the assumption is the notion that verbs such as 'believes', 
'knows', 'wishes' and the like are two-place predicates joining a singular 
term and an expression. Because of this notion philosophers have tried to 
analyse sentences describing propositional attitudes such as 'James says 
that man is mortal' as reducible to 'James says: "Man is mortal"'. This 
sentence is said to express a relation between a speaker and a form of 
words named by being enclosed within quotation marks. Others have tried to 
analyse 'James says that man is mortal' as a relation, not between James 
and a form of words, but between James and a more obscure object called a
'proposition' - an abstract object - that is named by the clause intro-
2duced by the word 'that'. Prior does not think that either of these theor­
ies is tenable. He considers that the reductionist theory about the 'form 
of words' is unacceptable because propositional attitudes such as 'James 
fears that . 'James brings it about that X is Y* and 'James wishes 
that X were Y' are obviously not about a form of words at all. This is 
where he thinks the advocates of 'propositions' seem to have a plausible 
argument. But, according to Prior, the fundamental mistake of such advoc­
ates is to parse 'James says that man is mortal' as 'James says / that man 
is mortal' because Prior does not think that the word 'that' goes with the
!
sentence that follows it to turn the sentence into a name. Rather, he 
thinks that 'that' goes with the verb which precedes it to turn it into a 
sentential connection. The proper parsing for Prior then is: 'James says 
that / man is mortal* in which a sentence is constructed not out of a
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name, but out of another sentence, and the whole is not about the sentence 
but about James and 'says that man is mortal' as a whole is a genuine verb 
or predicate. According to this view there is no relation between James 
and anything whatsoever, for 'man is mortal' is a sentence and not the name 
of e. form of words or of a 'proposition'. Prior considers also that 
’ ... says that ... ' is like ' ... brings it about that ... ' and is 
extensional, similar to ' ... is a man and ... ' as in 'James is a man and 
is mortal', A similar way of parsing sentences describing propositional 
attitudes has also been considered by Quine who says;
'A final alternative that I find as appealing as any is simply to 
dispense with the objects of the propositional attitudes ... The verb 
"believes" ... ceases to be a term and becomes part of an operator 
"believes that" ••• which, applied to a sentence, produces a composite 
absolute general term whereof the sentence is counted as an immediate 
constituent
In this analysis of propositional attitudes, Quine treats 'believes 
that' and the rest of the propositional attitudes as comprising a new 
lexical category, i.e. the 'attitudinatives' and then to 'recognize a 
construction that builds a one-place predicate such as "believes that 
Darwin erred" by concatenating an attitudinative "believes that" and a 
sentence "Darwin erred". On this analysis, "thinks", "believes", etc., are 
not cast with "eats" and they are not predicates at all. On this
analysis, objects of propositional attitudes are no longer called for.
But there is a price: one can no longer say "x believes and the like, 
with quantifiable "y_". One can no longer say that there is something that 
X believes'5 However, Prior does not consider this to be a serious objec­
tion to accepting 'believes that* as an operator because he thinks that 
Quine's scruples about quantifying only over variable names are quite 
unfounded. Following Ramsey^ Prior sees no reason vjhy we should not quan­
tify over sentential variables and concoct such complexes as 'For some jp,
— 102 —
Paul believes that p and Elmer does not believe that £' without thereby 
being 'ontologically committed’ to the view that sentences name objects, 
prior rejects Quine's dictum that to be is to be a value of a bound var­
iable as a 'muddling dogma
Prior is equally dismissive of Quine's worry about propositional 
attitudes’ violating the 'law of extensionality' which says that if the 
sentences ^1 and ^2 have the same truth-value, then any compound sentences 
which differ only in one having ^ 1 where the other has ^2 must have the 
same truth-value also. Suppose, says Prior, 'X thinks that grass is pink* 
and 'X thinks that grass is purple* were genuine compounds with 'Grass is 
pink* and 'Grass is purple' as components, then these compounds would have 
to have the same truth-value since the corresponding components do, both 
being false. It is plain to Prior that a man may think that grass is pink 
without thinking that grass is purple. As Prior says;
'The moral drawn from this is that ’’X thinks that grass is pink" is 
not a genuine compound with "Grass is pink" as a component, or as it is 
technically put, not a genuine function with "Grass is pink" as g.T^ 'giiment.
But I cannot see the slightest reason, other than stubbornness, for not
drawing the moral that the law of extensionality is false. There is, it is 
true, a large and interesting area of logical theory within which it holds, 
just as there is a large and interesting area of physical theory in which 
we can retain the laws of classical mechanicsj but I cannot see the least 
reason for claiming any more for it than that. I have been assured by some 
of its defenders that they can see immediately and intuitively that it is
true; I can only say that such intuitions as I personally have about the
7matter are all to the contrary';
Elsewhere, in Qratio Obliqua, Prior also declares:
'The so-called law of extensionality was an interesting early effort 
at generalization in a scientific logic, and no doubt does hold within 
the first area to be thoroughly examined -'the functions required in the
- 103 -
foundations of mathematics - hut in no other science that I have heard of
do the practitioners cling to the first guesses of their teachers, in the
face of the most obvious counter-examples, with the fervour of religious 
,8devotion'.
Prior thinks that it is possible that the law of extensionality has 
been mistakenly assimilated to one expression of Leibniz' Law, i.e., the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals which Prior accepts as true. According to 
this Law, if x and ^ are one and the same individual object, then what is 
true of X is ipso facto true of Or, as Quine puts it, given a true 
statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the
9other in any true statement and the result will be true,• But, as Quine 
has shown, Leibniz’ Law cannot apply to propositional attitudes because of 
referential o p a c i t y . F o r  instance, if Philip believes that Tegucigalpa 
is in Nicaragua, we cannot substitute, on the basis of the true identity 
that Tegucigalpa = the capital of Honduras, and transform the truth of 
Philip’s belief into the falsehood that Philip believes that the capital 
of Honduras is in Nicaragua. The name ’Tegucigalpa' is here referentially 
opaque and no substitution can be allowed in such a case. Thus neither 
Leibniz’ Law nor the law of extensionality can be applied in propositional 
attitudes.
The notion of referential opacity as put forward by Quine concerns
the status of proper names in propositional attitudes. If I say; ’Paul
thinks that Elmer is a fellow-traveller’, I thereby imply, according to 
11Kenny, that Paul regards ’Elmer' as a proper name, but I do not use the 
word as a proper name myself. Kenny believes that in reported speech we do 
not commit ourselves to the ontology of those whose speech we are reporting^ 
nor in the case of Paul and Elmer in the above propositional attitude, 
are we reporting a relationship between Paul and Elmer. If, on the. other 
hand, one wishes to accept the reported ontology, Kenny agrees with Prior 
that 'Elmer has been accused by Paul of being a fellow-traveller' does
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commit its utterer to the existence of Elmer and a relation between Paul 
and Elmer. This locution is in stark contrast to 'Paul thinks that Elmer 
is a fellow-traveller' where 'Elmer' is referentially opaque.
In the analysis of propositional attitudes, Kenny and Prior are in 
substantial agreement. They both interpret sentences like 'James said that 
' on the model of 'James is a man and man is mortal', treating the ex­
pression '... said that ...' as comparable to '... is a man and ...'. They 
also agree that there are times when these expressions do enter into gen­
uine two-place predicates, form part of the expression of a relation 
between two individual objects, e.g., when X believes something of Y, that 
is, in the relation of believing that Y is or does this. But this relation, 
in many cases, is seen by both of them to be of an indirect kind. For 
example, in the case of 'Mrs. Murphy believes that, for all o, if Fr,
Gordon says that then u', if Fr. Gordon says something that Mrs. Murphy
does not understand, such as that there is a Necessary Being, Mrs. Mur-
12phy's Belief in what Fr, Gordon says is a Blind one, and so there is not 
even an indirect relation Between Mrs. Murphy and what Fr. Gordon has said. 
However, while Prior thinks that it is only very rarely that a genuine 
relation is involved even in an oBlique way, Kenny considers that there 
are more mental states than Prior thinks which are capable of Being repor­
ted in a relational form. This is Because Kenny has a more liberal view 
on proper names. Prior takes a Russellian view of proper names, refusing 
to regard anything as a proper name unless there is a Bearer present,
whereas Kenny accepts as a proper name anything that the user 'intends' to 
13name. The gap Between Prior and Kenny here is enormous even though they 
are in complete agreement about the standard form of propositional atti­
tudes as Being non-relational, non-transitive and consisting of a one- 
place predicate attached to a singular term as subject.
Davidson^^ is not surprised that we have so much difficulty with 
indirect speech or with propositional attitudes in general because he
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thinks that v.e do not know their logical form. According to Davidson, 
indirect discourse transgresses against the standard logical form of first 
level quantification theory with its variables, constants, and logical 
particles and its criterion of truth as laid down by Tarski in the schema: 
(T) X is true if, and only if, £, 
with taking the place of an' arbitrary sentence and *X* taking the 
place of the name of this sentence. These sentences are then equivalent. 
Tarski says: 'We shall call any such equivalence (with '_g_' replaced by any 
sentence of the language to which the word "true" refers, and 'X' replaced 
by a name of this sentence) an "equivalence of the form (T)"'. Tarski 
continues; 'We wish to use the term "true" in such a way that all equival­
ences of the form (t ) can be asserted, and we shall call a definition of 
truth "adequate" if all three equivalences follow from it. T h u s ,  if the 
definition of truth is to conform to his conception, Tarski says it must 
imply the following equivalence:
The sentence "snow is white" is true if, and only if, snow is white^^
A semantic theory like Tarski's enables us, finite creatures with 
finite powers, says Davidson, to comprehend an indefinitely large number 
of sentences and the semantic role of each significant expression in any 
of its appearances within a sentence, and to say how the expressions con­
tribute to the truth conditions of the sentence. Through the study of log­
ical form we are also able to determine what logical form a sentence must 
have in order for it to be the logical consequence of other sentences and 
in order for it to have other sentences as its own logical consequences.
But Davidson thinks that in the sentence:
'Galileo said that the earth moves', 
the relation between truth and consequence breaks down and we cannot infer 
anything from such a sentence because no sentence can be expected to re­
place 'the earth moves' without changing the truth value of the compound 
sentence 'Galileo said that the earth moves'. Although one may counter this
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conclusion by pointing out that 'Galileo said that the earth is in motion' 
is an acceptable enough substitution, salva veritate, still what Galileo 
said was actually 'the earth moves', not 'the earth is in motion'. This is 
why Davidson agrees with Quine about the impossibility of translating 
another's words correctly, even within the same language. He is thus 
forced to seek a new analysis that does not entail the logical equivalence 
of sentences. He comes up with a new and ingenious theory which he has 
traced to the Oxford English Dictionary which says;
'The use of that is generally held to have arisen out of the demon­
strative pronoun pointing to the clause which it introduces. Cf. (l) He 
once lived here: we all know that; (2) That (now this) we all know: he once 
lived here; (3) we all know that (or this): he once lived here; (4) V.'e all 
know that he once lived here
Prom this Davidson concludes that 'sentences in indirect discourse ... 
wear their logical form on their sleeves (except for one small point). They
consist of an expression referring to a speaker, the two-place predicate
17'said', and a demonstrative referring to an utterance. Period.' He ex­
plains that what follows the demonstrative gives the content of the 
subject's saying, but it has no logical or semantic connection with the 
original attribution of a saying. This last point is the novel one upon 
which everything, he thinks, depends, because from a semantic point of 
view the content-sentence in indirect discourse is not contained in the 
sentence whose truth counts. Thus his novel analysis of 'Galileo said that 
the earth moves' is transformed by him into;
'Galileo said that. The earth moves.'
On this analysis, Davidson claims that standard problems seem to find a 
just solution. The appearance of failure of the law of extensional sub­
stitution is explained as due to our mistaking what are really two senten­
ces for one. He thinks that we make substitutions in one sentence but it 
is the other, the utterance of which changes in truth. He believes that
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an utterance of 'Galileo said that' and any utterance following it are 
semantically independent, and there is no reason to predict, on grounds of 
form alone, any particular effect on the truth of the first from a change 
in the second. On the other hand, he says, if the second utterance had 
been different in any wa,y at all, the first utterance might have had a 
different truth value, for the reference of 'that* would have changed.
In this way, Davidson thinks that the paradox that sentences (or 
utterances) in oratio obliqua do not have the logical consequences they 
should if truth is to be defined, is resolved. What follows the verb 'said' 
is a singular term, the demonstrative 'that'. Davidson assumes that 'that* 
refers to something in 'Galileo said that' and the something is the per­
formative which follows .'Galileo said that': 'The earth moves'. Thus 
Davidson thinks that he has dissolved all the difficulties inherent in 
other analyses of indirect discourse since Frege, It seems to him incred­
ible that the words : 'The earth moves', uttered after the words: 'Galileo 
said that' should mean anything different, or refer to anything else, than 
.is their wont when they are used in other contexts. The basic insight is 
that language is the instrument it is because the same expression, with 
its meaning unchanged, can be used for countless purposes and indirect 
discourse, according to Davidson, does not put a strain on this basic 
insight.
However, Blackburn^^ does not consider Davidson's theory on proposi­
tional attitudes to be at all satisfactory. In order to avoid the usual 
objection to 'said' as requiring a noun to follow it, Blackburn construes 
Davidson's 'said' as introducing the relation of samesaying, where one 
samesays an utterance by making one synonymous with it. This but conforms 
to Davidson's own usage, according to Blackburn, in developing his theory 
on hovf to analyse indirect speech. Blackburn points out the important 
equivalence between:
(S) X said that the earth moves; and 
(D) X samesaid this: 'the earth moves';
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where the quotes indicate that it is the utterance made which is the object 
of the preceding demonstrative*
Blackburn's criticism of this analysis is that there exists no plaus­
ible semantic theory of the 'that'-clauses which can block the move from 
'X says/thinks/knows ... that £' to the abstraction 'What X says/thinks/ 
knows'; the proposition. His reasons for this criticism are;
(1) There is no way to decide whether the demonstrative 'that' refers 
to the succeeding utterance or to some fi:^tion of the succeeding utterance.
(2) There is no logical equivalence between (S) and (D). Firstly, (o) 
does not entail that there was any utterance at all ever made after X said 
that the earth moved, since it is possible that the utterance made by X was 
the last one ever. Secondly, it is possible that X should have said that 
the earth moved and not samesaid that, since that utterance might have 
failed to mean what X said. So (S) does not entail (D) and (D) does not 
entail ( s ) .
(3) Davidson's theory is meant to display the logical form of the 
sentences with which it deals, but (d) is not logically equivalent to (S) 
and is fe,r from displaying a more perspicuous form of the sentence. The 
generation of logical equivalence is fundamental to the theory of truth and 
Davidson's analysis does not provide it.
(4) To preserve the sensible view that the demonstrative in (s) really 
is functioning as a demonstrative, Blackburn thinks that the only natural 
solution is to take the demonstrative to refer to the thought or propos­
ition which X in fact expressed, otherwise one would have to consider it
in terms of that which some sentence/utterance/concrete item does actually 
express and propositions are thus brought in by the back door.
(5) Other cases of abstraction arise similar to propositions. It is 
because the two expressions each expresses whichever proposition they do 
that they are synonymous; it is because two objects each have the colour 
they do that they match; and it is because two lines each have the di-•
section they do that they are parallel. So the abstract item seems doubly
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immune to reduction: a contingency prevents any reductive analysis or- 
equivalence for the purposes of the theory of truth, and the nature of the 
contingency, its own involvement with the abstraction, makes it clear that 
such reauctions would not be likely to improve one’s understanding of the 
problem.
Blackburn’s defence of propositions and other abstract items is also a
defence against Quine’s theory of radical translation which is based on
19the principle of indeterminacy. Quine uses two main arguments to support 
his theory of the indeterminacy of radical translation. He labels them as 
one ’from below' and one 'from above'. The argument 'from below', the 
'gavagai' argument, is designed by Quine to answer those who say that 
one's body of beliefs about the world is based upon a semantics which one 
recognizes as a function of its structure and of the semantics of its 
component parts. Quine uses his 'gavagai' argument to suggest that there is 
no semantic determinacy in things like predicates, quantifiers, numerals 
and the like. He begins his argument by reflecting that if a native utters 
a particular sound, say, 'gavagai' when and only when a rabbit is visible 
to him, the linguist does not Icnow whether the native means by his sound 
'rabbit', or 'undetached rabbit part'. The linguist could settle the prob­
lem if he could ask, 'How many gavagai?' or if he could ask, 'Is this the 
same gavagai as that?' But, Quine says, the linguist does not know how to 
ask this when starting on an alien language. One might assume from this 
that if the linguist knows the alien language better he could make more 
accurate translations, but Quine counters this assumption by saying that 
however natural it might be for a linguist to think that he has the answer, 
it is always a question of the projection of his own 'domestic' apparatus 
of reference, identity and number on to the native and, since there is no 
empirical evidence for testing this projection for rightness or wrongness, 
the question whether it is right or wrong does not arise.
Quine's thesis of indeterminacy of translation does not seem to allow
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for cases where a bilingual translator brought up in two cultures who 
speaks both languages like a native might be thought to surmount Quine's 
obstacle. But this is not really the problem that Quine poses. What he 
wants to show is that even within the same language, native fluent speakers 
of the language will have difficulty in giving a precise translation of 
one another's sentences in isolation from the background theories in which 
the speakers are steeped. Quine's argument 'from above' is designed by him 
to show that when we are confronted by recalcitrant experience and we modify 
our network of statements or theories by giving up or retaining whatever 
belief we choose, this choice is not confined to the experience of just one 
person or any scientific community at any one time. It is an open choice 
for all time. He thus imagines two omnipresent and omniscient entities of 
limitless intelligence and capacities of memories who have sated themselves 
with all the experience which a physical world can provide - past, present, 
and future. One of them has a total structure of belief of the world which 
a linguist may label A and the other's he labels B. Quine thinks that there 
is no guarantee that A and B are in any way identical and, ex hypothesi, 
there is no crucial test for them because their beliefs are complete and 
final. Moreover, even if the linguist identifies A with B, there is no reac­
tion of either entity to any experience that would show the linguist to be 
right or wrong.
Quine claims that the linguist’s problem is insoluble; 'The question
whether, in the situation last described, the foreigner really believes A
or believes B, is a question whose significance I would put in doubt. This
20is what I am getting at in arguing the indeterminacy of translation'. The 
problem is insoluble because the linguist can no longer vary the situation 
to test assent or dissent for he already knows what A and ^  are in their 
entirety,
He have seen in Chapter III that it is Quine's thesis that it is a 
network of beliefs, or theories, which is vulnerable to experience and which
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places a determinate constraint upon it. He believes that theories rather
than sentences are the smallest things with determinate meaning, hence his
doctrine about the indeterminacy of sentence-meaning. As he says, the single
sentence 'has no fund of experiential implications to call its own' while
a block of theory which has such a fund, works to the indeterminacy of the
single sentence and 'seals the fate of any general notion of propositional 
21meaning ...' Consequently Quine finds it meaningless to talk of sameness 
of meaning and propositional identity as well as other abstract entities.
But while there is nothing to choose between rival theories where truth is 
concerned, once a theory has been chosen, ordinary translational problems 
are not seen by Quine to be insuperable, at least from the practical point 
of view.
22In answer to some of his critics, Quine shows that he is not averse 
to accepting an abstract object such as a proposition for the common meaning 
of two synonymous expressions, but it is the two-place predicate of synonymy 
itself which is wanting in clarity and perspicuity. His theory of radical 
translation, he declares, has been developed to make the problem of synonymy 
graphic, not to deny that behavioural criteria will ordinarily decide in 
favour of one translation rather than another, 'When they do,' he says, 
'there is emphatically a fact of the matter by microphysical standards; for 
clearly any difference in overt behaviour, verbal or otherwise, reflects 
extravagant differences in the distribution of elementary physical states.
On the other hand my doctrine of indeterminacy had to do with hypothetical 
manuals of translation both of which fitted all behaviour'. He goes on to 
say; 'Thus consider the propositional attitudes; consider belief. There 
are unproblematical attributions of belief in unproblematic attributions 
even to dumb animals ... When we attribute a belief about ancient history to 
someone ... we are dependent on what he says - even though we are loth to 
equate belief with lip service. If the believer is a foreigner, our attrib­
ution may be subject also to the vagaries of translation of his testimony 
into our language. In some cases factual content is lacking; in others
- 112 -
it is sparse and ill defined'. Because ordinary language is only 'loosely 
ontological’ he thinks that we have to 'regiment' language - a 'matter 
rather of freely creating an ontology-oriented language that can supplant 
ordinary language in serving some particular purposes that one has in 
mind.
Despite his strong attack on any determinate meaning for sentences
and the inadequacy of translation of sentences, Quine admits that language,
being a social phenomenon, depends on what he calls 'associating utterances
with stimulations that can be publicly identified in their recurrences from
occasion to occasion and speaker to speaker.' But he realizes that where
inter-subjective equating of stimulations are concerned, the most that we
can realistically speak of is 'resemblance and not identity of stimulation
patterns'. This, he concedes, is 'glaringly theoretical'. Nevertheless, it
'works well in practice ... because of the anatomical resemblance of people.
24But for these similarities language itself might not have been propagated'.
Thus Quine seems to have toned down his original rejection of translation
altogether and lets in similarity, if not identity, of stimulus patterns
and so of language patterns. This is his behaviourism at work again.
Another solution Quine has offered to the problems facing propositions
and propositional attitudes is this. 'We might,' he says, 'keep attributes
and propositions after all, but just not try to cope with the problem of
their individuation ... positing of attributes and propositions without
hint of a standard of identity. The precept "No entity without identity"
25might simply be relaxed'. He believes that by analogy with the first obf. 
jects we posit attributes and propositions without an accompanying identity. 
He asks: 'Why not just accept them thus, as twi-light half-entities to which 
the identity concept is not to a p p l y ? B u t  such a manoeuvre will cause a 
'certain disruption of logic*. This will entail adjusting the logic of our 
conceptual scheme to accommodate them and then any resulting complexity can 
be weighed against the benefits of the half-entities admitted, Quine no
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longer thinks it necessary to settle for an all-purpose conceptual scheme. 
After all, propositional and attributary attitudes belong to the daily 
discourse of hopes, fears, and purposes and should be allowed for, as he 
says. He, therefore, proposes that there should be two conceptual schemes, 
one that is ’relatively simple and austere’ for official scientific busin­
ess, free of half-entities, and another one, a ’second-grade system’ that
27will accommodate the half-entities. This represents a big advance and a 
new line of thinking on Quine’s part on the subject of propositional attit- i
2 8  Iudes and other intensional entities. In his Word and Object Quine has :
Ialready given the idioms of propositional attitudes and indicator words a
second grade status, but though he does not mind doing so with indicator ■
words, he regrets relegating propositional attitudes to such a position over
29which ’one is less comfortable. One has a sense of genuine loss'.
It thus seems that a sense of reality is breaking into philosophical 
analysis. Natural language, after all, is very rich and diverse and it is 
both a, hopeless and a futile task to regiment it into one fixed mould. Nhat : 
really matters is that we should be able to distinguish one logical form 
from another and in doing so gain a proper understanding of our use of 
language.
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V. HVKGU...GE ALP BELIEF |
According to Dummett^ Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy of translation | 
is an indirect account of a theory of meaning. An advantage of an indirect | 
account is that we ’laiow exactly what form a translation manual has to take,' 
viz., an effective set of rules for mapping sentences of translated language!
2 iinto sentences of language into which translation is being made...’ The ‘ 
disadvantage of it is that it is not certain what consequences such an in- ' 
quiry into translation will have for the notion of meaning, just because 
they are stated without direct appeal to that notion. For Dummett, to grasp 
the meaning of an expression is to understand its role in language and a 
complete theory of meaning for a language is, therefore, a complete theory 
of how language works as language. The device of a translation manual does 
not accomplish this. It can only be accomplished, according to Dummett, if 
we could ascribe to a speaker of an object-language a knowledge of the 
propositions expressed by sentences of the theory of truth independently 
of any language in which those propositions might be expressed. Dummett 
distinguishes between knowing of a sentence that it is true and knowing 
th^ proposition expressed by the sentence. In saying this he makes no 
acknowledgement of propositions as entities, and he makes no commitment to 
the ontology of propositions. As he says, the phrase ’propositions' is 
simply a ’convenient’ means of expressing generalization of distinctions 
between, for example, saying of someone that he knows that the sentence 
’ 19 is prime’ is true and saying of him that he knows that 19 is prime. 
Another example is that a person may know that the sentence ’Horses are 
called "horses" ’ is true,—without knov;ing.-the proposition^expressed by . that 
sentence, for to know the proposition is to know not the truth of the 
sentence ’Horses are called "horses"’ but to know that horses are called 
’horses’ - the proposition which is independent of the language of the 
sentence.^
Dummett observes that although the concept of meaning is a fundamental
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and indispensable one, we are unclear even about the surface structure of 
statements involving that concept. Vie do not know what kind of sentence 
in natural language to take as characteristic for an attribution of a 
particular meaning to some given word or expression in it, .«hat is even 
worse, Dummett is not at all sure what is the right investigation to make 
in an area of philosophy where "vfe know even less what it is that we are 
talking about than we do in other areasLocke, however, is quite certain 
that knowledge has to do with 'the force and manner of the signification of 
words’ and that knowledge and language are so related that an understanding
5of language is a prerequisite for fixing the boundaries of knowledge. ;ords 
are, for Locke, interposed between our understanding and the truth so that 
they are like the medium through which visible objects pass but which ob­
scures and mixes them up. Most l8th century philosophers believed with 
Locke that by uncovering the origin of language, they were investigating its 
nature and hence helping to decide the part that language plays in the ex­
ercise of the human intellect. The l8th century assumption was that language 
was a product of thought, a mirror reflecting, however obscurely, our men­
tal processes. Locke showed that thought and language were clearly separated 
because of the harmful effects that he saw language having on the human 
understanding.
Since Frege, however, philosophers have agreed that mind and language 
are not so easily distinguished even though they may not be one and the 
same thing. According to Frege, any theory of language should show that the 
meanings of individual words are given by their contributions to the meaning 
of sentences in the language- On the other hand, his theory also states 
that the meanings of sentences can be grasped by recognizing the conditions 
under which the sentences are true. Indeed, for Frege, the sense of a sen­
tence is that which, together with extra-linguistic facts, determines the 
truth-value of a sentence, i.e., true or false. Frege held that the attri­
bution of propositional attitudes such as belief, knowledge, and assertion
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6requires the assigning of senses to words and sentences.
In the last seventy-five years, however, Frege’s theory has been called 
in question and new theories have been put forward which advocate that:
(1) Sentences have meaning only in so far as they are verifiable unless
7they are 'analytic*;
(2) Truth is an abstract notion that is unclear and ’assent-conditions'
should be substituted for it;^
(3) Frege’s basic insight that the sentence rather than the term is
the unit of meaning is correct and should be complemented with 
Tarski's definition of truth so that there is no need for any 
commitment to Frege’s rlatonic entities such as senses and 
truth-values;^
(4) A finer analysis of the concepts of meaning and truth is required
and are available;and
(5) There is no single notion such as truth or verification that holds
the key to the understanding of meaning.
As we have seen, the analysis of belief is shot through with questions 
about the meaning of words and sentences and their relation to the concept 
of truth. The ascription of beliefs seems to involve the use of language 
on the part of the person who holds a belief as well as on the part of the 
person who ascribes the belief. It would therefore seem that only language 
users can ascribe or have beliefs. But such a conclusion has not gone un­
challenged. There are those, for instance, who believe that it is possible 
to have a private language - i.e., a language that is not shared or sharable 
with other people and that can still be meaningful and useful to oneself. 
There are others who disagree about this and contend that language is a 
social phenomenon and manifests itself through social need and social inter­
course. There are still others who maintain that if private languages are 
possible, then surely it must also be possible for people to have beliefs 
without being language users. Similarly, dumb animals who do not use
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language can also have beliefs. According to this view, beliefs or thoughts 
exist apart from language. These controversies have a direct bearing on the 
analysis of belief which has taken it for granted that beliefs are expressed 
and expressible in language and that it is only the method of analysing 
their expressions that is at stake. Therefore, the question whether lang­
uages are private or public is a fundamental one in the analysis of belief 
and of propositional attitudes in general.
It was Russell who said that we could not enter into the minds of
others to observe the thoughts and emotions which we inferred from their
behaviour^^ and that other people could tell us what they felt but that we
12could not directly observe their feelings. As against this way of thinking, 
Wittgenstein remarks:
'That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sens­
ation on the model of "object and name" the object drops out of consider­
ation as irrelevantWittgenstein says that we must reject 'the grammar 
which tries to force itself on us here'^^ i.e., the grammar of 'object and 
name* that leads us to think that sensations are private. We are then false­
ly led to think that names of sensations must have got their meanings by 
private ostensive definitions. In illustration of this, he remarks: 'I have 
seen a person in a discussion on this subject strike himself on the breast 
and say: "But surely another person can't have THIS painj" The answer to 
this is that one does not define a criterion of identity by emphatic
stressing of the word " t h i s " T h e  word 'this' does not itself carry a
criterion of identity because it does not define the kind of identity that
is meant. Of course, the pain that I feel in my tooth is not the pain that
another person feels in his tooth, but Wittgenstein wants to 'get rid of the 
idea of a private o bjectalthough  there is an unproblematic sense in 
which our sensations are private: we can keep them to ourselves, as we can 
keep our thoughts to ourselves. But the notion of 'privacy' according to 
which we are supposed to be able to speak a private language that nobody
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else can understand is, to Wittgenstein, a defective one because he finds 
that language has sense only when it is recognized as a common language.
The word 'pain* is understood and can be used intelligibly only because 
there are people who are in agreement about the appropriate circumstances 
in which it should be used. As .ittgenstein says; ' iords arc connected with 
the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used in their
place, A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him !
17 ! and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences*. |
18 ÎAn early supporter of Wittgenstein on this is Rhees to whom the prob-i 
lem about private language is the problem of how words mean and what s. rule ! 
■ of language is. To say that pointing or mirroring refers to things is to I 
indicate that there is a convention within which pointing or mirroring is ; 
understood. I point only for the sake of someone who understands what I am 
doing. It is possible for us to learn the language we speak because there 
are certain rules for the use of words which are commonly recognized and it 
is possible for two people to communicate with one another because we agree 
in our reactions. The reactions themselves are not languages, nor are they 
language. The consensus appears only with language, with the common reac­
tions developing within the course of the language for, if people do not 
agree to use any word, say, 'red',in any regular way, there would be no 
distinction between using it wrongly or correctly. Unless I were used to 
talking about colours and to understanding people when they did talk about 
colours, then I should not know what red is and I should not know red when 
I see it.
If there were a private language then our ordinary use of words and 
concepts would be meaningless to Rhees. There would have been no sense in 
talking about following the definition, because it would have been 'my* 
definition, and there would have been no sense in which I could have been 
following it incorrectly. In any case, what does any definition establish 
if language were private? When I remember the sensation of, say, giddiness
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that I felt and the colour that I saw, I feel the same sensation and that 
is the same colour. But the identity, i.e., the sameness, comes from the 
language, from the fact that it is part of the common language that we have 
learned. In a private language there would he no sense in which we can 
•know* it, nor in which we can 'mean this’ or 'mean that* because both 
'knowing' and 'meaning' have reference to other language-users with whom we 
can communicate. Unless language is a social activity with agreed norms of 
use and meaning, we would not understand it or its use. People say something 
because of what they need and what they find in their lives and also because 
what they say can be understood by everyone. Rhees agrees with Wittgenstein 
that language is a way of life, a social use of words which are the same 
words partly because their meanings have to be learned and are therefore 
independent of the users. There cannot be a private language for Wittgen­
stein because language satisfies a social need, not a private idiosyncrasy.
Ayer disagrees with both Wittgenstein and Carnap on the issue of a 
private language. He is against Wittgenstein's view on the meaninglessness 
of one's using any language that is not sharable by other users as he is 
against Carnap's view on 'protocol language*. Ayer explains what he means 
by a private language in the following wordsî
'What philosophers usually seem to have in mind when they speak of a 
private language is one that is, in their view, necessarily private, in as 
much as it is used by some particular person to refer only to his own pri­
vate experiences. For it is often held that for a language to be public it 
must refer to what is publicly observable: if a person could limit himself 
to describing his own sensations or feelings, then, strictly speaking, only 
he would understand what he was saying; his utterance might indirectly con­
vey some information to others, but it could not mean to them exactly what 
it meant to him'ï^
Such a view ascribed to philosophers in general is not unlike Russell's 
20quoted above. Carnap, however, goes beyond this with his theory of proto­
col language. He gives the name of 'protocol language' to any set of sen-
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fences which are used to give a 'direct record' of one's own experience, so 
that if a person Ü. utters 'Thirst now' to describe 'only what is immedia­
tely given* to it cannot be understood by anyone else. Another person
may claim to be able to recognize and so refer to 's thirst, but 
'strictly speaking' all that he ever recognizes is some physical state of 
's body. If the 'thirst of _S^ ’' is understood to refer not to the physical 
state of his body but to his sensations of thirst, i.e., a non-material 
thing, then ^ ' s  thirst is beyond the reach of 's recognition, cannot 
possibly verify any statement which refers to 's thirst, in this sense, 
and cannot consequently understand it, 'In general', says Carnap, 'every 
statement in any person's protocol language would have sense for that person 
alone ... Even when the same words and sentences occur in various protocol 
languages, their sense would be different, they could not even be compared. 
Every protocol language could therefore be applied only solipsisticallyî 
there would be no inter-subjective protocol language. This is the conr-
5^ :^ iience obtained by consistent adherence to the usual view and terminology
21 I(rejected by the author)'. !
Carnap wishes to maintain that people can understand one another's 
protocol language statements so that statements made in what he calls the 
physical language can be inter-subjectively verifiable and so he draws the 
inference that 'protocol language is a part of physical language'. He there­
fore concludes that sentences appearing to refer to private experiences 
must be logically equivalent to sentences which describe some physical state 
of the subject. While some philosophers agree with him in giving physicalist 
interpretations to the statements that one makes about others' experiences, 
they do not do so as regards the statements that one makes about one's own 
experiences. These philosophers claim that certain sentences do describe 
the speaker^s private experiences and therefore they have a meaning for him
different from any that they can have for other people.
22As we have seen, Wittgenstein's criticism of a private language rests 
on different grounds. If language were private, he says, one could not give
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the same name to two sensations felt on different days, for the comparison 
of the sensations will depend on one's memory being 'right' or 'correct', 
but there is no criterion of correctness to be referred to apart from one's 
present judgment which could well be unreliable. The result is that whatever 
is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here one 
can't talk about 'right'.
Wittgenstein returns constantly to the point that the ascription of 
meaning to a sign is something that needs to be justified and that the 
justification lies in there being some independent test for determining 
that the sign is being used correctly, i.e., independent of the subject's 
recognition, or supposed recognition, of the object which he intends the 
sign to signify. In other words, his claim to recognize the object as being 
the same has to be backed by further evidence. For Wittgenstein this evid­
ence must be public, i.e., accessible, in theory, to everyone. He does not 
believe that checking one private sensation by another is enough because if 
one cannot be trusted to recognize one of them, then one cannot be trusted 
to recognize the other. As against this, Ayer argues that unless there is
something that one is allowed to recognize, no test can ever be completed
23and there will be no justification for the use of any sign at all. In 
looking up a time-table to check the time of the train’s departure, I have 
to trust, in the last resort, says Ayer, my eyesight or other people's eye­
sight or their testimony or the correctness of the signs that they make. In 
the end, whether it is a public or private object that I am checking, I 
have to rely on the testimony of my senses. If, Ayer concludes, I can 
recognize noises or shapes or movements, why cannot I also recognize a 
private sensation? Wittgenstein has indeed pointed out that the difference 
between a public and a private object is that one can give an ostensive 
definition of a public object but one cannot do so of a private sensation 
which is not an object at all, 'But*, asks Ayer again, 'what difference does 
this make? I can indeed extend my finger in the direction of a physical
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object, while I pronounce what I intend to he the object's name: and I can­
not extend my finger in the direction of a private sensation. But how is 
this extending of my finger anything more than an. idle ceremony? If it is 
to play its part in the giving of an ostensive definition, this gesture
has to be endowed with meaning. But if I can endow such a gesture with mean-
24ing, I can endow a word with meaning, without the gesture,' Ayer, I think, 
has made an important point here. It is true that pointing at a physical 
object while I speak, I can make my meaning clear to a bystander who can 
observe my gesture and hear my utterance. It is also true that I cannot give 
an ostensive definition of the word which I wish to stand for a sensation. 
Nor can I define it in terms of other words which cannot be defined either. 
Therefore I cannot give the word any meaning. But, as Ayer shows, this 
argument is based on two assumptions both of which he believes to bè false. 
The first false assumption is that it is logically impossible to understand 
a sign unless one can either observe the object which it signifies, or at 
least observe something with which this object is naturally associated. The 
second false assumption is that for a person to attach meaning to a sign it 
is necessary that other people should be capable of understanding it too.
In attacking these two assumptions, Ayer imagines a Robinson Crusoe 
left alone on his island as an infant, not having learned to speak and being 
nurtured by an animal until he can fend for himself. He is now an adult. He 
adapts his behaviour to the many things on the island, thus showing that he 
can recognize them,Despite Wittgenstein's theory that a solitary being would 
need no language and therefore cannot invent one, it is not inconceivable 
or self-contradictory to Ayer that Crusoe should invent a language because 
the first symbols in a language could have originally been a purely private 
enterprise. If we allow Crusoe to describe the flora and fauna of his is­
land, says Ayer, why not allow that he could also invent words to describe 
his sensations? Of course, his use of words cannot be checked by a fellow 
creature, but i^ yer thinks that while such a check is useful it is not
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indispensable, Moreover, ayer considers that it would be difficult to argue 
that the power of communication, the ability to keep a diary could come to 
him only with the arrival of Man Friday, nyer's case for a private language 
rests on Crusoe's ability to remember what names he has given which objects 
and to recognize a mistake when he has made one. If he can do so with phy­
sical objects, asks nyer, why can ho not do so with his own sensations? Any 
mistake he makes in identification may not make any practical difference to 
him but that is not to say, Ayer points out, that there is no mistake at 
all, as Wittgenstein claims. Verification, Ayer says, must stop somewhere 
and so must testing. Even if Crusoe must rely on his fallible memory for 
identification and recognition, it does not follow that he has no means of 
identifying it, or that it does not make sense to say that he identifies it 
right or wrong.
So long as Crusoe is alone on the island, Ayer thinks that the only 
distinction he can draw between 'external' objects and his 'inner' exper­
iences (if he draws a distinction at all) is that his experiences are trans-j 
lent in a way that external objects are not. On Man Friday's arrival he 
will find that he can teach the new arrival his words for external objects 
by showing them to him, but he cannot do the same about his sensations. 
However, it does not follow that he has no use for the latter words himself.; 
'In a context of this sort*, Ayer says, 'one can teach only what one already 
understands. The ability to teach, or rather the ability of someone else to 
learn, cannot therefore be a prerequisite for understanding.' It seems to 
Ayer that it is a contingent matter whether Man Friday understands Crusoe's 
words for his sensations or not because, Ayer says, the ways in which 
languages are actually learned do not logically circumscribe the possibil­
ities of their being understood, Carnap's mistake seems to Ayer to be that 
he attaches properties of being private or public to different sorts of 
objects, independently of our linguistic usage. To Ayer it is a matter of 
notation whether we describe two different persons' perceiving the same
-  125 -
table as each sensing his own private 'tabular' sense data or as each doing 
something else. This is just a contingent matter. Suppose, says Ayer, that 
we modify our rules of identity and allow ourselv -s to say that what is 
ordinarily described as  ^and S^'s observing the same physical event is 
'really' a case of each of them sensing his own sense-data which, while 
they might be qualitatively similar, could not be literally the same. This, 
he says, does not entitle us to conclude that neither could understand what 
the other said about this physical event. Similarly, the fact that cannot 
feel or inspect 's feelings in no way entails that he cannot understand 
what says about them. 'The criteria for deciding whether two people 
understand each other are logically independent of the fact that we do, or 
do not, have a use for saying that literally the same objects are perceived 
by both't^
Ayer's conclusion from all this is that it is not necessary for a
person to understand another's language for the latter to be meaningful and
that for anyone to understand a descriptive statement it is not necessary
that he should himself be able to observe what it describes. If this were
not so, then not only do we not understand statements about other people's
sensations but also statements about the past. If we re-interpret other
people's statements by substituting bodily states for feelings and the
future for the past, we are changing their reference altogether. The desr
CV'iptive statement should still be verifiable, to Ayer, but it need not be
directly verifiable and.,.-even if it is directly verifiable, it need not be
27directly verifiable by me.
From a logical point of view, Ayer is right in saying that Carnap and 
Wittgenstein have not made out a case against there being a private lang­
uage, Carnap's reduction of all statements to physical language is too 
narrow because there are many statements such cis prepositional attitudes 
and hypothetical statements, for example, for which there seem to be no 
logical equivalents in physical language. On the other hand, Jittgenstein*s
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thesis against there being a private language is too wide because even if 
language is a social activity, it does not follow that there could never 
have been £i time when it was not. But, of course, it would not then be a 
language according to Wittgenstein because, for him, a language is by def­
inition a social activity.
Those philosophers who agree with Wittgenstein that language is a
social activity assume tha.t communication among native, fluent language-
28users is self-explanatory, but, as Dummett points out, the word 'commun­
icate* has no more precise signification than does 'whatever may be done by 
the utterance of one or more sentences of the language'. That members of a 
linguistic community do communicate with one another by means of their 
language is a contingent matter which does not provide the ground for con­
cluding that communication was the purpose for which language came into {Ibeing. That young children learn to use words and expressions of the lang- i
Iuage from the teaching of adults does not entail that there is nothing for j 
the sounds and other symbolic marks to signify. If it is said that they i 
signify only observable behaviour, then the reasoning seems to come full | 
circle, for we are told that the cries of pain or sounds made are also |
part of behaviour. Even though sensations, such as pain, and thoughts, such 
as belief, are not objects that are observable, they are not the same as 
behaviour. The distinction between them is both important and recognizable, 
but it is not clear how one should specify it. A sociological explanation 
such as Wittgenstein's does not touch the logical aspect such as that 
outlined by Dummett and Ayer,
Podor is in agreement with Ayer and Dummett in this. Podor is also on 
the side of Augustine when the latter is criticized by Wittgenstein thus;
'Augustine descrbes the learning of human languages as if the child : 
came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the '
country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or - 
again, as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And "think” j
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29would here mean something like, "talk to itself".'
Wittgenstein makes the point that this picture assumes that the child 
has access to a linguistic system in which the 'figuring out' is carried on 
and that such a view is patently absurd. Podor, on the other hand, considers 
that Augustine 'was precisely and demonstrably right and that seeing that he 
was is pre-requisite to any serious attempts to understand how first 
languages are learned
Podor's thesis is that you cannot learn a language unless you already 
know one. This is not the same as saying that you cannot learn a language 
unless you already learned one. The latter claim, he says, leads to infinite 
regress but the former does not. According to him, the language that is 
known is 'the language of thought’ which is prior to the first language 
ever learned. In other words, Podor believes that the language of thought 
is innate although he is not entirely in agreement with Chomsky's theory, 
Podor does not agree with Chomsky's assumption that there is a universality 
of language structure across historically un-related communities or the 
assumption that the complexity of information the child has to master in 
order to become fluent is such that there is an innate language of thought 
in every child, Podor thinks that this is a good argument but the flaw in it 
is that we do not know which features of language are universal and there­
fore which aspects of the child's representation of his native language 
are innate,
Podor's reasoning is this;
•Learning a language (including, of course, a first language) involves 
learning what the predicates of the language mean. Learning what the pred­
icates of a language mean involves learning a determination of the extension 
of these predicates. Learning a determination of the extension of the pre­
dicates involves learning that they fall under certain rules (i.e. truth 
rules). But one cannot learn that P falls under R unless one has a language 
in which P and R can be represented. So one cannot learn a language unless
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one has a language. In particular, one cannot learn a first language unless 
one already has a system capable of representing the predicates in that 
language and their extensions. And, on pain of circularity, that system 
cannot be the language that is being learned. But first languages are 
learned. Hence, at least some cognitive operations are carried out in 
languages other than natural languages'^^ This is Podor*s language of 
thought,
In saying that his language of thought is innate, Podor does not mean 
that there is an innate conceptual system at birth, but only that it is un­
learned. Further, he means that only elementary concepts are unlearned and
that we need the environment to supply us with the examples of our concepts,
32i.e., red poppies for the concept 'red'. The latter assumption seems most 
implausible, especially where colours are concerned as people born blind 
have no concept of colour at all. It does not seem reasonable to assume 
that one can have the concept 'red' before one has seen the colour 'red',
Podor is concerned to show, as against Wittgenstein, that the terms in 
a private language - i.e., his language of thought - can be used coherently. 
In the case of natural language there is a certain correspondence between
what a speaker of the language believes and the form of words he uses to
express his beliefs. This correspondence holds because the speaker knows 
and adheres to the conventions that govern the language, Podor admits that
in the case of his language of thought, he has to show how such a relation
could be mediated by something other than public conventions. Podor does 
not agree with Wittgenstein that a term is coherently employed in a language 
when its use is controlled by the facts about the world. Podor thinks that 
a man’s verbalizations are determined not just by his intentions but also 
by his beliefs. Even in a public language Podor thinks that coherence 
requires only a stable relation between the way the terms are used and the 
way the speaker believes the world to be, not the way the world is. Hence 
the coherence of natural language is only a matter of the speaker's assent
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to his belief and his acceptance of linguistic conventions for expressing 
the belief. In the case of the language of thought, then, the coherence 
lies in what Podor calls the 'innate structure of the nervous system 
which Podor compares to a computer which has been programmed to match ma- 
cKtne states with linguistic formulae. This is the representational system or 
language of thought to which a learner of a first or natural language must 
have prior access. Podor does not explain this representational system or 
that of natural language for he says; 'It remains an open question whether 
internal representation, so construed, is sufficiently like natural language 
representation so that both can be called representation "in the same 
s e n s e " , T h e r e  is an analogy between the two kinds of representation — 
but it is merely an analogy and Podor leaves it open whether we wish to call 
the internal representation a language or not. b'hat he wishes to emphasize 
is that whether we call it a language or not, it is an unlearned internal 
representational system, prior to the learning of natural language.
If we accept the view that learning a first language involves formul­
ating and confirming hypotheses about the semantic properties of its pred­
icates - a view which Podor accepts as plausible - then, he thinks, it must 
be possible to express, for every predicate in the natural language, a co­
extensive predicate in the internal code. Podor apparently thinlcs that this 
is entailed by his thesis that an innate internal code is presupposed by 
our ability to learn a first language. But since he allows that his inner 
code need not be a language, there is no reason to suppose that every 
predicate in natural language should have its counterpart in the inner code 
in the form of a co-extensive predicate. All that his thesis requires is 
that there should be an innate ability in human beings for language, not 
that this ability should take the specific form of a language equivalent 
in every way to natural language,
Podor points out that his account of propositional attitudes is a 
novel one in that to have a certain propositional attitude is to be in a
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cerxain relation to an internal representation^^ The relation between the 
organism having the propositional attitude and the internal representation 
is regarded by Podor to be 'nomologically necessary and sufficient for
(or nomologically identical to) having the prepositional attitude....
Attitudes to propositions are, to that extent, "reduced" to attitudes to 
formulae, though the formulae are couched in a proprietary inner code’.
By this means Podor thinks that cognitive psychology can exhibit the ration­
ality of mental processes. He agrees with Quine that translation is an 
enterprise in which we do our best for the rationality of texts, and
suggests that cognitive psychology is the one in which we do our best for
37the rationality of mental processes at large.
In his book ’Rationality* Bennett is concerned to demonstrate what it 
is that makes human beings different from dumb animals. He says : 'I use 
"rationality" to mean whatever it is that humans possess which marks them 
off, in respect of intellectual capacity, sharply and importantly from all 
other known s p e c i e s H e  sees this rationality expressed primarily in the 
use of language, i.e., natural language. He considers the case of honey 
bees whose behaviour seems to lead to the theory that they do express 
themselves in a language governed by three rules at once - those of dis­
tance, direction, and concentration. The bees’ dances appear to be symbolic 
in character, indicating apparently to other bees where they could find 
food. But Bennett suggests that the ’correct' performance of a dance showing 
exactly where the food is can be explained in terms of the digestive state 
of the dancing bees resulting from the concentration of the imbibed sugar 
solution, the degree of muscular fatigue as a result of the distance flown 
since feeding and the optical state produced by the direction of flight from 
the food. Similarly he suggests that the apian behaviour which manifests 
'understanding' of observed dances can be explained. Observation of a dance 
causes the observer to move in such a way as to attain a certain optical 
state, and thus to point in a certain direction, and it creates a bodily
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disturbance which causes flight and fades away after a certain length of 
flight; as when adrenalin flows. He considers that the bees’ behaviour is 
a matter of simple stimulus and response, like purring and whining and can­
not be counted as evidence of apian rationality. In von Frisch’s experiment,
bees were made to dance on a rotating surface^^ The bees kept pointing in !
the direction of the food and might be said to be acting with intelligence ! 
and rationality. But von Frisch found that bees are more sensitive to polar-;I
ized light than unpolarized light and have visual clues that we do not have.! 
This test is said to prove that the alignment-preserving behaviour of the | 
dancing bees is not due to intelligence but to the bees’ sensory states.
The dancing of the bees may seem to us to be governed by rules but, as 
Bennett points out, unless they somehow manifest an awareness of their rules
as rules, we cannot really say that they have rules or that they dance ac*
Cording to the rules that they have. Their behaviour is indeed regular but 
not necessarily rule-guided. He suggests that the bees’ dancing behaviour 
could be reactions to smells and not based on anything we call assessment 
of evidence. If a capacity for certain apparently intelligent behaviour 
is possessed from birth rather than acquired by trial and error, Bennett 
considers that we would be reluctant to believe that it really does manifest 
intelligence on the part of the behaver. He thinks that behaviour which is 
unlearned or not suitably modified as circumstances change is logically 
inconsistent with ’intelligent’ behaviour or with ’rational behaviour’.
However, Bennett does not deny all intelligence to animals. He mentions 
the tapping horse as evidence that it can do sums but, of course, he wrote 
before the recent overthrowing of the evidence. He also credits the dog 
that buries its bone for future use with intelligence. But what counts with 
him is the crucial difference between animal and human behaviour, i.e., 
human beings' possession of theoretical knowledge and hence of language.
He thinks that it is quite possible for creatures without language to have 
reasons for their actions but only those who have language can give reasons.
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He also claims that ‘only linguistic behaviour can be appropriate or inv» -
appropriate to that which is not both particular and present*^^ In other words,
generalisations and descriptions of past events need language, for 'the only
way in which behaviour can fit or fail to fit a fact about the past is for
it to say something which means that something was the case in the past*5^
Such a language has a special power deriving from the fact that linguistic
behaviour obeys rules correlating performances with empirical states of
affairs - any kind of states of affairs of the past, present or future and
whether particular or general. Only in a language is it possible to register
theoretical knowledge, i.e., knowledge — that-jp which is not cast as know-
ledge-hovj-to-get-x. From all this Bennett concludes that only human beings
have language. In a later book Bennett reverses his position and argues
that it is possible for animals to act according to general beliefs about
the past, present, and futuref^ But such general beliefs in animals have
not produced a structured language that human beings have.
Davidson, however, considers that to attribute intentions and beliefs
to dogs and other animals is to commit anthropomorphism^^ Quine also is of
the same opinion when he comments that we attribute beliefs, wishes, and
strivings even to creatures lacking the power of speech, 'such is our
dramatic virtuosity. We project ourselves even into what from his behaviour
we imagine a mouses's state of mind to have been, and dramatize it as a
belief, wish, or striving, verbalized as seems relevant and natural to us
in the state thus feigned'f"^
The belief that Davidson talks about is essentially human belief. He
considers that belief is central to all kinds of thought because whatever a
person thinks about, for instance, a gun, he must have certain beliefs about
the gun - that it is a weapon, loaded or unloaded, and so on. There are thus
endless inter-locked beliefs forming a system in which a thought is identif
jied by its logical and epistemic space. His thesis also requires the 'idea
45of an interpreter, someone who understands the utterances of another'7 It
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is not essential to his theory that they should have a common language or
that thought should be reduced to speech in any way. He allows that there
may be thoughts for which the speaker cannot find words, or for which there 
are not even words. His main thesis is that a creature cannot have thoughts 
unless it is as an interpreter of the speech of another^^
The immediate aim of Davidson’s theory of interpretation is to give the 
meaning of an arbitrary utterance by a member of a language community. Cen­
tral to such a theory is a theory of truth that satisfies Tarski’s Conven­
tion 2) modified to apply to a natural language; 'An utterance of sentence
2 by a speaker x at time 2 is true if, and only if — Uttering words,
however, is an action and action is explained by identifying beliefs and 
desires - a way of fitting an action into a pattern of behaviour made coher­
ent by the theory of interpretation. The belief and desire that explain an 
action must be such that anyone with that belief and desire would have a 
reason to act that way - that is to say, there must be a teleological 
explanation for the belief and desire. But in order to explain why someone 
said something, we need to laiow, among other things, his own interpretation 
of what he said, i.e., what he believes his words to mean in the circum­
stances in which he speaks. His beliefs will include those about how others 
will interpret his words. We can know that a speaker holds a sentence true 
without our knowing what he means by it or what belief it expresses for him. 
But. if we know that he holds the sentence true and we know how to interpret 
it, then we can make a correct attribution of belief. Davidson sees the 
methodological problem of interpretation as seeing how, given the sentences 
a man accepts as true in given circumstances, to work out what his beliefs 
are and what his words mean. He thinks that holding a sentence true is 
inevitably linked with having a desire and complex intentions. If all the 
sentences held true by a speaker are put together, they will provide a 
total theory comprising an interpretation of the sentences as well as the 
beliefs and desires, with both the latter conceived as relating the agent
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to sentences or utterances, Buch a theory would, according to Davidson, 
explain all behaviour, verbal and otherwise.
Davidson considers that the attribution of desires and beliefs must go 
hand in hand with the interpretation of speech. Otherwise we should not be 
able to make the fine distinctions between thoughts that a,re essential to 
the explanations that we make. If speech were not available, asks Davidson, 
how was one to explain the distinction between universal thoughts and the 
conjunction of thoughts, or thoughts with mixed quantification such as 'He 
hopes that everyone is loved by someone'? Contrary to Wittgenstein's dictum 
that the meaning of a sentence is in its use, Davidson holds that the auton­
omy of meaning is essential to language: it is because the interpretation of
a sentence is independent of its use that the utterance of a sentence can
49serve in the description of the attitudes of others.
For Davidson belief plays an important role in the interpretation of
language only because words mean the same even when employed in different
contexts. As a private attitude a belief, to him, is not intelligible unless
it is adjusted to the public norm provided by language. 'It follows' he
says, 'that a creature must be a member of a speech community if it is to
have the concept of belief ... given dependence of other attitudes on belie:^
more generally, only a creature that can interpret speech can have the
concept of a thought
Davidson claims that someone cannot have a belief unless he understands
the possibility of being mistaken and this requires grasping the contrast
between truth and error - true belief and false belief. But he thinks that
this contrast can emerge only in the context of interpretation which alone
forces us to the idea of objective, public truth. For him the notion of a
true belief depends on the notion of a true utterance and this in turn de-
51pends on a shared language.^
52Dummett criticizes Davidson's theory on various counts. First, the 
core of Davidson's theory of meaning is a theory of truth framed on Tarski's:
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model. But such a theory of truth, says Dummett, lacks the apparatus requfhed 
for converting it into an explicit definition, for it does not explicate 
the concept of truth in any way hut takes it as already known for the 
interpretation of the object-language. Second, Dummett thinks that David­
son's theory leads to an understanding of the objeot-language only via a 
grasp of concepts expressed by its primitive expressions which it does not 
itself explain and so Dummett thinks that an interpretation theory like 
Davidson's is similar to a translation theory and does not fully display in 
what an understanding of the object-language consists. Third, in claiming 
that in his theory a direct ascription of meaning will be derivable at 
least for sentences, such as '"The Earth moves" means that the earth moves', 
Davidson, in Dummett's view, is employing part of the metalanguage which 
appears totally unexplanatory because it is uninformative. Fourth, David­
son's theory requires that an understanding of a sentence consists in a 
knowledge both of the relevant T^sentence and of the fact that that Tj- 
sentence is derived from a theory of truth for the language which satisfies 
the constraints imposed upon such a theory for it to be acceptable. These 
constraints are the background knowledge about those sentences. But Dummett 
thinks that this appeal to background information cannot supply what we 
need because a T-theory does no more than a traditional translation manual 
does. That is, it does not explain what it is to have a mastery of a lang­
uage such as one's mother tongue, independently of a knowledge of any other, 
Dummett says that such a conclusion can be avoided only if we could ascribe 
to a speaker of the object-language a knowledge of the propositions express 
-sed by the sentences of the theory of truth, independently of any language 
in which those propositions might be expressed. Davidson's theory, according 
to Dummett, provides no model for what an appreciation of such propositions 
might consist in, otherwise than in an ability to enunciate them linguis­
tically,
A molecular theory of meaning based on the notion of truth conditions
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such as Davidson's must, according to Dummett, attribute to one who under­
stands a sentence a knowledge of the condition which must obtain for it to 
be true, not just a capacity to recognize that sentence as true just in 
case that condition holds. Furthermore, Dummett thinks that such an account 
would leave no room for mistakes. In order to leave room, he thinks that we 
must claim that an acceptable theory of truth will give the best possible 
fit between the conditions of truth for the truth of a sentence and the 
conditions under which it is held to be true, not a perfect fit. Consequent 
?ly, he concludes that a speaker's understanding of a sentence cannot be 
judged save in relation to his employment of the entire language. The 
difficulty arises precisely because there is no way of determining, within 
such a theory, the individual content with which any speaker endows a sen­
tence.
Davidson, says Dummett, uses the gap between the truth condition of a 
sentence and the condition under which it is held true to explain the gene 
-sis of the concept of belief. Dummett calls this ’an abnegation of what we 
are entitled to expect from a theory of meaning - which is to be able to 
distinguish between disagreements stemming from a difference of interpret­
ation and disagreements of substance’ - i.e., about the facts and explain 
how it is possible for disagreement-'over the truth value of sentences to 
occur even when there is agreement over their meaning. Davidson's reply is 
that we ought not lightly assume that every disagreement over truth value, 
e.g., 'The Earth is round' should be regarded as one of substance rather 
than of interpretation. Dummett's criticism is that a disagreement between 
individual speakers of the same language at the same time either cannot 
be the account for it at all or it should be explained by attributing to 
them divergent theories of truth for the language. The same, he thinks, 
applies to a change of mind on the part of the individual and in either 
case there is no longer the conception of a linguistic community.
The general conclusion that Dummett draws from all this is that the
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judgments which we make are not directly correlated with states of affairs 
which render them true oi* false. The reason is seen by Dummett to be that 
for the most part we are not capable of recognizing that the appropriate 
condition obtains for us to arrive at an evaluation of the truth of the 
sentence.
P^llesdal^^ also sees a great deal to criticize in Davidson's theory, 
Davidson's theory of interpretation or translation lays down two conditions;
(l) that translation must carry over from one language into another all the 
structure needed for a theory of truth and (2) that the translation required 
should maximize agreement, i.e., in translating A's language into B's, 
sentences A assents to should as much as possible translate into sentences 
B assents to, and conversely; correspondingly for dissent, p/llesdal agrees 
with Davidson that it is important to preserve linguistic structure which 
is needed both for language learning and for an account of how the truth 
conditions of each sentence relate to the words of the sentence that recur 
in other sentences and can be assigned identical roles in other sentences, 
p/llesdal also agrees with Davidson that maximizing agreement is important 
since in order to get to know and share others' beliefs, the more agreement 
you already have the easier it is to secure more agreement. But P^llesdal 
thinks that Davidson exaggerates the agreement required and neglects the 
part that sensory experience plays, p/llesdal believes that in maximizing 
agreement one has to weight the sentences in accordance with the evidence 
relations and that this can be done only if one assumes rationality on the 
part of others. He regards rationality to be even more important than 
agreement. After all, the main source of evidence for a rational person 
is his sensory experience without which there can be no agreement. Hence 
Davidson's theory is unsatisfactory to P^llesdal. This sensory evidence is 
required by p/llesdal to include not only verbal behaviour in stimulus- 
response situations but also spontaneous behaviour, like ostension, which 
will show whether the speaker is referring to the object about which we
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think something is true or false. A satisfactory theory is also seen by 
P/llesdal to include a study of human action in which meaning and belief 
enter where language is not used. Human actions are not always rational 
because they are governed by moral and social rules which may influence 
our actions. The observation of actions may cut down on the indeterminacy 
of translation while the interpretation of what a person says may help to 
determine his preferences and explain his actions. F^llesdal sums up his 
views by saying that any satisfactory theory of meaning must take account 
of how meaning is connected with the whole variety of human experience.
Bishop^^ is critical of Davidson's theory about dumb animals. If think­
ing, says Bishop, is just acquisition of certain behavioural dispositions, 
then languageless animals can think provided they can acquire relevant 
dispositions. But if thinking is silent speech, then dumb animals evidently 
cannot think. If it is claimed that human beings are different in kind from 
the rest of nature because their behaviour requires a special form of 
'rational* explanation and human phenomena are seen as the outcome of an 
agent's practical reasoning from his beliefs and intentions, then. Bishop 
says, the following claims need to be established:
(1) That rational explanations constitute a logically distinct form 
of explanation;
(2) That some human phenomena need rational explanation in order to 
be understood; and
(3) That no non-human phenomena may rightly be given a rational 
explanation.
In order to establish (3) one would need to know, he says, first, that 
only language users can exhibit behaviour which admits of rational explana- ; 
tion, and second, that humans are the only language users. The nub of the ; 
claimed difference between human and non-human beings is the distinction 
between intentional agents and beings incapable of intentional action. If, 
Bishop says, machines can use language, it is plausible to assume that use
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of language suffices for intentional agency. In this respect Bishop does not 
consider that Davidson has succeeded in overturning the prevailing opinion 
that dumb animals can think#
Davidson proceeds on the assumption that there is indeterminacy in 
assigning content to the beliefs and intentions attributed to dumb animals, 
but Bishop thinks that the indeterminacy equally applies to human beings' 
beliefs and intentions* Even if there is indeterminacy in regard to dumb 
animals' beliefs and intentions, that does not seem sufficient ground to 
Bishop for denying their possession of these states. All that the indeter­
minacy argument can show to him is that 'the fine distinctions we are used 
to making in the attribution of thoughts' cannot be employed in the absence 
of evidence of speech.
Davidson's language user, according to Bishop, is one who can interpret 
but not necessarily produce linguistic utterances. Such an interpreter of 
language must have the concept of belief without which Davidson claims 
that he cannot interpret the speech of others. But Bishop thinks it is 
possible for someone to have a belief, and deploy it in practical reasoning, 
without actually formulating a sentence. He compares Davidson's claim with 
Sellars's view that belief episodes are to be understood as theoretical 
entities modelled on certain sorts of overt linguistic utterances. Both 
claims affirm the primacy of reference to language in any adequate account 
of belief. In fact Davidson has himself quoted Sellars as saying that think­
ing at the distinctly human level is essentially verbal activity.
However, Bishop points out that to have a concept of belief is one 
thing and to understand it theoretically is another. He admits that to 
have a concept is to have the capacity to discriminate instantiations of 
it - a kind of understanding. But it differs from theoretical thinking, for
it can pick out the blue but not make the concept of blue intelligible.
/
Bishop shows that Davidson needs to establish that the capacity to be 
aware of beliefs requires linguistic ability and suggests that the most
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that Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation shows is that belief 
cannot be rendered intelligible without reference to its role in interpret­
ation. Bishop concludes that Davidson has failed to show that languageless 
creatures cannot have the concept of belief for it is logically possible 
for dumb creatures to exliibit behaviour explicable in terms of their having 
beliefs about, and intentions to'produce, beliefs and, therefore, language­
less creatures can have a concept of belief.
Bishop dismisses Davidson’s claim that the capacity to make mistakes 
entails a capacity lor belief, for to make mistakes is to behave inappro» - 
priately as causal consequence of being in the state of registering false 
information. But the capacity for belief is not a consequence of register­
ing true or false information, for it is the ability to reason from beliefs 
and intentions to appropriate intentional action. If Pido is in error we 
say that he has a false belief, not that he has no capacity for belief.
The debate has so far been about whether languageless creatures can 
have the concept of belief and what the concept of belief itself entails. 
Cooper•s-'^  ^theory of belief rules out the attribution of any concept of 
belief to animals and it does not even allow such a concept to young child 
-ren of less than about three years of age. His reasons are clear and sim­
ple. Young children's speech is not, contrary to the traditional view, 
'telegraphic* in the sense that the words spoken are like the words in a 
telegram which are ordinary sentences with the omission of certain grammat­
ical signs for the sake of economy. Both the sender and the recipient 
speak the same language and understand the telegraphic message in the same 
way. But it is not possible for an adult to know if the sounds made by 
young children mean to them what they may mean to him. For example, take 
the word 'doggie' so often used by young children. There is no knowing from 
the child's use of the word whether he means to say, in our adult language, 
'dog', 'doggish', 'doghood', 'dogs', and so on. Such conceptual indetermin- | 
acy rules out any attribution of concept-thinking to young children. Cooper !
-  141 -
defines young children as those who possess a language which lacks a cert­
ain 'logico-syntactic apparatus'This apparatus contains at least the 
following elements; articles (definite and indefinite), plurals, numerals, 
pronouns, identity operators (for example, expressions like is the same
one as ,.,'), and quantifiers (for example, expressions like 'all... are 
or 'There is a ...'). It is in virtue of this apparatus that adults can ;
distinguish between 'doghood' and 'bits of a dog', for instance. Thus by itranslating the child's 'doggie' into 'doghood' or,whatever, we are attrib- i 
uting to him a concept which he may not possess or, if he does, it may not 
be what he means. There is no knowing, one way or the other. This indeter- ; 
minacy may be said to apply equally to adults' speech, but it would be a 
reductio ad absurdum to claim that we cannot understand others' speech for, j
to the extent that we do not understand others' speech, we do not under- j
stand our own. Our language is understandable in so far as it is publicly
Iintelligible. Cooper does not consider that young children's language is 
unverifiable so much as that it lacks the logico-syntactic apparatus that 
tells us at a- glance whether they are talking about 'doghood' or 'a piece of 
dog* or whatever. Even though young children do use this apparatus occasion­
ally, they do not use it often enough or consistently enough or with suff- I 
icient sophistication for us to be able to identify these elements in their 
speech. Of course, it does not mean that we can never translate a young 
child's speech correctly, Uhat it does mean is that whether a translation 
is correct or not does not arise because there is no criterion for judging. 
At the level of concepts we can only ascribe a concept to a person if it 
makes sense to ascribe it as a thing-concept rather than a property-concept 
or some other concept. But such distinctions are intelligible only in terms 
of a logico-syntactic apparatus. Cooper warns that he is not stripping 
young children of all intelligence, but only of the logico-syntactic 
apparatus that adults have. It is possible, of course, as some psycho­
linguists claim, that young children have their own logico-syntactic rule
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that allows them to delete the copula from their language, hut Cooper shows
that there is no reason why we should ascribe such an apparatus to them.
Their speech is their normal speech and not at all like the telegraphic
speech used by adults in telegrams in order to save money. It is also
possible that the child's comprehension exceeds his production but even if
we admit this without further analysis - which is necessary - it is not at
all obvious to Cooper that the child's 'holistic' grasp of a whole utterance
should imply his having understood each, or even any, component of that
utterance. He may be ignoring certain components, as Cooper points out, or
57systematically misinterpreting them;
It is possible that concept-possession need not be of Cooper's logico-
syntactic kind. It could be of the discriminatory kind like that of the
chicken-sexer who could sort chicks correctly into male and female without
58knowing how he did it; In other words, he does not possess the concepts 
applicable to his discriminated classes, male and female chicks. Cooper 
points out that it is surely extraordinary to credit a person with possess­
ing the concept.-of dog if he does not even recognize that dogs are certain 
physical objects as distinct from thinking that dog is a property-, 
stuff-, or abstract entity-concept. It is illicit to argue from *X can 
discriminate between A's and B's' to 'X has the concepts of A_ ^ .nd B'. 
However, Cooper thinks that there is a mdre important reason against under­
standing concept-possession in terms of discriminatory behaviour. For in­
stance, a gorilla may try to peel an unpeelable lump of wood, but it has 
made no conceptual mistake. If a man correctly perceives a dog but wrongly 
calls it a 'cat', then he has made a conceptual mistake. This mistake can 
only be identified through questioning by means of the linguistic system 
in terms of which answers can be given. Thus Cooper says that it is not ‘ 
just fine differences, as Davidson thinks, which require language in order 
to be distinguished. Hence having a concept is closely tied to the capacity 
of making a conceptual mistake.
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The second important reason that Cooper puts forward against using 
discriminatory behaviour as an explanation for the possession of concepts 
is this. If, he says, concept-possession is understood in terms, simply, 
of discriminatory behaviour, then concepts could not play the explanatory 
role v;e normally give them. For normally we want to explain certain types 
of discriminatory behaviour as resulting from the possession of concepts.
It is because I have the concept of money that I can sort out the shillings 
and pence into one pile and the mere lumps of metal into another. But if we 
identify the possession of the concept in terms of the discriminatory beha­
viour, no such explanation is available. It should not be a tautology, he 
concludes, to say 'X is disposed to discriminate between A's and B's under 
certain conditions because he has the concepts of A and B,' To be able to 
sort out is not the same as to have a concept.
It has often been said that human beings are distinguished from other
animals by the structural complexity of their language and their ability
to make novel combinations of their words into new sentences but. Cooper
insists, it is the appropriateness of certain combinations of their words
for performing a crucial role - that of asserting or stating how things
59are - that is really distinctive of human beings; There is all the diff­
erence in the world, he says, between asserting that, for example, one is 
in pain and making sounds from which others (including animals) could infer 
that one is in pain. The complex social organization and the sophisticated 
artefacts that belong to human communities require the setting and harmon­
izing of long-term goals. This in turn presupposes human rationality which 
is stronger than intelligence. The latter is shown in adjusting to contin­
gencies, but rationality involves more than just adapting to circumstances. 
It involves inferring, hypothesizing, testing the general against the 
particular, and recognizing inconsistencies. It presupposes a special con­
cern with the truth of thoughts or beliefs, A dog may be concerned whether 
its bone is $till at the foot of the tree, but it is not concerned with the
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truth of the belief that the bone is buried there. To say that a creature 
has beliefs is not to attribute to it the ability to grasp the concepts of
belief and truth, Man is rational in so far as he has such a grasp.
Logical relations are recognized by human beings as holding between 
beliefs. To recognize an entailment is to recognize that the truth of one 
belief is guaranteed by the trutfi of another, and to recognize an inconsis­
tency is to recognize that one belief is true while another is false. If 
human beings are rational, then they are in possession of the concepts of 
belief and truth. It is not possible to talk about a belief being true or 
entailing another belief or contradicting a third unless one has a language 
in which the elements of the sentences are structured in the way that the 
elements of the belief are.
For a belief to be true, the elements of the belief have to be so struc 
-tured that the belief corresponds to how the world actually is. But we have 
no account, says Cooper, of how conceptual elements relate to the world that 
is not derived from our account of how sentential elements (names, predC
.-cates) relate to things. Hence our grasp of v?hat it is for a belief to be
true is thoroughly parasitic on our theory of linguistic truth. Cooper is 
not claiming that belief-elements are identical to linguistic elements, or 
that beliefs are merely sentences held to be true. All that his theory in­
sists upon is that our understanding of belief—elements and of the truth of 
beliefs is derived from our understanding of linguistic matters. Hence if 
human beings are conceived of as creatures with a reflective concern for 
the truths of beliefs, then they must be creatures whose understanding 
derives from their understanding of their language, which is their system 
for producing and structuring sentences.
If Cooper is correct in his account of language and belief, then no 
animal that has been known to exist could have had a language. Neither 
could the sounds animals or young children make be described as language.
Nor could the 'semantic systems' of the Symbolists and anthropologists
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take the place of language. Language is the only means of communication in 
which propositions are generated which can he true or false according to 
whether they describe correctly or incorrectly how things are. It is also 
in language alone that one can talk about referential devices being the same 
or not, or about whether any two sentences or messages are paraphrases of 
one another, or whether they must have the same truth-value or the same 
structural correspondence. Messages generated by language are understood 
precisely in terms of the conscious, assertive intentions of agents whose 
rationality is displayed in the language they speak. It would seem, there­
fore, that the private language defended by Ayer - whether as one invented 
by Crusoe or by the first man ever to keep a diary - would not be considered 
as a language at all by Cooper*
Quine's theory about the relation between language and thought is a 
radical departure from what has gone before him. His theory^^ is behaviour- 
istio as well as mechanistic and genetic. He traces all phenomena- back to 
dispositions. He considers that each disposition is a physical state or  ^
mechanism which, in the case of solubility in water, can be set forth in 
terms of the arrangement and interaction of small bodies. Such a formulation 
or definition can, he says, take the place of the old disposition term. The 
word 'disposition', he explains, is a useful term in that it can be taken 
to refer to a hypothetical state or mechanism that we do not yet understand, 
while merely specifying one of its characteristics such as solubility in 
water. He even includes intelligence among the dispositions. We do not, he 
points out, understand the physical workings of intelligence and all we have 
to go on is that it is the disposition to learn quickly, 'Ey intelligence', 
he writes, 'I still mean some attribute of the body, despite our ignorance 
concerning it; some durable physical state, perhaps a highly disjunctive 
one'^^ Even if 'intelligent' cannot be eliminated, as 'water soluble' can 
be into terms of the mechanics of small bodies, it will remain as an unelim- 
inable component of a few theoretical statements. It does not need to mean
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more than that, he thinks, because if an animal has intelligence, it is 
quickly, conditioned to act in a certain way. If intelligence is thus re^ » ” 
cluced, then it is not surprising that Quine also reduces mental entities 
such as ideas, meanings, propositions, and the like concepts, into 'hypo­
thetical physical mechanisms and posited with a view strictly to the sys­
tematizing of physical phenomena'*^'" If we do this, then there is no need to 
ask questions about whether a triangle we think of is a scalene one or not, 
or whether the spots on the speckled hen we think of are odd or even in 
number. Since the triangle and the spots are both hypothetical posits, they 
are not like ordinary physical objects that have shape or can be counted.
Quine also reduces percepts and perception to perceptual similarity 
on the basis of degrees of perceptual similarity. For example, a configura­
tion of seven spots proves, by experiment, to be perceptually more similar 
to the circular stripe for an animal, than to the configuration of four 
spots^^ Such a shift to perceptual similarity brings flexibility and ontol­
ogical clarity for, instead of percepts and perceptions, we can now talk of 
the episodes related by perceptual similarity as brief stages or temporal 
segments of the perceiving subject's body. In this sense, perceptual simil­
arity is subjective rather than objective, but, Quine points out, it is hot 
easy to explain a general objective similarity relation among things in the 
world. One might say that a thing is more similar to one thing than another 
if it shares more properties with the one than with the other. But then we 
are confronted with the question of what to count as a property and we are 
no further forward. A subjective perceptual similarity may still have a 
certain degree of objective validity. After all, Quine says, man's inductive 
expectations are reached by extrapolating along lines of perceptual similar­
ity; experiences that begin similarly are expected to turn out in similar 
ways. Since good prediction has survival value, natural selection will have 
fostered perceptual similarity standards in us and in other animals. It 
follows that some implicit standards, however provisional, for ordering 
our episodes as more or less similar must, therefore, antedate all learning
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and be innate.
If similarity standards arc innate, they are hereditary in the race 
and so they must be much alike. But there is no question of the subjects 
sharing receptors since the receptors of different subjects are far from 
homologous, Quine agrees with the psychologists, however, that anatomical 
homology is not necessary. All that is required is that the homology is 
relative, for what is necessary is that 'there are no physical differences 
that are apt to matter.
Perceptual similarity is, to Quine, no more than the subject's dispos­
ition to submit to conditioning in one way or in another. He agrees with 
Holt that conditioned reflexes are no different in kind from innate reflex­
es since to acquire a reflex is to acquire a neural path of lowered resis­
tance. Indeed, for Quine, that path the reflex. Such paths he sees as 
being established by the reinforcement of random movements of the foetus, 
with the innate reflexes being learned in utero, while innate dispositions 
of a deeper sort being handed down from generation to generation through 
genetic coding in the chromosome. He admits that the attribution of a 
behavioural disposition, learned or unlearned, is a physiological hypoth­
esis - an assumption of some physiological arrangement giving a satisfactory
65explanation of the animal behaviour in question.^
If perceptual similarity is basic to Quine's theory of language and 
thought, so is his 'pleasure principle* according to which an action is 
repeated because the earlier one has been rewarded and an action is avoid­
ed because a previous similar action nas been punished. Everyone is disposed
to simulate a pleasant earlier episode. As Quine puts it succinctly, 'to
66learn is to learn to have fun'.
Quine says that he is not bent upon a factual account of the learning 
of a natural language such as English. What he is content to obtain is just 
a plausible account^^ of how one might proceed to a logically regimented 
language of science, even bypassing English; hence his use of analogy from 
psychology, physics and biology and his deliberate speculation on
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the origins of language and its gradual development into a sophisticated, 
regimented and highly theoretical system of communication.
Even though the pleasure principle, as he calls it, is grounded in 
behaviour, it is still, Quine admits, a conspicuous instance of a mcntalis- ! 
tic idiom. However, he thinks that mental entities are unobjectionable I
if conceived as hypothetical physical mechanisms posited in the hope of j
their submitting some day to a full physical explanation. Language learning I 
does not require the positing of ideas having causal relations with one 
another. It has been thought that it is necessary to have ideas and con­
cepts in order to explain how men can have achieved the conjectures and 
abstractions that go into scientific theory, but Quine thinks that there
i
is a way out by talking about language - i.e., of the concrete noises 
concrete men make and the words they use all of which we can see and hear. 
Even scientific theories are in words and there are no theories apart from 
words. He agrees with the nominalist who shows that we have all learned to 
apply the word 'red* to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, and boiled lobsters.
An understanding of the mechanics of language and language learning can be 
obtained by a continuing adherence to externals with internal mechanisms, 
such as ideas or propositions, being reduced to neurological findings.
In order to account for Man's mastery of scientific theory by means 
of theoretical language, Quine thinks that we only need to study words 
which are more open to investigation than ideas, A scientific theory is 
formulated in words which are based upon the observations that support the 
theory. Learning a language is through relating its terms to the observat­
ions that elicit them. This learning process, Quine points out, is a matter 
of fact, accessible to empirical science. By exploring this process we are 
in effect exploring the evidential relation between science itself and its 
supporting observations.
Observations are therefore basic both in the support of the theory 
and the learning of language and they are basic because of what Quine calls
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their inter-subjective immediacy. They are what he says witnesses will t
agree about or disagree about, on the spot, where scientific theory is 
concerned. They are also the shared circumstances in which we learn lang­
uage from other people, whether verbally, relating strings of words to 
strings of words, or non-verbally, in the matter of non-verbal reference 
points, i.e., non-verbal circumstances that can be inter-subjectively ap«^  
predated and associated with the appropriate utterance, on the spot. This 
is ostensive learning which is fundamental - occurring when both parent 
and child see some red thing and the child learns to call it 'red*.
Because of the fundamental part observations play both in science and 
in language learning, some philosophers have been led to the verification 
theory of meaning, speaking 'too b l i t h e l y a s  Quine puts it, of the mean­
ing of individual sentences. But sentences interlock and most sentences do 
not admit separately of observational evidence for, when an observation 
refutes what Quine calls a 'chunk of theorycomprising a cluster of sen­
tences, we are free to choose which of the sentences to abandon and which 
to retain as true. Thus the link between observations and theory is intric­
ate and indirect. Similarly with the link between observations and language 
learning in which we partly associate terms or sentences directly with 
observations and partly by linking them to one another.
Observations, however, are sensory and thus subjective and it is cru­
cial to their validity that they be socially shared, as Quine says. But 
even this does not ensure objectivity since two men in the same environment ! 
may not notice the same features of the environment, nor do they necessarily 
share the same theory. Hence it is essential to talk of observation senten­
ces rather than observations, for sentences serve to pick out what witnesses 
can agree on. Quine defines an observation sentence thus;
'A sentence is observational insofar as its truth value, on any
occasion, would be agreed to by just about any member of the speech commun-
70ity witnessing the occasion.' Membership of the community, says Quine,
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means mere fluency of dialogue which can be observed by anyone, even one 
without knowing the language, Â sub-class of observation sentences is 
called by Quine an occasion sentence, that is, one that does not command 
assent or dissent once and for all time, but only variably from occasion
71to occasion. Here again we have a behavioural criterion of vihat to count 
as an observation sentence. However, the definition depends on joint wit­
nessing by more than one person, presupposing homology, beyond which 
Quine does not go,
Quine’s principle of perceptual similarity depends on the child’s 
noticing the distinctive trait shared by the episodies appropriate to that 
observation sentence. This, he says, is the unifying principle that enables 
a child to identify bodies such as Mama or Pido and to expect bodily persis­
tence. Quine thinks that this principle is innate because body-mindedness 
has survival value. The notion of body is imprecise and can give way, 
according to Quine, to the ’more inclusive, more recondite, and more precise 
notion of physical object, but, he goes on, ’any arbitrary congeries of
particle-stages, however spatiotemporally gerry-mandered or disperse, can
72count as a physical object'.
It is 'instinct', Quine thinks, that enables a child to learn simple 
terms like 'Mama', 'red', 'water' and less simple terms that require indivl 
;-duation like 'dog'. Quine traces the 'inception of the identity predicate.. iwhose sense or utility has been pondered by Aristotle, Leibniz, Locke, Hume,1
73 !Frege, Wittgenstein and Geach' to the reduction of an absolute general i
term 'dog' to a relative mass terra 'same dog as', Quine thinks that 'the 'irelative mass term "same dog as" suffices to individuate the dogs: each dog ■
consists of just the points that are on the same dog as some one point. This!
happy circumstance depends on the fact that no dogs have points in common.
A relative mass term "same circle as" would not suffice to individuate
74circles ... some ... may overlap, or lie one within the other'. This, 
however, is the primitive sense of identity which, as Quine points out.
- 151 -
identity later outgrows. Geach's theory of identity is true so long as the
sides of the identity sentence are demonstrative pronouns. There is no
sense, says Quine, in pointing twice and saying 'This is the same (one) as
that' for we can only ask 'Same what?' But when we are sophisticated enough
to make statements of identity with names on either side, or descriptions,
or variables, then, says Quine, 'we can affirm identities without relativ-
izing them. We can say outright that _â is identical with b so that whether
a is the same dog as b, or the same 'ear' as b will depend on whether a
75is a dog or an 'ear'.
Having traced the origin of identity sentences, Quine proceeds to deal 
with the more theory-laden sentences such as standing sentences and eternal 
sentences. He describes them as follows:
*A standing sentence, once assented to, remains as a standing commit­
ment for a while at least. Among the standing sentences there are, at the 
extreme, the eternal sentences. Their truth values are fixed for good, 
regardless of speaker and occasion - though speakers may still disagree 
about them, through error, or change their minds,
'An eternal sentence may be general in import, or it may report a 
specific local event. In the latter case it will gain its specificity 
through explicit use of names, dates, or addresses. The eternal sentences 
most characteristic of scientific theory are of course general'.
Quine thinks that we are disposed to assent or dissent, whenever 
asked, to eternal sentences such as 'Water is liquid' or 'Dogs are animals', 
but this is not the only role of eternal sentences. They often play an im^ - 
portant role linking parts of a theory together, including the periphery 
through the occasion sentences of which science and language imbibe all 
empirical content or meaning. Since each part of the theory and each sen­
tence can be described only by its inter-relations with the others, says 
Quine, 'there ceases to be any clear sense in asking the meaning of a simple 
such sentence at all. The sentence can be naraohrased in terms of others
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of its kind, and perhaps a substantial fabric of such sentences can be
given some joint explanation in terms of their combined net bearing on
77observations and occasion sentences'.
In the learning of language, Quine thinks that we are learning how to 
distribute truth values, and he agrees with Davidson that we are thus learn­
ing the truth conditions of various sentences. In the learning of the eteri'V 
-al sentence construction, we are learning, he says, how to judge whether 
a given pair of terms produces a true predication, true for good, or a 
false one, false for good. The sound of a word can have, he suggests, some­
what the same effect as the sight of its object, and this has enabled us to
'account for the learning of standing predications and of universal 
78categoricals'•
Even analytic sentences, according to Quine, need not be other than
empirical and social, like the rest of language. If, as Carnap and Frege
maintained, the laws of logic held by virtue purely of language and if,
as Quine maintains, language is social and empirical in origin, then, as
he says, 'we may at last have a line on a concept of analyticity: a sentence
is analytic if everybody learns that it is true by learning its words.
79Analyticity, like observationality, hinges on social conformity*. Quine 
goes on to say: 'In learning our language each of us learns to count certain 
sentences, outright, as true; there are sentences whose truth is learned 
in that way by many of us, and there are sentences whose truth is learned 
in that way by few or none of us. The former sentences are more nearly 
analytic than the latter. The analytic sentences are the ones whose truth is 
learned in that way by all of us; and these extreme cases do not differ
80notably from their neighbours, nor can we always say which ones they are*.
Quine, therefore, holds no brief for those who believe in mental en#» 
titles whether in scientific theory or in language learning. All is to be 
reduced to observation or occasion sentences, not excluding so-called 
analytic sentences or logical truths. For him, occasion sentences are
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traceable to the first words of language learning such as ’Mama* and 
’Pido' - words for bodies, later made more sophisticated as physical ob­
jects. This referential part of language learning is, to Quine, central to 
our conceptual scheme. He thinks that if we understand the psychogenesis 
of reference we could understand better reference itself, or ontology - 
that is, what it means to posit something, hence what universals are, 
analogy with bodies because of the 'superficial grammatical p a r a l l e l s h e  
thinks that we came to objectify colours or shape or to speak of queer 
sorts of objects for which we can supply no principle of individuation.
Take characters of fiction, for example, he says. Do two drafts of a novel 
have the same hero? How dissimilar can they be? How dissimilar can the 
drafts be and still be drafts of the same novel? Or take gods. Was Baal 
the devil? Were the Algonquins, in their worship of the great spirit, 
worshipping God? All these are examples of 'identity between individuals
82in different possible worlds'. They have no reality in the way that 'Hama' 
has and yet they are often treated as though they had. As he says, 'Bodies 
are the prime reality, the objects par excellence. Ontology, when it comes, 
is a generalization of somatology ... emergence of such general terms as 
'colour' and 'shape' (comes abou^ by grammatical analogy to the general 
terms for bodies ... we j^hu^ make our first faltering allusion to incor- 
poreal things. Grammar is thereby simplified, while ontology»- is multiplied'.
Similarly, Quine is convinced that classes or attributes are first 
conceived through substitutional variables for general terms by means of 
substitutional quantification cast in natural language, with the result 
that the abstracts become the purported or simulated names of classes, and 
so classes go objectual. Thus we identify a fit of ague with a segment of 
the victim's body and we can identify a battle with the physical object 
that is the sum of the appropriate temporal segments of all the combatants. 
As Quine observes, when we become clearer and more explicit in ontological 
matters we come to appreciate the urgency of individuation principles which
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are weak or wanting in the case of intensions* We also become aware of the 
problems of referential opacity and, because of the difficulties involving 
intensional entities, Quine dismisses them by saying 'out they go'^^ How­
ever, Quine realises that what objects we dismiss will depend on our ontol­
ogical framework and that it is only within the framework of the logic of 
truth functions and objectual quantification that there is no room for 
intensional entities such as prepositional attitudes.
Quine describes his philosophical position as that of relative empiri-
85cism - relative in the sense that he no longer thinks it possible to trans­
late corporeal talk into sensory talk, but that while he still recognizes 
the 'irreducible leaps' between what he calls the globally learned obser­
vation sentences and the recognizably articulate talk of bodies, he believes
in minimizing them and minimizing any further leaps that may be required for
86'further reaches of ontology'. But it would seem that any leaps Quine has 
minimized in one area have been replaced by other leaps in other areas, 
such as 'internal mechanisms* and 'neural findings'. As Bundle says, 
questions of meaning are questions of the connections of words with the
87world, 'not of intracranial connections' to which we normally do not 
have access.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In the fore-going chapters we have seen that the problems encountered 
in the analysis of belief - and of prepositional attitudes generally - have 
shifted in focus as time goes on. Russell and Moore began by diagnosing the 
problem as one concerning false belief: if a true belief corresponds to 
fact, then what does a false belief correspond to? Since there seemed to be 
no satisfactory answer to this question, Russell switched his attention 
to a new formulation. He now saw belief - and other prepositional attitudes 
- as a relation between the subject - that is, the believer - and a number 
of factors combined in a definite sequence according to whether it is a true 
or a false belief. But, as Wittgenstein pointed out, Russell was unable to 
specify in advance the order of the sequence of factors involved and so 
Russell's theory of belief or judgment, as he then called it, foundered on 
its inability to prevent a nonsense from being believed, Wittgenstein's 
own proffered solution, however, is counter-intuitive. According to his 
'picture theory' of language, he considered that *A believes that to be 
simply ' says £* - a theory that begs too many questions. Although
Russell later no longer believed in the existence of a subject, his analy 
rsis of belief took a psychological turn wbich is outside the limits of a 
logical inquiry. Frege, on the other hand, saw the problem of indirect 
speech - an example of propositional attitudes, though not considered as 
such by Frege who was not aware of the phrase invented by Russell - more 
as an infringement of the fundamental law of identity in elementary logic 
than as a question about the truth or falsity of a belief. For Frege 
realized, as Plato did, that to a believer, his belief is unquestioningly 
true. What interested Frege was that in 'A knows that £', 'A wishes that 
o', *A hopes that jp', *A says that , and so on, 'that 2.’ cannot be 
replaced by other words identical in meaning without affecting the truth 
of the whole sentence in which the subordinate clause is embedded. As 
an attempt to save Leibniz' Law, Frege's distinction between the sense and
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reference of a singular term is recognized to be a useful insight, but his 
postulation of a third realm for propositions has led to a wide debate that 
is still current. There is no single answer to the question 'Are there pro­
positions?' because some philosophers, like Quine, consider that proposit­
ions are no more than sentences while others think that there is a useful 
distinction to be made not only between propositions and sentences but also 
between both of them and a third entity called 'statements', Russell class­
ifies propositions as 'logical fictions' or 'logical constructions' together 
with tables and chairs as well as Socrates and Piccadilly. Following 
Russell, prior also calls propositions 'logical constructions'. Dummett 
finds propositions a convenient device for generalization and says that, 
though he is not committed to any sort of ontology for propositions, the 
latter are, nevertheless, independent of the language of the sentences in 
which they are formulated. Quine's latest theory about propositions is that, 
like ideas, meanings and the like concepts, propositions are 'hypothetical 
physical mechanisms and posited with a view strictly to the systematizing 
of physical phenomena'. However, Quine’s relative empiricism has to rest, 
in the final analysis, upon something 'innate' - what he calls 'perceptual 
similarity' standards which are 'hereditary in the race'. This may seem a 
complete reversal of Quine's well-known philosophical outlook but, as he 
points out, it is part of his deliberate speculation on the origins of 
language and its gradual development into a sophisticated, regimented and 
highly theoretical system of communication.
The analysis of belief and other propositional attitudes is, inevit­
ably, in terras of the language used in expressing and analysing them. This 
has led to the discussion of whether there can be beliefs without language, 
whether dumb animals can have beliefs and whether human language has only 
a social purpose. On all these related matters Popper has been able to 
throw some new light and help us to see a way through the above controver­
sies.
According to Popper^ without taking the words 'world' or 'universe'
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too seriously, we may distinguish the following three worlds or universes: 
first, the world of physical objects or of physical states; second, the 
world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behav­
ioural dispositions to act; and third, the world of objective contents of 
thought, especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art.
It is not part of Popper’s argument that our worlds might not be enumerated 
in different ways or not be enumerated at all. We might also enumerate more 
than three worlds, for instance. He uses.the term 'the third world* as a 
matter of convenience. Popper is, as he confesses, a realist in holding that 
there are a physical world and a world of states of consciousness, and that 
these interact. What Popper’s third world contains is acknowledged by him 
to resemble most closely the universe of Frege's objective contents of 
thought. The inmates of Popper’s third world are theoretical systems, prob­
lems and problem situations, critical arguments, the state of a discussion 
or the state of a critical argument and the contents of journals, books and 
libraries. The third world is, according to Popper, a natural product of the 
human animal, comparable to a spider's web. It is also largely autonomous, 
even though we constantly act upon it and are acted upon by it. It is auton­
omous in spite of the fact that it is our product and that it has a strong 
feed-back effect upon us as inmates of the second and of the first world.
Popper compares his third world to a kind of Platonic (or Bolzano- 
esque) third world of books in themselves and theories in themselves which 
are the product of human beings but at the same time there are many theor­
ies in themselves, arguments and problems which, like natural numbers, have 
never been produced or understood or may never be produced or understood 
by human beings. He holds that natural numbers are man-made, but once 
made they create their own problems which man has not thought of before.
For example, the distinction between prime numbers and even numbers is 
discovered by us - it is an unintended and unavoidable consequence of our 
creation of natural numbers. Popper considers that language itself is an 
unintended by-product of actions which are directed at other aims. Hhat is
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important about language is that it has, for Popper, four functions: (l) 
self-expression, (2) communication, (3) description and (4 ) argumentation, 
With the descriptive function of human language, the regulative idea of 
truth emerges, that is, of a description that fits the facts. The argument­
ative function of human language presupposes the descriptive function - 
arguments are, fundamentally, about descriptions: they criticize descrip­
tions from the point of view of the regulative ideas of truth, content and 
verisimilitude. With the development of an exosomatic descriptive language 
(and, further, of a written language), a linguistic third world can emerge. 
It is only in this way, and only in this third world that Popper thinks 
the problems and standards of rational criticism can develop. It is also to 
these higher functions of language that he ascribes our rationality - i.e., 
our powers of reasoning and our powers of critical argument. This shows 
Popper the futility of all theories about human language that focus on 
self-expression and communication. Most philosophers, says Popper, have 
overlooked the importance of the two higher functions of human language 
and have therefore concentrated on the two lower functions of self-express­
ion and communication. He sees the reason for this in the fact that the two 
lower functions are always present when the higher ones are present so that 
it is always possible to 'explain* every linguistic phenomenon in terms of 
the lower functions. Hence those philosophers who consider communication to 
be the only purpose of human language as well as those who think that dumb 
animals possess linguistic ability have only a partial view of the functions 
of human language. The descriptive and argumentative functions - which 
presuppose Cooper's logico-syntactic apparatus - pertain only to human 
language and so there is no possibility of dumb animals having language, 
in the human sense of the word nor of a private language like Ayer’s 
being dignified with the status of human language.
Popper's postulation of the third world also clarifies for us the 
ontological status of propositions which has been such a controversial 
topic in the philosophy of logic. According to Popper, propositions are
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•theories and, like theories, are denizens of the third world. In fact,
Popper considers them to he the most important third world linguistic 
entities. For him propositions are linguistic entities "because they are 
formulated in language "but they also belong to the third world in that once 
formulated by us they become autonomous and generate their own problems#
They do not entirely belong to the first world of physical objects as marks 
on paper or sound waves. Nor are they simply expressions of a subjective 
or psychological state belonging to the second world. They are the product 
of the second world in the form of the first world but once produced, they 
take off into the third world leading a new life with its own problems, its 
own solutions which in turn generate new problems, new theories with their 
unintended and unexpected problems - problems that we have never thought of 
until discovered by us. For example, the complete system of all true pro^- 
positions in the arithmetic of integers is not axiomatizable and is essential 
-ly undecidable. It follows that there will always be infinitely many un.*»- '
solved problems in arithmetic. Such unexpected discoveries about the third
2world are largely independent of our state of mind. Yet arithmetic is man- 
made to begin with, popper’s theory of the third world seems to give a more 
persuasive and fuller account of the ontology of propositions and of lang­
uage in general than other theories so far considered.
It was Russell^ who pointed out that the analysis of such propositions 
(by which he means sentences) as 'A believes that 2 *, *A doubts that 2 ' ; 
etc., raises two problems of great logical importance. The two logical 
problems are, he says, that of extensionality and that of atomicity.
Russell divides the principle of extensionality into two parts. The 
first part says that all functions of propositions are truth-functions, i.e. 
that, given any statement which contains as a part a proposition 2> Its 
truth-value is unchanged if we substitute for 2  other proposition 2  
having the same truth-value as 2« The second part of the principle of 
extensionality states that, in any statement about a propositional func­
tion, any formally equivalent function may be substituted without changing
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the truth-vulue of the statement, Russell explains propositional functions 
thus :
'Two propositional functions are said to he "formally equivalent" if, 
for every possible value of the variable, the resulting propositions are 
equivalent. Thus "x is a man" and "x is a featherless biped" are formally 
equivalent; so are "x is an even prime" and "x is a real cube root of 8", 
When two propositional functions are formally equivalent they determine the 
same class'.
However, Russell also pointed out that prima facie, the thesis of 
extensionality is not true of propositions asserting propositional attit­
udes. If A believes that o, and that p is true, it does not follow that A 
believes all true propositions; nor, if that 2  Is false, does it follow 
that A believes all false propositions. Again, A may believe that there are 
featherless bipeds that ahe'not human beings, without believing that 
there are human beings that are not human beings. Consequently those who 
maintain the thesis of extensionality have to find some way of dealing 
with propositional attitudes, Russell goes on to explain why he thinks the 
thesis has been maintained. First, the thesis is very convenient technic­
ally in mathematical logic. Second, it is obviously true of the sort of 
statement that mathematicians want to make.- Third, it is essential to the 
maintenance of physicalism and behaviourism as a philosophical theory.
But Russell does not consider that any of these reasons gives any ground 
for supposing the thesis true. As for the principle of atomicity as laid 
down by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus and by Russell himself in his 
Monist lectures, it is obvious today that it does not apply to propositional 
attitudes since the latter can never be expressed in truth-functional 
language. In fact, both Russell and Wittgenstein changed their minds after 
the publication of their respective theories of logical atomism.
It would therefore seem that those philosophers who try to analyse 
propositional attitudes in conformity with the principle of extensionality
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are doomed to failure from the start. As Prior points out, what is true of 
mathematics need not he true of natural language. Furthermore, in natural 
language every declarative utterance contains a (usually deleted) prefix, 
for example, 'The mountain is beautiful' may have the prefix *I think that', 
'I believe that', 'I know that', etc., deleted or understood. In the case 
of certain utterances, as Austin^ says, with ordinary verbs in the first 
person singular present indicative active, when a person makes them, we 
should say that that he is doing something rather than merely saying some­
thing, As illustrations, Austin points out that in the course of a marriage 
ceremony I say - if I am the bride or the bridegroom - 'I do' - (i.e. take 
this person to be my lawful spouse). Or again, if I tread on your toe and 
I say 'I apologize' I am doing something as well as saying something.
When I say 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth* I do not describe the 
christening ceremony, I actually perform the christening. When I say 'I 
promise that ...' I do perform an act of promising - I give a promise.
All these are what Austin calls 'performative utterances' or 'performatives' 
for short. But very often we delete 'I promise that' as a prefix and simply 
say 'I will come tomorrow' meaning that 'I promise that I will come tomor­
row'. Similarly, instead of 'I warn you that you will be in danger,' we 
often say 'You will be in danger', leaving out 'I warn you that' - the 
explicit sign of a performative utterance. This is a common occurrence 
in ordinary conversation.
In scientific discourse, as Quine points out, every statement is 
provisional or probablistic or part of a hypotnesis which is subject to 
modification. As Quine says :
'Tne totality of our so-called knowieuge or beliefs, from the most 
casual matters of geograpny and history to the profoundest laws of atomic 
physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges ... If this view is right, 
it is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual 
statement - especially if it is a statement at all remote from the exper­
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iential periphery of the field. Furthermore it becomes folly to seek a 
boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on exper­
ience, and analytic statements, which hold come wha,t may. Any statement 
can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments 
elsewhere in the system. Even a statement very close to the periphery 
can be held true in the face of recalcitrant experience by pleading 
hallucination or by amending certain statements of the kind called logical 
laws. Conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. 
Revision even of the logical law of the excluded middle has been proposed 
as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics; and what difference is there 
in principle between such a shift and the shift whereby Keppler superseded 
Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?*^
If Quine is right, then every statement that we make is only a provis­
ional statement which is open to revision at some future date. ’The sun is 
hot’ is really ’I think that the sun is hot*; 'Everyone is foolish' is 
really 'I believe that everyone is foolish'; 'All ravens are black' is a 
truncated form of 'I am sure/l know that all ravens are black'; and even 
'Two plus two equals four' is short for 'I know that two plus two equals 
four'. In other words, declaratory sentences are really expressions of 
propositional attitudes or are performative utterances. For example, 'I 
will come to the meeting' is really 'I promise that I will come to the 
meeting' and 'McEnroe is the best tennis player' is really short for *1 
state that, I believe that, etc,, McEnroe is the best tennis player'. Every 
indicative or declaratory sentence has a prefix such as 'I think that ,
'I say that •••', 'I promise that etc. deleted or understood. This
is so in scientific as well as in ordinary social discourse. In the case 
of a propositional attitude expressed as 'A says that £', it is really, 
according to the above thesis, 'I believe that A says that 2 * * I know
that A says that 2 ’ *I declare that A says that 2 S  etc. If this is 
conceded, then an old puzzle raised by Moore can be seen in a clearer light*; 
It will be remembered that Moore was puzzled by the fact that to say
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'P, and I don't believe is absurd, but it is not self-contradictory and 
does not transgress against the usual laws of logic. Nevertheless, one 
feels a sense of dissatisfaction with such a conclusion. However, if one 
were to construe '?, and I don't believe P' as a disguised or implicit 
sentential expression of a propositional attitude, then the puzzle disapp­
ears. Its explicit form is 'I believe and I don't believe P' - as 
obvious a self-contradiction as one can find anywhere. It is like saying 
'p and not-p*. In this light, Moore's puzzle can be seen to have been the 
result of an inadequate understanding of the language we daily use. 
Furthermore, if all statements are open to revision, then they express 
no more than temporary beliefs or suppositions, provisional assertions 
and probable opinions. All assertions in the form of declaratory or indic­
ative sentences are implicit expressions of propositional attitudes or 
performatives. It follows from this that the normal sentences describing 
propositional attitudes, such as 'I think thqt 2 *, 'I believe that 2 S  
etc., are explicit expressions of propositional attitudes. Similarly,
'I promise that 2 S  *1 state that 2 * > etc, are explicit performative 
sentences.
If we accept the distinction between implicit and explicit expressions 
of propositional attitudes and performatives and the thesis that explicit 
expressions are the norm rather than implicit expressions - which have so 
far been taken as standard - then we will have to revise our notion of what 
is and is not standard logic, at least for natural language. The standard 
logic of quantification, truth-functions and identity is completely adequate 
for mathematics in which whatever is true is true for all time or in all 
possible worlds. But the same does not hold true for natural language in 
which words and phrases are subject to periodical change of usage in a 
subtle way that is unplanned and does not seem to be under anyone's con­
trol, In mathematics the law of extensionality applies without fail 
because the objects mathematics deals with are numbers which do not change
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with time or place. Mathematical logic is concerned with abstract formul­
ations such as Leibniz's Law or Existential Generalization according to 
which we can infer ' (3 x)Fx * from 'Fa'. But in natural language an atomic 
sentence such as 'Fide is hungry' is not what it seems. It is not really an 
atomic sentence as such but is to be prefaced with 'I think that' or 'I 
know that' or 'I assert that', etc., so that it is really a shortened form 
of 'I think that Fido is hungry' or 'I state that Fido is hungry', and so 
on. Thus the standard sentence in a revised standard logic will be express­
ing a propositional attitude (including indirect speech) or a performative, 
so that the ordinarily accepted simple sentence 'Fido is hungry' is not 
complete, does not stand by itself and should not be taken as the norm in 
logical analysis. The norm is, I suggest, the complex sentence 'I believe 
that Fido is hungry' or 'I bet that Fido is hungry', 'That Fido is hungry' 
could be regarded as an example of Geach's 'predicable*, for instance. Thus 
if sentences describing propositional attitudes and performatives are treat­
ed as the norm for first level logic, then their analysis will not have to 
take account of the principle of extensionality that has been devised to 
govern mathematical formulations which are quite different from natural 
language expressions. Most analyses of sentences describing propositional 
attitudes try to make them amenable to the rules of standard logic, but if 
it is realized that standard logic was first invented for mathematics and 
is not suitable for the analysis of sentences extracted from complex 
sentences expressing propositional attitudes, then it would be both unreas­
onable and futile to try and make standard logic the touchstone of such an 
analysis. My suggestion is that explicit propositional-attitude sentences 
are the norm in natural language and implicit propositional-attitude 
sentences should be made explicit before they are analysed. When they are 
analysed, then the rules of the hitherto standard logic should not be 
applied to them for if they were applied it would be tantamount to insisting 
- unreasonably - that rules devised for mathematical language in particular 
should be applicable to natural and other languages.
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An additional argument in support of the above thesis is that an 
utterance is only intelligible in terms of the intention with which it is 
uttered. To adapt an example of Anscombe's, if you intend to shoot a 
suspected burglar only to find that you have shot your loved one, then 
your action is intelligible only in terms of your intention. An utterance 
is also an action and, in the case of an utterance in the form of an 
indicative sentence, it is, typically, intended to get your listeners to 
think that you, the speaker, believe something or know something or promise 
something or doubt something, etc. Hence the basic sentences are those 
describing propositional attitudes, and performatives.
An alternative, albeit linguistic, approach to a solution of the 
problems in the analysis of propositional attitudes is by way of another 
remark of Quine's. If, as Quine says, the truth predicate is a means of 
disquotation as well as a means of semantic ascent, then it is reasonable 
to think that reported speech, and expressions of propositional attitudes 
in general, offer a clear case of semantic ascent. They are language about 
language. For example, in 'John said that Martin had told him about a new 
theory of literary criticism' John is reporting in language something that 
Martin has expressed in language so that it is clear that what John said 
is on a different logical level from what Martin had said. It seems reason­
able, therefore, to regard the expressions of propositional attitudes as 
language about language - that is, as meta-language, which is not subject 
to the rules of first level standard logic. Hence it would seem that it is 
a category mistake to analyse sentences of propositional attitudes 
according to classical logic.
If indirect speech and propositional attitudes in general are seen 
to be expressed in meta-language, then one has to consider the effect on 
direct speech. Since everyone knows, as Geach points out, that sentences 
in direct speech can be easily translated into sentences in indirect speech 
and vice versa, then a change of logical status seen in one may well affect 
the logical status seen in the other. If sentences of indirect speech are
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in meta-language, then sentences of direct speech may also he in meta­
language, However, some logicians, like Quine, have considered that in a 
sentence such as, e.g., "James said 'man is mortal'", 'man is mortal' is a 
name because it is in quotes and is in fact the name of the sentence used 
by James, However, Kenny points out that the quotation "'man is mortal'" 
is not a name, for a name is a simple symbol no part of which is a symbol 
whereas "'man is mortal*" contains a series of quoted expressions each of 
which has in quotation a symbolic function peculiar to itself though 
different from the function which it has outside quotation. Kenny thinks 
that when "James says 'man is mortal'" reports James’s actual words, it 
does so not by naming his total utterance but by describing it in terms of 
the expressions contained in the quotation and the order in which they 
occur. Geach is of the same opinion as the following quotation shows:
'The rationale of using quotes is, I think, widely misunderstood by 
contemporary logicians. Instead of saying that quotes signalize a special 
use of the quoted expression, many logicians use the terms "mention" and 
"use" as though they were mutually exclusive - as though a 'mentioned'
(i.e. quoted) expression were not at the same time being used. They would 
say that when an expression is quoted, not it but the corresponding quotat­
ion is being used; and that although the quotation is physically built up 
out of the quoted expression and a pair of encircling quotes, the quoted 
expression is not logically or syntactically a part of the quotation, any 
more than the word "man" is logically a part of the word "emancipate", or 
the variable "x" of the word "six". Some logicians, it seems, would even 
deny that the quotation ""igan"" is logically a part of the quotation ""man 
is mortal""; a quotation is held to be, logically speaking, a single long 
word, whose parts have no separate significance.
'This last view is clearly wrong. A quoted series of expressions is 
always a series of quoted expressions; the quotes around a complex express­
ion are to be read as applying to each syntactically distinct part of the
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expression? and if vie fail so to read them, because vie cannot discern the 
syntactical parts of the quoted expression, then we likewise fail to under­
stand the quotation - we do not know what it is a quotation of.The quotation 
""man is mortal”” does not indeed contain the quotation ”"man”” as a 
physical part, i.e. it does not contain ”man” directly enclosed in a pair 
of quotes? hut it does logically or syntactically contain ””man”" as a 
part, for the single pair of quotes in ””man is mortal”" is to he read as 
applied to the three quoted words "man”, ”is”, and "mortal" severally. If 
we use an ampersand to mean "followed hy", then "man" & "is" & "mortal" 
is just the expression "man is mortal"; I should maintain that the quotation 
""man is mortal"" is rightly understood only if we read it as meaning the 
same as ""man" & "is" & "mortal" , i.e. read it as describing the quoted 
expression in terms of the expressions it contains and their order. This 
result - that quotation of a complex expression must he taken as describing 
the expression in terms of its parts - is vital for our purpose? if in 
"they said "let us destroy them together"" the quotation were a single, 
logically unanalysable, word and not a complex description, there would be 
a breakdown, at the very outset, of the idea that oratio recta is a system 
of decription applied in the first instance to actual written or spoken 
language and secondarily to thought.
If Geach and Kenny are correct about this, then a sentence in direct 
speech is as much a description as a sentence in indirect speech; and since 
either construction can be easily turned into the other without loss of 
sense or of truth, then sentences in direct speech are also language about 
language - i.e., meta-language and so are not to be analysed according 
to the rules of standard elementary logic.
If standard elementary logic were not to be the criterion in the 
analysis of prepositional attitudes, then the ontology of propositions 
would not be an issue. Nor would prepositional identity, synonymy and 
analyticity be considered in relation to the rules of mathematical logic.
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The question whether there are transgressions against quantifioational 
rules and against the principles of extensionality and atomicity would not 
arise. None of the traditional problems about prepositional attitudes 
would exist. A whole new logic applicable to natural language might have 
to be devised - a gigantic task, like that suggested by Geach^for a new 
modal logic of potentialities, but it would not be impossible.
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